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6Summary
This thesis compares Smith's and Hegel's social theory and in particular focuses on the 
concept o f labour and division of labour in conceptualising the positive aspects of 
modem society. I examine the shift made from the natural law and social contract 
theories of society as a form of justification of rights and power towards theories that 
argued for social reproduction and cohesion on the basis of the rule of law and the 
rationality that arises from the politico-economic role of the division of labour in 
society.
Smith set the question of the division of labour in modem society as a politico- 
economic question with socio-theoretical implications for the modem theory of 
industrial society. In other words, the division of labour for Smith is both the source 
of wealth for the modem nation and a principle for the organisation of production. 
Modem commercial society is characterised by an extensive division of labour which 
in so far as it highlights individual self-interest, serves to challenge traditional ideas of 
morality and civic morals as forms of social cohesion. Political economy as the 
modem science of society reconstructed critically, on the one hand, the political 
economy o f  modem institutions, and on the other hand, offered a moral argument that 
articulates a moral critique o f the conflicts of modem society which are extended in all 
forms of social life.
This socio-theoretical endeavour had great impact on the theories critical of 
enlightenment such as Hegel’s. Hegel, influenced by the developments in the French 
and Scottish enlightenment, made a shift from his early theological interest towards 
the socio-political conceptualisation of social developments as part of the 
conceptualisation of “objective spirit”. His early account is negative and exposed 
both the negativity of the immediate/empiricist and universal/formalist approach to the 
political science of right and modem ethical life. Labour and division of labour played 
a crucial role in illustrating the mediating social and ethical elements involved. Hegel 
was led to a phenomenological and political view of right/law labour/division of 
labour and exposed the internal logic of the dialectics of civil society and of the 
division of labour on the institutional level.
Both social theories are dealt with as a conceptualisation of the crisis and the 
reconstruction of enlightenment thought. In that respect Smith’s and Hegel’s 
arguments were complementary although they offer different formulations and 
answers on the particular question of the division of labour. The first, places 
emphasis on the political economy of modern liberty and morality in modem 
commercial society, and the second offers a historical and conceptual reconstruction 
of right and o f political constitution where division of labour is the mediating moment.
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This thesis compares the types of social theory offered by G. F. W. Hegel and A. 
Smith as two ways of conceptualising modem commercial or civil society and 
reconstructs the links between the two. Both theories made central the question of 
labour and division of labour as a form of mediation of the economic activity of self- 
interested individuals, but also as the conceptual or "rational" basis for the analysis of 
modem society. The former highlights the philosophical, and phenomenological 
aspects of labour and the division of labour, and underlines its importance as a 
structure of recognition, misrecognition and externalisation The externalisation 
through the modem form of the division of labour refers to its politico-economic 
social and moral effects on the individual labourer as well as on the level of the 
modem nation as a whole. Division of labour highlights the relations of social 
interdependence on the basis of mutual interest and thus becomes a structure of 
moderation of self-interest. To put it in a nutshell, Smith offers a systematic, 
aesthetic, politico-economic, moral argument and Hegel explores philosophically the 
contradiction of the systematic enlightenment approach showing its ethical conflicting 
nature and the forms of recognition and misrecognition involved.
For Smith the division of labour is important for the analysis of the politico-economic 
relations in the modern nation, i.e. the analysis of its positive aspects as a form of 
interdependence: first, on the social level meant the increase of the wealth o f the 
nation. Second, the intensification of social inequalities in the form of economic 
inequalities and stratification in society. Third, the re-examination of the balance
9between public and private sphere. Forth, it highlighted the importance of exchange 
on the basis of self-interest in contrast to the immediate effects on the individual 
labourer. In other words, specialisation, although it increases the skill, industry, and 
knowledge of the individual labourer, minimises the time needed to perform a 
particular task, it transforms individuals into skilled, self-interested "idiots", 
uninterested in social, political, aesthetic and religious matters.
Smith holds that the division of labour has positive effects for the whole society 
although the conflicts and contradictions that brings forward. Its positive aspect is to 
be justified in the natural disposition to barter and exchange one thing for the other, 
and the need for the assistance of one another. On the socio-theoretical level it has 
the following consequences: individuals are not perceived as self-interested atoms in a 
state of war. Instead, the individual is primarily a social, moral being with the 
“practical rationality” analysed in Smith's system o f sympathy and moral theory. The 
overcoming of the situation of the state of nature towards civilised society 
presupposes not only the foundation of the monopoly of power by the sovereign, but 
a different conception of society and socio-economic relations altogether. The 
moderated self-interested individuals, make exchanges and communications possible. 
The latter is associated with a developed system o f  division of labour which allows 
individuals to pursue their interests, which are mediated by the very structure of the 
division of labour, i.e. by producing for others and exchange. The contractarian 
distinction of the pre-social and social contractual agreement in Smith becomes 
diffused by his "four stage theory" which results in the stage of commercial society
10
with a developed division of labour. The latter stage presupposes a form of civility 
which differentiates commercial society from the barbarous society o f violence
The individualism that underlines Smith's argument is essential and his idea of 
practical rationality is reflected in his theory of just order. Justice is the primary 
public and moral virtue and is built on the basis of individuals' moral sense and 
interests The social dynamic realised by the division of labour is essential for the 
economic, social and political constitution o f the modem nation state and the rule of 
law. Thus the politics that Smith introduces, although it illustrates the political role of 
economics, does not merely function according to the doctrine of "private vice public 
benefit" or what neoclassical economics later argued for. Rather, if Smith is read this 
way then we end up with a "liberal" conception of society which undermines the 
emphasis that Smith put on the rise of social classes related to the division of labour. 
Therefore his civic idea of the well-ordered society on the basis of the different role of 
social orders in the TMS leads him into the observation of the new class of free 
labourers related to the development of commercial society and industrialisation.
The politico-economic conception of a just social order is related with the division of 
labour which “enforces” a dubious individualistic foundation of modem politico- 
economic developments It is made into a common sense principle that morality and 
moral consciousness, economic and political developments were very much influenced 
by the division o f labour and trade which led into colonisation and the
internationalisation of the market.
¡1
The introduction of the Scottish enlightenment and Smith to the continent was 
simultaneous, due to socio-political developments but also due to the intellectual links 
between the different "national" versions of the enlightenment Hegel offered a 
critique of enlightenment thought, as well as its reconstruction on a phenomenological 
and political systematic level. Hegel shared with Smith the critique of the natural law 
tradition, property right, contract, and social contract theories, on the socio- 
theoretical level. In addition he made labour and the division of labour a philosophical 
question related to the core of modem social theory, and as a form of objectification, 
recognition and misrecognition in the context of modem ethical life.
For the critique of the science of natural law and therefore of political science as a 
historical science, Hegel offered a critique of formal and empirical science of right. In 
Natural Law Essay, that led him into an inquiry on the idea of ethical life and the 
actualisation of right in modem ethical life through the construction of the modem 
nation state {Volk). This early awareness of modem political-economy led to the 
analysis of ethical life in the System o f Ethical Life labour and the division of labour in 
the Jena writings.
The study of political economy in the Jena writings was negative. Labour under the 
system of division of labour, system o f needs and exchange appeared as a source of 
horror and a challenge to the "religious" idea of the community of citizens, or of the 
civic idea of the Republic. Nevertheless, wage labour and the division of labour were 
critical for the rationalisation of the labour process on the basis of individuals’ tasks 
and led gradually to the abolition of the classic forms of slave labour. The individual's
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right, activity, resources and properties were to play an important role for the 
foundation o f  the modem nation as examined in the later political writings
Hegel, like Smith, offered a re-examination of liberal contract theories and practical 
morality by highlighting the importance of the relations of recognition/misrecognition 
or “natural deception” and the dialectics of enlightenment involved. The dilemma 
between scepticism and moral antinomies is reconsidered in Hegel’s thought in the 
context of his phenomenology and dialectics. Smith's systematic moral argument 
articulated: first, on the basis of public and social principles, second, on a critical 
examination o f the systems of morality (TMS) and of political economy (WN). Third, 
it led to the negative acknowledgement of the ethical and social nature of moral or 
systematic conflicts or contradictions and the conflicting nature o f the modem division 
of labour.
Early Hegel offered a negative view of modem ethical life that looked at the centrality 
of politico-economic relations from a phenomenological and ethical stand-point. This 
political economy is reflected on the institutional level in the way that civil society and 
the state are reconstructed in the Philosophy o f Right as ethical moments. In that 
sense, although the differences between early and later writings Hegel articulated the 
politico-economic and moral arguments in that he offers a conceptual philosophical 
and historical discussion of ethical life and of modem institutions.
Hegel and Smith offer a critique and reconstruction of the formalist and historicist 
accounts o f society, such as contract theory and the romantic organic approach of the
13
nation state as representing a community of customs and language, or o f police state 
policing the division of labour. In that sense both are enlightenment thinkers and the 
development of their social theory conceptualised the crisis, conflicts and rise of 
modem social theory. Their account of enlightenment rationality acknowledges the 
political economy of social mediations. Therefore, more than the “naturalisation” of 
reason and bourgeois society, Smith and Hegel exposed the “rationalisation” and 
“socialisation” of what was meant by natural, human and social resources and the 
freedoms and unfreedoms that this process released. The naturalisation of reason as 
the characteristic of human nature or rather its identification with instrumental 
practical reason is part of the modem "myth of reason". This dialectics of 
enlightenment “enlightened” not only the conflictual nature of modem rationality but 
also of the appropriation of social rather than merely natural resources as a social 
politico-economic relation. That is the economy of the social aspect o f the division 
of labour to be examined in Hegel’s and Smith’s systematic moral, political-economic 
and politico-philosophical writings.
The historical account of labour as slave labour, agricultural physiocratic, industrial, 
mechanical, commodified labour, became "intelligible" and reflected through the 
transformation of the concept of labour in relation to the different forms of the 
division of labour, economic, social and moral relations. Smith's work, and Hegel 
being his follower, underlines the importance of labour, in the transformation of 
society from one dominant form to another. The very role and organisation of labour 
as it is conceptually grasped by the division of labour reflects on the socially produced
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product. Due to its social characteristics and particular forms of appropriation and 
exploitation, fetishism, objectification alienation and modem freedom ensue
Hegel's account of modem ethical life analysed this complexity in a threefold form. 
The analysis of the contradiction o f property right, contract, morality, exchange, 
which led him into the analysis of modem ethical life split into individual, particular 
universal (negative universal) and universal (positive universal) moments. This 
distinction reflects the subdivisions o f the will in itself and for itself, of particular and 
general will, as realised and actualised in modem political and philosophical science. 
However, Hegel was very much concerned to show that his philosophy should not be 
read as prescription. The nature o f the politics of natural law is open and that is 
exposed philosophically as the dialectic of will actualised in modem institutions and as 
the dialectic of recognition and misrecognition in the philosophy and phenomenology 
of spirit. It presupposes the nature o f the subject matter as object reconstructed and 
there lies the subjectivity of its politics, i.e. in the conceptual knowledge of the social 
aspects and the contingency involved in the dialectics of the reproduction of right and 
will which at the same time is a reproduction of social and individual freedoms.
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Part 1
Introduction
The first part deals with Smith's social theory which splits into moral theory (TMS), 
jurisprudence (LJ) and political economy (WN). I shall reconstruct the conceptual 
links between these writings and I shall highlight the continuity and the discontinuity 
in his argument and the theoretical and practical problems that it raises. The uniting 
question for this endeavour is his conception of labour and the division of labour 
which became central for his analysis of commercial or civil society.
The first chapter examines the liberal individualistic argument of the labour theory of 
property offered by the contract theory of society and the conception of labour in 
physiocratic political economy. Then 1 examine the subjectivist theories of value and 
price characteristic of the neoclassical reading of Smith, which offers a subjectivist 
approach to Smith's ideas of value and price. Last, I examine the concepts of 
productive and unproductive labour and I offer a brief critique of Smith on the 
question of labour and value by using Marx’s historical critiques of 
productive/unproductive labour and labour as the source of value. This introductory 
chapter focuses on a historical account of the forms of labour linked either with the 
property contract or with politico-economic theories o f society. For Smith labour is 
examined in relation to the extensive division of labour and that linked the question of 
labour/division o f labour with the rise of the modern commercial society. Reading 
Smith as a liberal economist implies an abstraction of his social theory and in
16
particular of his theory of society on the basis o f the modem conception of the 
division of labour.
In the second chapter I offer an exposition of the modem concept of the division of 
labour as a politico-economic concept (Smith, Rousseau), in contrast to the accounts 
of the division of labour in the philosophical discussions of classic antiquity (Plato, 
Stoics). Two main views are contrasted: the modem concept of the division o f labour 
based on the commodification of labour and the classical view o f the division of 
labour as the principle of the just republic of free citizens and as source of innovation. 
In that sense I highlight the difference between the modem and classical conceptions 
of the division of labour which at the end of the day implied two different forms of 
societies altogether.
The third chapter deals with Smith's discussion o f the different forms of the modem 
division of iabour and its positive consequences for the increase of the wealth of the 
nation, but also the drawbacks and its alienating effects for the individual labourer and 
the class of the "labouring poor". In this chapter I also use Marx's critique of the 
division of labour, in contrast to Smith's moral critique, as a social critique and as a 
critique of the capitalist form of the division of labour based on the commodification 
of labour and the production of relative surplus value (see also chapter one). Thus the 
division of labour in its social form can be read as the "invisible hand" which takes 
place behind the backs of individuals. Last I examine some of the sociological 
arguments which dealt with the question of the division of labour as socio-theoretical 
question.
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In the fourth chapter I examine Smith's moral theory and the "Adam Smith Problem" 
or "pseudo-problem", as well as the doctrine of "private vice public benefit". The aim 
of the chapter is to highlight the aesthetic philosophical approach that Smith offers on 
the basis of his system o f sympathy in contrast; first, to a utilitarian view and second, 
to a functionalist view o f society and of moral sentiments offered by Mandeville's and 
Hobbes's idea of society based on the power of the sovereign. The basis of this 
critique is articulated conceptually by an examination of Smith's system of sympathy, 
direct and indirect sympathy, approbation and disapprobation and the idea of the 
good. The theory o f moral sentiments is presupposed also for Smith's political 
economy as a form o f moderation o f self-interest but also as condition of its 
realisation on the social level.
In the fifth chapter I deal with the virtue of justice as the primary public virtue and the 
moral foundation of commercial society with just exchanges. Just policies are proved 
to be a constitutive part of commercial society. Smith's idea of justice is supported by 
an argument against benevolence as being the principle of society, but also of the 
casuistic idea of justice which reduces the laws of justice and public welfare into 
police and justice into penal justice. In that sense Smith puts forward a normative, 
natural and politico-economic conception of justice as the presupposition of social 
peace, as the presupposition of the individual's well-being and the pursuit of their self­
interests.
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Chapter one
1. Conceptions of labour.
The transition from the contract theories of society to the rise of political economy 
was reflected in the conceptual shift from an anthropological or social contract natural 
law concept of labour to a "sociological" conception of labour. By the former I mean 
the labour theory of property as the basis of individuals’ appropriation of nature. This 
conception of labour is not ruled out by Smith's analysis o f labour in relation to the 
division o f labour. The difference lies in that the latter analysis puts the emphasis on 
the appropriation of social resources produced by the combination of individuals' 
labours. The form o f combination is the subject of the analysis of the division of 
labour.
Waldron (1994) has drawn the distinction between a social contract and a political 
anthropology. The anthropological approach, applied to the contract theory 
distinction between the state of nature and the contractual situation, is mainly related 
to the state of nature. As Waldron points out:
"to rescue Locke from the dilemma, we need to develop an account of the relation 
between the two stories which can explain the role of the usefulness of the contract 
idea notwithstanding its defects as a developmental hypothesis".1
The way he goes on to develop this relation is by an account of the relevance of 
history and what he calls the "historicity objection". Nevertheless, moral categories
Waldron (1994) p. 57.
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are necessary for the study of history and Locke's argument is resourceful for the 
questions of political legitimacy and obligation. This reading of contractarian thought 
seems to reproduce the contractarian division of the political and pre-political at the 
expense of suspending some of the issues raised in the prepolitical state as 
anthropological questions. For Dunn there lies the distinction between Locke's 
liberalism and the "sociology" developed by the Scots, and in particular by Smith's 
argument.2
In that context Smith's idea o f labour was not merely "anthropological". It was rather 
viewed historically and in relation to the physiocratic political economy which first 
drew the distinction between productive and unproductive labour. The particularity 
of Smith's political economy is that he analysed commercial society on the basis of the 
division of labour in manufacture but also its importance for the rise of commercial 
society.
The appropriation of Smith's economic analysis by the neoclassical school 
"misunderstood" the nature of Smith's political economy and "sociology". The 
neoclassical reading of Smith focused on his subjectivist theory of price, supply and 
demand, and highlighted the importance of the scholastic natural law tradition of its 
predecessors. Thus Smith was read as a liberal economist.
2 On this transition see Dunn who finds in Locke a theological argument with regard to the way he 
reconstructs the political sphere and the constitution of the political, discusses the turn which is made 
by Smith and the Scottish enlightenment towards sociology and compares Hume, Smith and Locke. 
Practical reason in Smith and Hume subordinated practical human reason to the contingencies of 
sociology, seeing history as a real causal process, but value for human beings was endangered in this 
process. Locke in contrast chose to devote his intellectual energies to shoring up human practical 
reason against the contingencies of sociology. Epistemologically the theocentric framework of 
Locke's thought was precisely to uphold human practical reason against the contingencies of 
sociology (Dunn (1983) p. 122).
The "production theories" critical of this approach developed their argument in 
contrast to the subjectivist theories by underlining the labour theory o f value and of 
production in Smith, related to his institutionalist analysis of labour in the context of 
the division of labour. The drawback of the latter theories is that they lose sight of 
how a subjectivist theory can be endorsed by a "sociological" reading o f  Smith.
Last, I examine Marx's critical view of productive and unproductive labour, and of the 
division of labour in a society differentiated by the division of labour as the form of 
production of relative surplus value. Marx's critique of the division of labour was 
used as a moral and social critique of the particular form of the division of labour.
2. From the labour theory of property to the labour theory of value.
The labour theory of property is rooted in the classical liberal natural law and contract 
theories. According to the classic Lockean labour theory of property, the individual 
has the right to appropriate the fruits of one’s labour.3 Thus labour is the basis of a 
simple idea of property and the foundation of the recognition o f  one's right to 
appropriate nature. This idea of property mainly implies the relation between the 
individual and free goods, i.e., the appropriation of natural resources through human
3 The theory of natural rights, i.e. the right to appropriate free natural goods, has been used in some 
of the recent debates and by the neo-libertarian arguments such as Nozick's which claim to draw 
from the Lockean liberal tradition of natural law. In this discussion the argument of the 
appropriation of nature is inverted to the extent that individual resources become the object of social 
appropriation or the appropriation of one's resources is socially mediated. See Waldron (1994) on 
the recent appropriation of the Lockean argument.
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effort and toil. The natural law tradition is rooted in the writings of Grotius and 
Pufendorf, and was first challenged implicitly by the contract theories' distinction 
between the pre-social and social state o f man. The very nature of commercial society 
is based on a common agreement to abandon the state of nature for rational (Hobbes) 
or "historically inevitable" reasons (Rousseau).
For Locke labour on something is the basis for the justification for somebody's 
property right in what is transformed by his/her labour, but also the right of property 
is extended to the property of one's person.4 Further, property in the fruits of one's 
own labour is the most sacred and inviolable right, and the basis for the justification of 
property. Nevertheless, his idea of labour mainly refers to a society based on 
agricultural production as the appropriation of natural resources and, as McNally 
points out, Locke returns repeatedly to the argument that landholders need protection 
from the state.5 Locke's mercantilistic economics are based on what McNally calls the 
"agrarian capitalism" whose central figure was that of rent, landlords and individual 
producers depended upon them.6
"Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet every Man 
has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any Right to but himself. The 
Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say, is properly his" .7
4 Locke John (1988) pp. 296-98
5 According to Hasbach the physiocrats borrowed the doctrine of the labour theory of value from 
Locke (Hasbach (1897) p. 690). Also the labour theory of property that Smith refers to in the 
Lectures has it roots in Grotius's natural Jurisprudence. I shall offer a more extensive account on that 
issue in chapter V.
6 McNally (1988) pp. 58, 92.
7 Locke (1988) pp. 305-6.
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Rousseau held that the nature of the origin of property is labour, despite the fact that 
on that basis is not possible to explain the extensive inequality of property in modem 
society.8 Accumulation of wealth and surplus meant the transition from a subsistence 
economy to an economy of productive development The latter is the one that 
produces for accumulation rather than merely for immediate consumption and 
subsistence The latter form of society is what he calls civil society For Smith o f the 
LJ and WN the decisive criterion to differentiate between rude and civilised forms of 
society is the degree of development of the division of labour. But that led him to 
modify the concept of labour in relation to the division of labour.
Smith's theory of labour in the WN endorsed the natural law tradition in a double 
sense; first, he examined labour in general from the view-point of labour being the 
source of value as effort and toil. Second, the "simple" idea of labour is viewed in 
relation to the analysis of the modern division of labour. The division of labour is the 
source of the productive powers of the wealth of the modem nation-state 
Smith's labour theory of value, i.e. labour as the source of value, assumes this natural 
law discussion based on the rights to property, which was the subject of a more 
extensive discussion in his Lectures given in 1762-63. In the WN Smith argues that 
the property every man has in his own labour is the original foundation of all other 
property (WN I, p. 136). But the individualist right of property, as the natural right of 
a persons is not the real core of Smith's natural law argument 9 This natural law
8 Rousseau (1990) p. 94.
9 Hume also underlined that
"Every person ought to enjoy the fruits of his labour, in full possession of all necessaries, and many 
of the conveniences of life. ... Add to this, that where the riches are in few hands, these must enjoy 
all the power, and will readily conspire to lay the whole burden on the poor, and oppress them still 
further, to the discouragement of all industry" (Hume (1975) pp. 271-2).
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argument is typical of enlightenment thought and is of particular historical interest: 
first, because it supported individual's right versus given social and property 
inequalities, and second, because it argued in favour of the abolition of slavery since 
all humans are bom free with the same natural rights (LJ (B) p. 455). What was 
important for the development of the division of labour was labour as "free labour" of 
the individual labour which was sold and produced for others
In societies with a developed division of labour the question of labour is viewed in its 
complex social basis, which presupposes accumulated stock, generalised relations of 
interdependence and exchanges and free labour. The concept of labour as dealt with 
in contract and natural law theory, but also in physiocratic thought, is different from 
the examination o f labour in the context of political economy with a developed 
division of labour. The difference lies in that the latter highlights the relation between 
labour and the division of labour as a social relation.
3. Contract theory and the rise of political economy.
The liberal individualistic orientation of natural law theory articulated how it is 
possible to justify property rights in the context of the pre-contractual state of nature 
and contractual theory of a society of property owners. Thus the individualistic 
labour theory of value in Locke's thought is presupposed to comprehend conceptually 
the property relations on which contract relations were based Therefore, a simple 
theory of labour is the basis for property right and citizenship.
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Smith, on the other hand, dealing with the complexities of modem commercial 
societies, introduces a theory of "minimum contract" as the labour "contract". His 
argument lies in the analysis of the diversity of interests and their combination under 
the system of division of labour and exchange rather than on contractual consensus.
On the level of exchange relations self-interested individuals, by pursuing their 
particular interests, contribute to the general good and also to the realisation of a 
natural concept of justice arising out o f the competition among self-interested 
individuals. The second form of "contract” in Smith's thought appears on the level of 
public deliberations and on the labour contract as the conflict over the minimum 
wage. On that level the conflict of interests and natural deception seem to give rise to 
an idea of the general good (WN B I, ch VIII, pp. 74-6).
According to Smith contractual agreement does not take into account that this deal 
may be more advantageous to the masters, since the relation between the opposed 
parties is subject to the use of force. However, contractual agreement over the level 
of wages cannot lead to the reduction of the wages below a certain rate approaching 
the limit of subsistence for the workman and his family. Thus, if the masters wish to 
maintain their advantage they have to keep the wages within a certain limit which 
permits the subsistence o f the workers (WN B I, p. 76). In other words the inequality 
of power among contractual parties had to secure the reproduction of labour as well 
as reproduction of the interests of masters in it.
In the same way the examination of the movement of the wages of labour according 
to the laws of the market and market regulation of wages is viewed on an ethical 
basis. Smith was confident that "the liberal reward of labour" would increase the 
industry of the common people, favouring the general increase of the wealth of the 
nation that will keep the level of wages on the appropriate levels (WN I, p. 91). 
Although Smith is in favour of free exchanges in the market he also highlighted that a
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"flourishing and happy society cannot have the greater part of its population in 
poverty". Social interdependence and the need for the reproduction of labour led 
Smith to an idea of a natural and ethical conception o f justice, which is the best 
guarantee of social order as just order.
In that respect the rise of political economy, as opposed to what Hume calls the 
contract theory "fiction", posits explicitly the fundamental complexity of political, 
ethical and economic interests informed by the conflicts in modem society. The 
analysis of the division of labour was the key for holding and reproducing in the most 
profitable way diverse social interests. However, as he did point out in the Lectures, 
the opulence which arises from the division of labour has to overcome a number of 
obstacles which I shall examine in detail in chapter three when dealing with his 
critique of the division of labour (LJ (B) pp. 497-451). For now I shall examine how 
Smith's liberal argument was aiming at a critique of mercantilism as the main political 
obstacle to his idea of perfect liberty.
Smith argues that the fluctuation of wage, profit, labour and the stock system tends to 
a "perfect liberty", following the natural course of things. This "system of perfect 
liberty" presupposes that every person is perfectly free to choose according to one’s 
own interest (WN B I, p. 111). Perfect liberty is not merely an ought or an 
unmovable law but it is conditioned, i.e. it "would" be achieved if a number of 
conditions were fulfilled.
These conditions were identified as policies which favoured particular interests and 
privilege traditional types of associations. However the history of mercantilism is 
long. What Smith meant by the mercantilist or commercial system was more than a 
"system of political economy", a type of commercial and money policies partial to 
particular interests they were serving. Viewing Smith's argument in its historical 
context it reflects a transitional period from the feudal form of organisation to the
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modem form of government and the construction of economic and political interests. 
Basic principles of these policies were that wealth consisted in accumulated metals 
and circulating money within the nation state (WN B IV, p. 462). Money as an 
instrument of commerce and measure of value was also the measure o f wealth in the 
context of the nation state. Thus the accumulation of metals and the restriction on 
exporting them abroad was the source of the wealth within the scope of the nation 
state. The intervention of the state for the application of these policies resulted in the 
creation of monopolies in the home or foreign markets and obstructed the natural 
distribution of stock and labour.
Smith attacked the main principle of mercantilism by saying that "wealth does not 
consist in money or metals but on what money purchases, and is valuable only for 
purchasing" (WN B IV, p. 458, B I, p. 35). Money was only an instrument of 
commerce and exchange, and its value was mainly its exchange value to purchase 
goods and labour (WN B I, ch XI, pp. 275-6). The latter is the well known "labour 
command" argument. What, according to Smith, increased the real wealth and 
revenue of the state as a whole but also of individuals, was the productive powers of 
land and labour.10 The extension of the market, division of labour and trade was the 
source for improving the productive powers of a nation and that was the source of 
wealth according to Smith Moreover, the employment of labour and division of 
labour was analogous to the accumulated capital not in metals but as commercial 
manufacture and agricultural capital (WN B IV, p. 475).
The mercantilists, since the accumulation of capital was mainly focused on circulating 
capital, orientated their policies towards coinage from the state and the monetary
10 Fumiss examines the mercantilist theories in the way they dealt not merely with the balance of 
trade and monetary policies, but also with the position of the labourer in the system of nationalism 
and of the social value of labour as "movable riches” (p. 19). He points out that it was commonly 
accepted that part of the national wealth was labour and the ways that it was used. The aspect of the 
mercantilist policies which had as a key issue the labour doctrine as the source of national wealth 
was left out by most literature on mercantilism (Furmss (1920) p. 5).
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policies regarding the amount of money circulating in the home market. A substantial 
part of their policies was concerned with the balance of trade and imports and exports 
of metals and money. This intervention was by means of taxing and keeping control 
of the balance of trade with regard to certain commodities but also by keeping the 
balance of exports and imports. Thus exports were encouraged as opposed to the 
imports, but not the export of metals and money.
This sort of interventionist policies in the home market resulted in monopolies 
following the feudal tradition of limitations on trade. However, the new form of 
interventionism was more part of the policies of the nation state which implied the 
opening of the market from the level of the feud to that of the nation state. Thus the 
monopoly of government to cut money meant the overlapping of political and 
economic power by the kings. The direct intervention in the market by the policies as 
regards metals and circulating capital but also by taxation on foreign trade had as "its 
ultimate object . . . to enrich the country by an advantageous balance of trade" (WN B 
IV, p. 159).
In the home market monopolies and privileges were more common than in the foreign 
market. In other words, corporations, vestiges of the guild system, acquired rights of 
trading as monopolies by being taxed by the sovereign political power. The classes of 
merchants were privileged in these deals compared to the farmers (WN B IV, p. 484). 
According to Smith, monopolies and the direct intervention in the market based on 
the feudal forms of control restrained the development of the productive powers of 
labour and land (WN B IV, p 123). The commercial or mercantilistic system had 
benefited more the traders and the manufacturers and not so much the interests of the 
consumers (W^ N B IV, p. 179).
That was the cornerstone of Smith's double critique of the commercial policies, 
endorsed by the mercantilists. First he was critical of the particular class interests and
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also the basis of the critique of the traditional type of associations and monopoly of 
rights protected by political intervention. This form of the state, although it drew its 
revenue from economic activities, redistributed services and rights in such a way that 
thwarted a just redistribution of advantages through market forces.11
Smith endorsed the Rousseauian distinction of the general from particular interests in 
the form that in a class society the social representation of particular class interests is 
important for the legislation of laws in the spirit of the general interest. Smith 
observed that the general interest seems to be exploited by the legislation concerning 
public policies and commerce. To avoid partiality in the representation of any of the 
social orders, and hence from the laws legislated by the public deliberation, he 
employed the idea of public interest which was closer to the interests of the 
productive classes associated with the development of manufacture. Therefore Smith 
highlights the fact that the order that lives from the wages of labour, although its 
interest is strictly connected with the prosperity of society, is incapable of 
comprehending its interest or understand its connection to the general social interest. 
The reason is to be found in the conditions in which the labourers live, and which 
make their power less regarded in the public deliberations (WN B I, pp. 277-8). He is 
very sceptical about the interest represented by the orders which live from the profits 
of stock, because their profit increases in periods of decline or narrow competition, 
which he regarded as being in opposition to an idea of the general good which seem 
to be in favour of liberalisation and against the monopoly of economic and political 
power.
11 According to Fine
"the strength of Smith's work as a whole was that he did not simply look to effect of the state 
intervention on commerce but also reversed the question to examine the determination of the state 
and its laws by commercial society" (Fine (1984) p. 46).
This approach of the modem state offered a critique of the contractarian theories of the state;
"he no longer based the state on the abstract consent of the people ... but he indentifies it with the 
equally abstract idea of the natural sentiments of the people." In other words by developing also a 
moral theory.
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Thus the problem in the "natural course o f things" with regard to social matters 
seems to originate: first, in the conflict among politico-economic interests and second, 
the way they are represented by the interventionist policies legislated and applied as 
did happen in Europe of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The characteristic 
of these policies was that they restricted competition12 by supporting monopolies and 
offered privileges to corporations. The paradox was that, though regulation was 
confirmed by the public law of the kingdom, it was evidently directed by the 
corporative spirit (WN B I, p. 133). Also in the case that "the legislature attempts to 
regulate the differences between masters and their workmen, its counsellors are 
always masters . . If it (the law) dealt impartially, it would treat the masters in the 
same manner" as the workmen's associations. But this is not always the case (WN B 
I, p. 159).13
Smith's analysis o f the political economy of commercial society offers a systematic 
explanation of the mercantilistic arguments by offering his idea of the system of 
perfect liberty supported by the development of the division of labour and just 
exchanges. In that sense, his work offers a critique; first, of the systems of political 
economy and their main principles on a conceptual level, second, of the contractarian 
views of social, political and economic relations, as the way o f  combining interests 
and third, a historical critique of the concrete policies of commercial society.
12 Smith says that competition increases with the tendency to go beyond what it naturally could be, 
because of the interventionist policy in Europe, which provides privileges and creates the unequal 
conditions for competition (WN I, p. 145). The idea of competition is thus introduced in a 
moderated degree.
13 This remark is not opposed to the views of The Theory o f  Moral Sentiments. Smith argues in 
favour of the modem public institutions and the modem state. Therefore, he is critical of the 
situation in which some panicular orders have the advantage of the government’s institutions (TMS 
P 341).
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4. The debate on value and price.
The debate on Smith's theory o f value and price is conflicting. Smith's work on the 
analysis of modem commercial society gave rise to different schools of thought which 
all somehow claim to derive from Smith's economic or politico-economic thought. In 
the context of the neo-classical school and its critique, the questions were focused on 
whether Smith has a subjectivist theory of utility and demand. The Hollander (1975)- 
Douglas (1928) debate seems to be representative of the conflicting views that claim 
to arise from Smith's analysis. The former argues that there is in Smith a subjective 
theory of utility and the latter that there is a rejection of the theory of utility and thus 
instead there is in Smith a moral argument on value.14
According to Hollander, the determination of price, as measure of value, arises within 
the equilibrium theory and Smith's idea of the market as the self-regulating 
mechanism. This self-regulation is possible on the basis of a simple model of supply 
and demand which promised to achieve perfect liberty.15 The determination of prices 
in Smith is crucial because he is the first to employ the natural law theories and 
physiocratic political economy in favour of the system of perfect liberty in the context 
of a modem market without monopolies. The root of this argument is to be found in 
the natural law tradition and it has been popular among liberal economists, who have 
pointed out that Smith had little faith in "political arithmetics".16 But then how can 
that model work in the context of the exchanges of commodities and exchange value? 
Smith mainly focuses on values rather than utility, and in particular on exchange 
value. 17
14 Douglas (1928).
15 Hollander (1973) p. 22.
16 Hollander (1982) p. 14.
11 Hutchison (1978) p. 11.
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Hutchison (1978) characterised as a revolution Smith's shift from the scholastic 
natural law tradition, i.e. Hutcheson, Pufendorf, and Carmichael.18 These natural law 
arguments dealt with questions such as scarcity and the question of subjective utility 
which for Smith could be resolved to a certain extent by the development of the 
division of labour. In the WN Smith turned away from scarcity and utility as a source 
o f value toward a labour value theory and an examination of the conditions of 
production in the WN.19 Nevertheless, Smith was concerned with the way that prices 
were determined The need to measure price is part of his historical analysis of money 
relations in the LJ which in the WN is preceded by the analysis of money In the LJ 
Smith linked value to the ideas of plenty and scarcity, a view which influenced 
Malthus, Jevons and Marshall (Manchester school).20
Bowley (1973) argues that Smith follows Pufendorf in his analysis of natural price in 
terms of the supply price. The nature of the natural price and its relationship with 
market price is the problem that Adam Smith recognises as needing to be resolved, 
but also it has been a source of contradictions in his thought.
"Dearness and scarcity are in effect the same thing. . . . So far, therefore, as goods are a 
conveniency to the society, the society lives less happy when only the few can possess 
them. Whatever therefore keeps goods above their natural price for the permanency, 
diminishes a nation's opulence."21
In this way Bowley finds in Smith an "analytical tool" for his critique of restrictive 
policies. These policies work to prevent the natural allocation of resources and 
prevent goods being supplied at the lowest price which would ensure the maintenance 
o f  their supply, i.e. the natural price. Pufendorf described market price as the natural 
common, or legal price according to the circumstances in the market, and Smith's 
natural price was the same as Pufendorfs. Following the scholastic tradition the legal
18 Hutchison (1978) p. 13.
19 Robertson and Taylor (1957) p. 181, Bowley (1963), Meek (1973b) cited by Brewer (1987) p. 9
20 Bowley (1973) p. 115.
21 Bowley (1973) p 108.
32
or natural price should just suffice to cover the proper expenses of producing and 
maintaining the supply of the commodity to the market. Where the price was not 
regulated by law, he implies that the natural price should, or would, approximate to 
the level which allows the supply of the commodity in the market .22
In the LJ, from where most of the economist's readings seem to arise, it has been 
argued Smith has no trace of the labour theory of value, while labour as a measure of 
value is mentioned only in passing after a lengthy discussion of the way in which 
money evolved as a measure of value and medium of exchange - a discussion which 
included consideration of why the value of money itself varied Although for Smith 
the introduction of money contributed to the natural opulence, opulence and wealth
does not consist in money, as I have shown by his critique of the mercantilism.
In the WN Book I ch V Smith offers a discussion of the differences between real and 
money prices and of the problem of measuring value. However, the problem of 
measuring value on the basis of the labour theory of value led him to his idea of the 
natural price. As O'Brien argued:
"The interpretation reverses the very common view that Smith's theory of natural 
price was as it were, a sound string in his analysis introduced because he found 
himself unable to develop a labour-input theory of value for an advanced society .1'23
O' Brien argued that the subjective theory of value inherited by the natural law 
discussions was not merely substituted with a cost of production theory .24
Meek analysed the cost of production of commodities in Smith as the basis to 
measure value and thus to develop a labour theory of value drawing upon natural law 
thought. The classic labour theory of value is based on the idea o f the individual 
producer's social labour. The simple abstraction that Smith starts with is that the 
exchange o f commodities is in its essence exchange of social labour Smith's theory of
22 Bowley (1973) p. 108.
23 Dennis O'Brien (1975)
24 Dennis O'Brien (1975)
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value seemed to be located on his Lockean natural law assumption that the real 
measure of value is labour 25 Smith for Meek has very little to do with theories that 
approach the problem from the side of demand (neoclassical subjectivist approach). 
The critique of the subjectivist view by Meek tends to over emphasise that demand 
and utility has nothing to do with the determination of exchange value.26 Therefore 
for Meek Smith's theory is a cost of production theory that could calculate the cost of 
commodities also in terms of money.
However, according to Meek, Smith seems to  accept that the extension of the social 
division of labour under modem conditions necessarily implied that the market was 
taking over several economic functions that had formerly been performed by other 
institutions.27 As regards the relation between natural and market price, their relation 
is to be found in the market mechanism (supply and demand).28 Nevertheless, the 
question of value in generalised exchanges focused on exchange value.
Myrdal in his account of the question of value emphases its Aristotelian roots where 
value consists in two layers: "The outer and visible layer is the theory of exchange 
value, and beneath there is a theory of real value". Smith follows this tradition and 
distinguishes between value in use and exchange value, in the same way that Marx and 
Ricardo did, Smith defines value primarily as exchange value. In their theory, 
exchange value can only be understood in relation to their real theory of value where 
labour is the measure of value.29 However, labour as a particular form of relation is 
examined in relation to different forms of societies
The inconsistency of Smith's argument on the determination of real value (on the basis 
of labour embodied) and market price, on the basis of his model of supply and
25 Meek (1973) p. 64.
26 Hutchison (1978) p. 15.
27 Meek (1973) p. 48.
28 Ibid., p. 50.
29 Ibid., pp. 61-2.
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demand, gave rise not only to the neoclassical school, but also to the Ricardian and 
Marxist labour theory of value and exploitation. The question of measuring value 
became more urgent than ever and Smith's account resulted in the dualism of price 
which could not be resolved analytically or economically. This duality is based on the 
causes that change value and the search for invariable measures of value Each of 
these paths led Smith to a particular conception of labour value or of labour as the 
basis of value. Smith's importance lies not in that he offered a rigorous theory of 
prices, instead his contribution lies in that he offered an analysis of the new social 
forms that effected the comprehension o f  the particular social and economic 
phenomena but also the way of dealing with labour theory of value in a society with 
commodified labour and extensive division o f labour.30
5. Smith and labour theory of value.
As the examination of the debate on labour theory has shown, there are diverse views 
on whether Smith has a labour theory of value. In the WN the analysis of the division 
of labour is followed by a historical inquiry into the origin and use of money The 
importance o f money as measure of value and instrument of trade led to the 
discussion o f relative or exchange value of goods. There Smith distinguished between 
use and exchange value and underlines the importance of labour in measuring values.
The first conception of the labour theory o f value refers to "the utility of some 
particular object and sometimes the power of purchasing other goods which the 
possession o f  that object conveys" (WN B I, p. 32).
The second conception refers to labour as being the real measure of exchange and 
"the quantity that somebody can command, or which he can afford to purchase" and is
30 Rubin (1926) p. 188
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the criterion o f wealth (WN B I, p. 34). A similar approach is used for the definition 
of real value o f price. "The real value of all the different component parts of price, it 
must be observed, is measured by the quantity of labour of which they can, each of 
them, purchase and command" (WN B I, p. 56). The latter is known as the "labour 
commanded" argument and is used versus the Hobbesian approach that money is the 
expression of wealth and that wealth is power. Instead Smith argues that the basis of 
power and wealth is the power to purchase and command labour, or over all the 
power to purchase and command the products in the market (WN B I, p 35). The 
quantity of labour employed is related to the development of the productive powers of 
land and labour and thus the degree of the development of division o f labour.
Third, Smith has a simple conception of labour as the labour needed to produce a 
particular product in different forms of societies.31 The labour needed is dealt with as 
the real cost, i.e. as the trouble and toil consumed for the production of a particular 
product. This conception is the invariable measure of values (WN B I, pp. 37, 41,
53)32
Fourth, is the determination of real and market price on the basis of supply and 
demand (WN B I, ch VII). This is an essential component for the achievement of 
perfect liberty.33 For feudal society the determination of price was the subject of the
31 The abstract character of labour is to be shown by the way that use value is dealt with: "Equal 
quantities of labour at all times and places may be said to be of equal value to the labourer... he must 
always lay down the same portion of his ease, his liberty, and his happiness". The two kinds of value 
do not have a fixed relation to each other; and the one cannot be the measure of the other (Bonar
1967).
32 In Smith's words:
"Labour alone, therefore, never varying in its own value, is alone the ultimate and real standard by 
which the value of all commodities can at all times and places be estimated and compared. It is their 
real price; money is their nominal price only" (WN B I p. 37) 
and then
"Labour, therefore, it appears evidently, is the only universal, as well as the only accurate measure of 
value, or the only standard by which we can compare the values of different commodities as all times 
and at all places" (WN B I, p. 41).
In the same lines he argues when comparing the rude state of society, which precedes the 
accumulation of stock and the appropriation of land (WN B 1, p. 53).
33 Smith's system of perfect liberty is distinct from both the commercial mercanlilistic, and from the 
physiocrats' system of laissez faire. For the critique of both systems see WN B IV.
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political will o f the head of the feud 34 Instead, in the commercial society based on the 
division of labour, the determination o f price of commodities and wages was more 
complex. In a way it was based on the particular developments of the modem 
extended markets and division of labour and the more complex forms of production 
In his early account in the LJ Smith first deals with the way the regulation of prices 
was done in the extended market, but also in relation to political regulation (LJ pp. 
338, 343, 345, 350).
Fifth, value is the cost of production, which splits into wage, profit, and rent: "the 
adding-up theory of value". Thus the price of every commodity corresponds to the 
three sources of revenue; wages, profit and rent The value of labour is represented 
by wages as the nominal price of the commodity labour (WN B I, ch VI). The wages 
of labour, as the particular commodity to be sold in the market, depended on the price 
of the means of subsistence for its reproduction and the increase of the demand for 
labour in the early stage of manufacture. The price of goods produced in manufacture 
fell by the increase of productivity under the new forms of organisation of labour and 
the form of production based on manufacture. It also depended on the price of com 
as the means of subsistence for the labourers but also in general for the whole society 
(LJ (A) p. 359).
Sixth, exchange value as the price of the commodity which is determined in relation to 
the gold standard (WN B I, ch V, pp. 45-7, 51-52). This implied the political 
intervention of the state in determining the quantity of money and circulating values in 
the market In other words the very possibility of commodity exchanges in societies 
with developed division of labour implied the new politico-economic role of political 
and economic power.
34 According to Cantillon, in a well-ordered society the market price of commodities does not deviate 
much from their intrinsic value. It may be the case that in years of abundance the city magistrates fix 
the market price of many things. Cited by Meek (1973) ch X.
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The division of labour has been dealt with only negatively as the necessary technical 
factor for the increase of productivity for the economist's reading of Smith or, as put 
by Smith, in relation to the natural propensity for barter and exchange Thus the 
liberal arguments focus on the analysis of the mechanism of the market and the need 
for the invariable standard to measure values which were rooted in the subjectivist 
theory of value. The idea of the division of labour, public goods, and institutions 
appear as externalities in the field of neoclassical economics and that passed to 
sociology 35 In other words they underlined that the question of value in Smith's 
thought leads to his theory of ethics and of society. The social costs of economic 
growth are to be viewed from the standpoint of the critique of the results of the 
division of labour in book V of the WN as a moral critique.36
The question of value in Smith's political economy lies in his very theory of society, as 
conceptualised on the basis of the analysis of modem economic relations on the basis 
of the division of labour.
6. Productive and unproductive labour: a historical view.
The distinction between productive and unproductive labour was not "invented" by 
Smith but was used first by the physiocrats and then was criticised by Smith. The 
general definition that Smith offers is that productive labour is the one that "adds to 
the value of the subject upon which it is bestowed: and there is another which has no 
such effect" (WN B II, ch III, p. 351). Productive labour adds value to what it works 
on so that the resulting product is more valuable than the sum of labour and the 
materials. Unproductive labour is production of services and production for direct 
consumption rather than o f durable commodities. Thus it does not add value and
35 Clarke (1991), Small (1907), Rcisman (1976). See Chapter III of this thesis.
34 Ioannidou Dissertation (1991) Ch 1 1.1, 1.2, Skinner (1995) pp. 174-9, Winch (1978), Macfie 
(1967) p. 17.
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such labour is the labour of servants, professors, and military personnel. Another 
criterion is the production of durable goods, in other words, for accumulation rather 
than for direct consumption.
For the physiocrats labour is mainly examined as agricultural labour in its concrete 
form and in a context of a restricted division of labour in the limits of the feud. 
Labour for the physiocrats is perceived as concrete labour applied for the cultivation 
and appropriation of the natural resources of the land The intrinsic value of the 
products is labour on land, mainly agricultural labour.37 According to Cantillon, 
labour is considered to be "the form and land the material to  which the productive 
activity of labour is applied".38
The division into classes is connected with the way these groups of people earn their 
living. All the inhabitants derive their subsistence and their benefits from the land 
which is not owned by them. Their dependence on the land explains their dependence 
on the proprietors of the land. The property relation to the land had a political 
significance with regard to the share of political power in agriculture-based 
economies.
The maintenance of society depends on the existence of the political order Political 
economy here is not the branch of the science of the legislator but the branch which 
deals with the population. In the naturally ordered society people are bound up 
together and that is what enables them to increase the goods the population, etc. For
37 For Cantillon the inhabitants of a state derive their subsistence and their benefits from the property 
of the proprietors of land, and are dependent on them. It is important to highlight that the relation of 
dependence or independence is considered in relation to the possession of land or capital. The 
proprietors of land derive their subsistence and their wealth from land. The proprietors of land are 
naturally independent in a state. All the other orders are dependent, i.e., entrepreneur, people on 
wages (Cited by Meek (1973) p. 20-1). A more critical view on relations of dependence in 
agricultural society is expressed as follows:
"It is the need and necessity which enables farmers and artisans of all kinds ... to work and be 
employed in the state. All these working people not only serve the prince and the proprietors, but 
also reciprocal, serve of one another" (Ibid., p. 16).
38 Ibid., p. 16
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Mirabeau and Quesnay what characterises the natural order is the way people live 
together and satisfy their needs and desires with the least possible toil and trouble. 
According to the different ways this question o f subsistence arises, the different forms 
o f societies are described.
The discussion of productive and unproductive labour reflects the separation of town 
and country and thus the interests of the town identified with that of the 
manufacturers, merchants and, in most cases, with the centralised political power. 
These developments in the cities resulted in the expansion of unproductive classes and 
were opposed to the interests o f the country; farmers, landowners and agricultural 
labour. These developments also had great influence on agricultural production in the 
following way: first, agricultural production offered raw material as the basis for the 
development of manufacture and commerce between country and towns. Second, the 
law of inheritance avoided the subdivision of land and thus the property of land was 
the inherited right of one man. That implied that the concentration of the property of 
land in one person left the others propertyless and thus free labour was used for the 
development of manufacture. Third, the development of towns opened up new 
markets and increased commerce.
Although Smith seems to agree with the physiocrats that agriculture was in the first 
place discouraged due to the mercantilistic policies followed by the central 
government which favoured the development of the cities, of commerce and 
manufactures, he points out that their division between productive and unproductive 
classes was too narrow. Due to the new developments in manufacture and then in 
agriculture the conception o f productive labour but also of productive classes was to 
be redefined. Thus the physiocratic conception of productive labour and classes as 
the ones which were applied for the appropriation of the natural resources of land was 
to be viewed under a different light. In book III of the WN Smith offers a positive 
historical account of how the increase of the role of cities and commerce was
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important for the development of trade between land and cities but also for the 
development of agriculture on a modem basis.
Mirabeau and Quesnay underlined the role of the civil law as the rule for the 
allocation of resources and subsistence. They argue against the illusory and self- 
evident basis of the modem legislator, who embarks upon the destruction o f all 
differences in customs and morals. Thus, natural law is the stand-point from which 
they are critical of the arbitrariness, violence and corruption of the princes and the 
relations in the traditional political sphere.39
The doctrine that land and nature were the source of wealth or what produces new 
values as surplus value was to be re-examined by Smith. Their idea of surplus, 
although distinguished from commercial profit made by the exchange of commodities, 
was too narrowly limited to the use of natural resources such as land and agricultural 
labour. Therefore, productive labour was only the gift of nature, or the work applied 
to  the land and productive classes the farmers, and agricultural labourers.40
Smith's examination of the question of productive and unproductive labour set the 
problem of labour on the basis of the developed division of labour. Thus productive 
labour is labour which produces durable goods which presupposed but also led to the 
accumulation of goods and knowledge, and this is the labour used in manufacture and 
organised on the basis of the modern form of the division of labour. In that sense 
Smith's idea of productive labour is not merely based on whether labour produces 
exchangeable values to be sold in the market but also of the labour commanded under 
the particular form of organisation of the division of labour. The whole o f the 
exchangeable values produced is taken as the measure of the values of commodities 
and also as the annual revenue in society. For Smith, productive labour, more than
59 Ibid., p. 105.
40 Marx (1988) V I, p. 285
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producing a surplus, is that labour that contributes to the accumulation of stock. This 
approach is what distinguishes Smith's conception of productive labour from the 
physiocratic concept but also Marx's concept of the production of absolute and 
relative surplus values of the TSV and Capital.
According to Marx's evaluation of both Smith's and the physiocrats' arguments, the 
former removed the naturalistic shell from the conception of labour. He showed that 
what is to be defined as productive or unproductive labour is generally a social matter 
in what use-value manifests itself, i.e. where and how it is applied productively. The 
main difference Smith's analysis brought out, in comparison to the physiocrats, is his 
examination of labour as such.41 Labour for the physiocrats is a definite kind of 
concrete labour, i.e. agricultural labour that creates surplus value. What they basically 
examine is the use value of the concrete labour, not the labour time which is the 
general social labour.42 The final product produced, is socially determined by the time 
spent for its production, presupposes and embodies all these techniques or factors 
which at a certain historical point are used for the production of a particular product. 
Marx highlights the importance of this development, because capitalist production 
rests in general on labour capacity. This labour capacity is bought as a commodity 
from the workers and is maintained in the form of capital and exists independently of 
the workers. The homogenisation of labour capacity is what he calls labour power, 
which is a commodity in capitalist society.
In the TSV Marx examined Smith's definitions o f productive labour, pointing out their 
double side and thus their antinomical nature. For Smith productive labour is the 
wage labour which results in the accumulation of stock and the wealth of the nation. 
For Marx it is the labour that produces surplus value and therefore capital.
4' Marx (1973) Grundrisse Introd. 1857.
42 Marx GWV, 30, p. 391.
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"The mere existence of the class of capitalist and also of capital, depends on the 
productivity of labour: not however on its absolute, but on its relative productivity"43 
Marx’s conception of surplus value is distinguished from earlier accounts in that he 
highlighted that: “Surplus value is wrongly conceived, because they have wrong the 
idea of value and reduce it to the use value of labour, not to labour time, social 
homogeneous labour".44
"These definitions are therefore not derived from the material characteristics of labour 
.. but from a definite social form The social relations of production, within which the 
labour is realized ... etc. ”.45 46 It is a determination of labour which is derived not from 
its content or its result, but from its particular social form.44 The material 
determination of labour, and therefore of its product, in itself has nothing to do with 
this distinction between productive and unproductive labour47
For Marx, the most important aspect for the capitalist form of production is that it 
produces commodities on the basis of the commodification of labour.
“A commodity - as distinguished from labour capacity itself - is a material thing 
confronting man, a thing of a certain utility for him, in which a definite quantity of 
labour is fixed or materialised. Therefore, productive labour produces 
commodities”.48 The concept of commodity however implies that labour embodies, 
materialises, realises itself in its product.49
The materialization of labour must not be understood as it appears in the form  of the 
thing. The commodity appears as past objectified labour as a form of labour capacity; 
but never as living labour itself. When Marx deals with commodities as presupposing
43 Ibid , V 31, p. 8.
44 Ibid., p 9. More on the question of productive unprodutive labour in Smith Mandeville see ibid p.
31.
45 Ibid., p. 13.
46 Ibid., p. 14
47 Ibid., p. 15.
48 Ibid., p. 19.
49 Ibid , p 26.
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the materialization of labour - in the sense of exchange value - this itself is only an 
imaginary, that is to say, a purely social mode of existence of the commodity which 
has nothing to do with its corporeal reality; it is conceived as a definite quantity of 
social labour or of money.50 The question of productive and unproductive labour 
involves the question of value.51 This analysis is offered in its most complete form in 
Capital.
For TSV the question of productive and unproductive labour is related to the 
distinction of productive and unproductive classes and their relation to the state 
Marx finds that bourgeois thinkers were critical of the state from that point of view.52 
Petty made the connection between the different types o f labour arising from 
unproductive luxury and the modem form of the division of labour. This idea is also 
to be found in Smith and Ricardo.53
Therefore, Marx's critique of the distinction of productive and unproductive labour 
focuses on whether labour produces not merely exchange value but also surplus value,
i.e. capital as the condition of the reproduction not only of labour power but also of 
capital-in-general in capitalist society. Here lies the difference between classical 
political economy and the critique of the political economy by Marx. For the former 
the relation of production and reproduction refers to the accumulation of stock on the 
basis of manufacturing production and the commercial society. For the latter there is 
a transition from manufacturing production to large scale industry and production on 
the basis of the production of surplus value.
In Capital the analysis of the different forms of the division o f labour is used for the 
analysis of the increased productivity of labour and thus the production of relative
50 Ibid., pp. 26-7.
51 Ibid., p. 29.
52 Ibid., p. 30.
55 Ibid , p. 34
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surplus value. Thus productive labour is not merely the wage-labour that produces 
surplus value but this form o f labour power which produces under the different forms 
of division o f labour. Although unproductive labour does not produce surplus value 
and exchange values directly it has been expanding in modem capitalist societies and 
tends to be a substantial part presupposed to directly productive labour. At the end of 
the day the division between productive and unproductive labour is an open question 
and is to be looked at historically in relation to the division of labour. That is the 
subject of political economy and of its critique 54
By way of concluding this chapter I should point out the complexity of combining the 
liberal theory of property and price with its sociological critique. What Smith's 
political economy highlighted was that both standpoints were to be looked at in 
relation to the division of labour and that highlighted the socio-theoretical content of 
this complexity. I shall deal with this question in the second and third chapters.
54 For a recent discussion of productive and unproductive labour and employment see also lan Gough 
(1972), Peter Meiksins (1981-2) and Jacob Morris (1958), Justin Blake (1960). The question of the 
productive and unproductive labour had been an open question in the Marxists discussion following 
Marx. As Meiksins put it, the dispute can be resolved in a way that is consistent with Marx's 
definitions of productive and unproductive labour from the point of view of capital (Meiksins (1981- 
2) p. 35).
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Chapter two
I. Division of labour as classic and modern concept.
In the following sections I shall examine the debate on the division of labour on 
whether there is a difference between a classic and a modem conception of the 
division of labour. What is at stake in this debate is whether and how the division of 
labour as a modem principle is distinct from earlier conceptions to be found as early 
as in classic antiquity.
There are two main views to be contrasted; one argues that the modem conception of 
the division of labour is not merely modem but there has also been a discussion of this 
question in classic antiquity, and thus Smith elaborated his discussion of the division 
of labour on the basis of the classical sources and discussions. This argument takes 
apart the particular aspects of the division of labour of Smith's argument in the WN 
and traces them back to the texts and discussions to be found in antiquity.
The second argument is merely modern and argues that the division of labour 
presupposes the enlightenment developments and the particular type of social and 
economic relations which are simply absent in classic antiquity. Thus the division of 
labour has to be viewed not merely on a logical level and as the concept of the history 
of ideas, but in relation to, or better as an expression of, modem forms of economic 
and social relations. In other words, instead of being the principle of the just city- 
state, it acquires a certain economic and consequently social significance which could 
not be grasped in the early stages of the "history of ideas".55 Further, it presupposes 
an analysis of the development of the division of labour and labour which were absent 
from the societies of antiquity which were based mainly on slave-labour.
55 The distinction of the modern world and antiquity' is the subject of the second part of this thesis 
where I examine Hegel's account of the distinction between the modern world and antiquity as well 
as modem ethical life and the Hellenic ideal community.
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In the last section I shall examine the way that Smith's account was influenced by his 
contemporary modem discussion and in particular by Rousseau's critique of civil 
society and political economy as distinguished from the economy of the oikos in the 
Greek polis- state.
2. The division of labour and history, history of the division of labour.
Smith was not the very first thinker to observe the importance of the question of the 
division of labour, although he was the first to highlight its centrality for the analysis 
of the modem nation and industrial developments The idea was adopted by a number 
of modem thinkers dealing with economic, social and moral questions, such as David 
Hume (1739, 1752), James Harris (1741),56 Mandeville (1705, 1714), an anonymous 
writer dealing with the foreign trade in India (1701), William Petty (1690), Hutcheson 
(1755), Rousseau (1755), the French physiocrats in the Encyclopedia (1751) 57
There has been a discussion of whether Smith's idea of the division of labour had its 
source in the modem French enlightenment thought or in the classical debates to be 
found in the classic texts of antiquity. Each of these claims led to a different reading 
of Smith's work. The first emphases the importance of Smith's thought as a modem 
thinker and as a labour economist and the second, reads Smith as offering an 
anthropological, historical and philosophical argument.
56 According to Foley (1975), Harris's Essay Upon Money and Coins was not published until 1757. 
Skinner and Campbell (1976) point out that even earlier than that a discussion on the question of 
labour is to be found in Josiah Tucker in an anonymous publication called Considerations on the 
East-India Trade 1701 p. 34.
57 The first volume came out in 1751 and the volume relevant to the division of labour discussion did 
not come out until 1757. According to Foley, Smith's familiarity with the classic sources very much 
precedes this edition of the Encyclopedia.
47
According to the latter view a conception of the division of labour is to be found as 
early as Plutarch's analysis of Egyptian society. Plutarch refers to the division of 
labour in his description of the organisation of labour in ancient Egypt Also in Plato's 
politico-philosophical thought, the division of labour becomes the principle according 
to which the ideal and just Republic is organised, i.e. on the basis that "each citizen 
devotes himself to what he is best fitted fo r1'.58
Foley (1975) offers a precise and detailed account of how Smith became 
knowledgeable of the classic philosophical texts, tragedies and other literary texts in 
their original language. That is reflected in his early writing and teaching on his 
Lectures on Rhetoric, Belles Letters, and the Essay on Astronomy. Foley argues that 
Smith's source of the division of labour is not modem but has its roots in classic 
antiquity.
Foley traced the "bits" of Smith's argument to their classic sources. Thus, by 
comparing Smith's account with classic texts, he sought to find their similarities. 
Xenophon in his Cyropepaedia59 argued that:
"the proof of the advantages of economic specialization is a comparison of a degree to 
which the division of labour can proceed in the large cities as compared with the 
countryside."60
The distinction between cities and the countryside is to be viewed on the basis of the 
division of labour, but also on its immediate effects to increase economic advantage 
and specialisation
58 Plato in his Republic starts with the discussion of justice between Thrasimakus and Socrates and 
on the level of the organisation of the Republic. Justice is defined as the just allocation of positions 
to each citizen on the basis "to what he is best fitted for". Foley mentions that Plato's account of the 
division of labour in the Republic as the mode o f  subsistence is related to the distribution of gift and 
skills by Zeus. The Gods had a debate on whether or not to model the distribution of gifts and talents 
on the same basis as the distribution of skills involved in the division of labour.
59 Cited by Foley VIII, ii, pp. 5-6.
60 Ibid., p. 221.
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Even the "butcher, brewer, baker" example of the WN seems, according to Foley, to 
have its source in Xenophon's "baking bread" process on the basis of the family 
household.61 Although both processes refer to the simple forms of the division of 
labour I should point out there is a distinction between the two. The baking bread 
process in the first case refers to the relation between distinct professions, or at least 
skills, and thus exchange and dependence among individual producers. The second 
refers to  the process o f baking bread on the basis of the household as the physical 
division o f  labour among the members of the household
Smith's argument on invention and the innovation of the artist, as well as the evolution 
of early government, is to be found in Seneca's letter. Seneca argued against 
Posidonious, who claimed that all invention stems originally from the cogitations of 
philosophers that;"the novel devices were more likely to be hit upon the common 
workman who is exposed to the manufacturing process in his daily life".62
Smith combined somehow both arguments by mainly referring to the invention of the 
machines on the basis of the division of labour and invention of tools and machinery. 
In Smith's words:
"I shall only observe therefore, that the invention of all those machines by which 
labour is so much facilitated and abridged, seems to have been originally owing to the 
division o f  labour. Men are much more likely to discover easier and readier methods 
of attaining any object, when the whole attention of their minds is directed towards 
that single object,..."
and then
61 Ibid., p. 221 fot., 10.
62 This was also quoted by Mandcvillc in the Fable o f  the Bees Cited by Foley Mandeville (1924) ed. 
F.B. Kaye, Vol. 2 pp. 143-45. cited by Foley p. 223.
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"A great part of the machines made use of in those manufactures were originally 
the invention of common labourers raised out from skill and practice acquired by 
repetition and judgement acquired practically by the use of the machines".
However,
"many improvements have been made by the ingenuity of the makers of the machines, 
when to make them became the business of a peculiar trade; and some by that of those 
who are called philosophers or men of speculation ... the principal or sole trade and 
occupation o f a particular class of citizens" (WN B I, p. 14).
To put it in a nutshell, Smith does not exclude that the use of a machine can result in 
invention and finding simpler ways of completing particular tasks. This idea seems to 
be more productive when applied to an extended division of labour and also can result 
in the advance of the division of labour by creating new branches of the division of 
labour and thus expanding the division of labour further.
Foley offers an apparently documented proof for his hypothesis that the division of 
labour is not to be found in modern French discussions but in the classic discussion of 
the division of labour. To support his argument he also refers to Smith's idea of 
history and his idea of the evolution of government and the just organisation of the 
city.63 Thus he observes that Smith's "four-stage theory" is very similar to Plato's idea 
of the evolution of the different forms of societies and of government 
"the job of attempting to uncover intellectual origins is a tedious one, and one which 
usually can never be brought to completion".64
McNulty, in reply to Foley's article, pointed out that his research is much more 
concentrate on the similarities between Smith and Plato than on their differences, and 
from that perspective tends to be one sided If Smith's argument is viewed from the
63 Republic 369 D, Laws 320C-323A etc. cited by Foley pp. 225-6. See Skinner (1965), Meek (1971) 
and their extensive publications on Smith's theory of history known as "the four-stage theory” dealt 
with in the LJ. See chapter V of this thesis.
64 Foley (1975) p 242.
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perspective of the difference between Smith and antiquity then, according to 
McNulty, the importance of Smith’s economic argument for his analysis of labour is 
highlighted.
Thus he focuses on the following points: first, that Smith's idea of justice differs from 
Plato's. For Plato the just city on the basis of the division of labour was connected 
with some form o f occupational stratification and labour immobility. In Plato the idea 
of the "natural calling", which was vividly presented in mythological terms, appeared 
as being the subject of debate among the Gods This model is very much 
differentiated from Smith's naturalism related to his idea of exchange. And to move a 
bit ahead in history, Smith's naturalism is also different from what is known as the 
"comparative advantage argument". For Smith exchange is the source of the division 
of labour and his naturalism is to be found in that he sought to justify it in the rational 
human disposition to barter and exchange, in the same way that is in need of the 
other's cooperation. Thus for Smith, taking into account his analysis o f labour on the 
basis of the division of labour, the "natural talent and gift" or "the comparative 
advantage argument" is less important for his argument. As he points out in the LJ, 
the modem organisation is contrasted to laws supported by the Sesostris that "every 
man should follow the employment of his father" (LJ (B) p 492). Thus the law of 
inheritance and custom is very much presupposed and challenged by the modem 
division of labour and the multiplicity and liberating aspects arising from it.
McNulty finds the importance of Smith's argument not so much in the stratification 
and immobility of labour, even if that is according to the prescriptions of the just city, 
but in the very nature of the modem division of labour to have changed the 
conception of labour altogether. Labour organised on the basis o f the division of 
labour became an essential homogeneous factor of production which is the root for 
labour mobility on the basis of its being "free labour" to be bought and sold, which 
also presupposes the simplification of tasks due to the organisation and subdivision of
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labour into simple tasks In that sense, Smith was critical of corporations and long 
apprenticeships and he offered an argument o f the "liberal reward of labour" with the 
cost of the commodification of labour, alienation of the labourer and the need for 
institutionalised education.65
From the standpoint of the theory o f society, the economy of the polis was based on 
slave-labour which was questioned in the philosophical discussions. Nevertheless, the 
abolition of slavery, as against the law of "human nature", was only posited by 
Enlightenment thought and became legalised by the bourgeois civil codes. What 
therefore distinguishes the modem division of labour from all earlier conceptions, 
according to Smith, is the accumulation and subdivision of stock which allowed the 
application of the division of labour, wage-labour and the legal abolition of slavery, 
and also, as Marx pointed out, the division o f labour is an economic principle and not 
the just principle of the Republic.66 The very nature of society and political economy 
as the root of modem sociology as a separate discipline and result of the division of 
labour is absent from the philosophical or historical accounts of antiquity.67 The 
"separation" of the political and economic is presupposed for the modem division of 
labour or it is to be put on a different basis.68
65 See Uno Pagano (1989) for a discussion of the division of labour.
66 Marx Capital pp. 488-9.
67 Marx points out that
"Political economy, which first emerged as an independent science in the period of manufacture, is 
only able to view the social division of labour in terms of the division of labour found in 
manufacture" (Capital p. 486).
68 This made possible the introduction of factory legislation to protect labour as a resource of social 
reproduction and at the same time the rise of social movements such as the Chartist movement with 
the demand for the length of the working day (Capital part V). This use of the separation of the 
economic and the political seems to be very much different from Aristotle's distinction of oikos and 
polis. Aristotle in his Politics deals with the division between the oikos (household based on slave 
labour) and polis (city-state based on the relation between citizens).
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3. Division of labour and Scottish Enlightenment.
In contrast to the earlier arguments, Hamowy (1968) offers an account of the dispute 
between Ferguson and Smith on who was the first to underline the importance of the 
division o f labour.69 More than the question of who owns the idea, which according 
to Ferguson had a French source anyway, it is of interest to develop why this idea was 
important not only for Ferguson and Smith.
Hamowy points out the similarity between Ferguson and Smith on the following 
points: first, they both refer to the example of the pin manufacture. Second, the main 
difference between Ferguson's and Smith's argument is that Ferguson granted priority 
to the sociological implications of the division o f labour or the psychological costs of 
the sociological consequences of the increasing subdivision of employment.70 Social 
stratification and separation between intellectual and manual labour, elevation of 
sentiment, liberality of mind, are identified with a certain class of people in a stratified 
society.
Hamowy seems to underestimate the importance of economic thought in the Scottish 
enlightenment. Both Ferguson and Smith were Hutcheson's students, and familiar 
with the moral discussion of the division of labour in the context of Hutcheson's moral 
philosophy but also of his predecessors Pufendorf and Carmichael. Hutcheson took all 
his economics from Pufendorf and Carmichael which was integrated into his moral 
theory. For Hutcheson the division of labour was founded on the natural propensity 
observable in the most natural social form of life such as the family.
69 According to Marx, Smith was Ferguson's student while he distinguishes between the social 
division of labour and division of labour in manufacture under the control of the capitalist. As has 
been pointed out, Ferguson seemed to be more aware of the undemocratic effects of the division of 
labour in society in general. So in that sense Ferguson could be the student of Smith. But I shall 
also underline that Marx's distinction between social division of labour and the division of labour in 
the workshop contrasted the lack of rights under the power of the capitalist with the idea of the 
citizenship and owner of one's labour, i.c. as subject of rights which are sold at the same time that the 
labourer enters the factory. State legislation was to secure these rights. Capital p. 483.
70 Hamony 1968 p 2S7.
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In the System o f  Moral Philosophy, Hutcheson deals with the concept of the division 
of labour as part o f the question of the human disposition which is taken as naturally 
social, presupposed to its social effects in the increase of productivity and 
interdependence. This social disposition is not forced into the disposition to exchange 
as in Smith's analysis. The human disposition is interpreted as the law of nature, 
which is an apriori law and, in addition, according to the common good of all. What 
is unnatural is the alienation from the natural community which leads men to isolation 
and melancholy.71 72 Both Smith and Ferguson in their analysis of the commercial or 
civil society seem to be grounded on the naturalistic and moral approach to the 
division of labour. However, their analysis developed in different ways.
The concept of the division of labour is the organising principle for the simple forms 
of social life, i.e. the family. Sociability is found initially in the family
"The mutual aids of the few in a small family, may procure most of the necessaries of 
life; and diminish dangers, and afford room for some social joys as well as finer 
pleasures. The same advantages could be obtained more effectually and copiously by 
the mutual assistance for a few such families living in one neighbourhood ... and 
would furnish more joyful exercises of our social dispositions.1,72
This approach is supplemented by the habits acquired just by being a member of some 
sort of community and with regard to the division of labour he refers to the natural 
subdivision of tasks. As a result of that some grow experts in something and the 
execution of labour in the system of divided labour is object of the joint labours of 
many skills in concert. Thus people acquire what is necessary for their subsistence 
and the conveniences for the enjoyment of life.
71 Compare with the idea of the ethical life to be found in Hegel's' Natural Law Essay. The 
naturalism of the social character of man reminds one very much of Aristotle.
72 See Hutcheson as cited by Meek p. 29.
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Exchange and the division of labour in its proper sense are said to  take place in the 
market where commodities are exchanged for money. That already implies the search 
for value as a means of exchange but also of a universally recognised medium of 
exchange. In the case of money in the form of metals it had the stamp of the state to 
avoid fraud among merchants.73 45
"The public faith of the state is interposed by these stamps, both for the quantity and 
purity, so that there is no occasion for assays or weighing or making divisions".74
However, it is not exchange "which increases wealth; it is industry which is the natural 
mine of wealth" .75 This analysis of the division of labour and exchange seems to have 
been very influential for both Ferguson and Smith, although modified. Both Ferguson 
and Smith emphasised mostly the importance of the division of labour and the rise of 
commercial society, although they did not leave out natural dispositions developed in 
the simple forms of social life which were seriously affected by the expansion of 
commercial society.
At the time that Smith was delivering his LJ, Ferguson was writing his Essay on the 
History o f Civil Society76 For Ferguson's account of civil society, the subdivision and 
separation of arts and professions arising from the development o f the division of 
labour and commercial society was of fundamental importance. Ferguson 
distinguished between the "mechanical arts" and "liberal arts of reflection and 
fancy".77 He underlined the subordination of the former arts to  the latter. This 
distinction, and the problem of subordination of one form of arts to others, was also
73 Hutcheson (pp. 30, 33), cited by Meek, See also Skinner (1995) who argues for the link between 
Hutcheson's economics and theory of money and Pufendorf De Officio Book 1, ch 14 cited by 
Skinner p. 174.
74 Ibid., p. 33.
75 Meek (1973) p.,40. Compare this argument with Smith's account of the way that the division of 
labour increases the industry of the people.
76 See Meek's and Skinner's (1973) research of the development of the idea of the division of 
labour in Smith's thought.
77 Ferguson (1966) p. 182.
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linked with Ferguson's speculation on the "political" consequences of the expansion of 
the division of labour78 The reason for them being distinct and some subordinate to 
others is acquired by the habits of the different arts, the difference of natural talents 
and dispositions, and the inequality of property. Physical and social inequalities led to 
changes in the moral sentiments of people and into their corruption. In Ferguson's 
account of the division of labour and commercial society, moral, economic and social 
aspects of the division of labour seem to overlap in the examination of the history of 
civil society.
Smith, in the LJ (1762-3, 1766) refers to the question of the division of labour in 
commercial society under the title of police, which is a subdivision of the examination 
of the principle of justice.79 Police initially meant the regulation of government in 
general, and it had its roots in the ancient Athenian commercial society "politeia" 
which signified the policey (policy) for the well-being of the polis of its citizens and 
the laws of the polis. However, Smith's observations on the division of labour mainly 
refer to the modem form of commercial society and the modem division of labour and 
the way that police and justice are related with the modem developments.80
In modem commercial society police as policy was meant to be: first, a form of 
regulating the inferior parts o f  government and the execution of justice in so far as this 
was concerned with the prevention of crime and the methods for keeping the city 
guarded (LJ (B) p 486) Second, police was concerned with the regulation of the
8 Hirschman argues that Ferguson was more willing to speculate than Smith with regard to the 
political consequences of the economic expansion. In other words, Ferguson was not as optimistic as 
Smith was with regard to the expansion of the economic sphere (Hirschman (1977) p. 112). Gellner 
(1994) of the dangers of the "modular" aspects of civil society see chapter eight on Adam Ferguson.
79 1 shall examine Smith's political and moral argument on the question of justice in a separate 
section since it seems to be fundamental for his thought as a whole. It first becomes the subject of 
examination in the TMS (moral argument), then in the LJ (negative justice in relation to the civil 
government and property) and WN (as the just natural order and the social justice argument). Thus 
justice was not merely a way of protecting the rich against the poor, i.e. a negative concept of justice, 
but also a concept of justice with regard to social inequalities (WN B V 236) and thus the foundation 
of social order.
80 See also ibid., ch V.
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security o f communications, exchanges, commerce, and regulation of the market, i.e. 
the price of commodities. Third, it was directing the operation of market exchange, 
and secured by just means the prevention of injuries and crimes against property 
Fourth, it secured order, contracts on the basis of the protection of private property. 
Thus police carried on the execution of Justice in the streets and the application of 
regulations for the prevention of crime (LJ (B) p 486).
In that sense the division of labour, more than being a principle of production 
corresponded to the eighteenth century political and social developments, 
presupposed for its being the form of organisation of the pin manufacture. Smith also 
refers explicitly to the developments that took place in France and to the particular 
regulations taken "for the cleanness of the streets" and the new poor concentrated in 
the cities being at the same time the "free labour" or the "labouring poor" which were 
the basis for the development of manufactures.
The expansion of the division of labour into the different spheres of social life implied 
the need for regulations, but also it was a result of historical developments examined 
by Smith in the LJ and the WN. Smith offered an extensive account of the separation 
of city and country, agriculture, manufacture and the accumulation of the different 
forms o f capital. The accumulation of capital was presupposed for the modem form 
of the division of labour.
In that context, the division of labour, more than being examined in its natural social 
form as by Hutcheson in the context of the family or the principle of the polis, became 
the principle of modern society and of political economy. In Smith's words, the object 
of political economy was to inquire into how revenue or subsistence for the people is 
produced and provided "to supply the state with a revenue sufficient for the public 
services" (WN I, p. 449).
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Although the way that the two thinkers deal with the question of the division of 
labour overlaps, there are also some distinctive differences Ferguson relates the 
question of the division of labour with an analysis of the history of civil or commercial 
society, which to a certain extent is similar to Smith's, though he does not use the 
"four-stage theory" that Smith uses for his historical analysis of society in general and 
of commercial society in particular. In the secondary discussions Ferguson was dealt 
with as the predecessor of sociology and his work reads as Smith without the 
separation into moral philosophy, jurisprudence and political economy.
With regard to the question of division of labour he mainly offers a sociological 
analysis of the division of labour and underlines its drawbacks, i.e. moral and social 
corruption. Smith, in the last part of his LJ and the ED, discusses the division of 
labour in the context of his analysis of commercial society. His orientation however is 
an analysis of the politico-economic, moral, and social relations, which resolve into 
the WN analysis of the division of labour. Before moving to this subject I shall offer a 
brief account of Smith's discussion of Rousseau, which was probably the French 
source that Ferguson referred to, as Hamowy reported.
4. Rousseau Smith: a social critique?
According to Ferguson the idea of the division of labour has its source in the 
discussions in France.81 Smith was primarily a moral philosopher and followed closely 
the developments at the time on science and natural history in the continent In 
particular he became interested in political economy developing in France not only 
through the Physiocrats and Encyclopedists but also by Rousseau's critical views.82
81 The same holds also Viner who located the source of the idea of the division of labour in 
Rousseau's Discourse on the Origins o f Inequality.
82 The five first volumes of the Encyclopedia had appeared by 1755 the same time as the Discourse 
on Inequality and were purchased by Smith for Glasgow University Library cited in the EPS p. 245.
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Smith's Letter in the Edinburgh Review had the tone of introducing its readers to the 
on-going discussions in the continent. In that context Smith offered a review of 
Rousseau’s publication of the Discourse on Inequality (1755). He compared 
Rousseau's work with Mandeville's in the way that they address; first, the division 
between civilised society and second, the presocial state of nature. This comparison 
appears plausible if viewed from the perspective o f the way that both thinkers 
reconstruct "society" and the state of nature or savage life. Rousseau's principles, 
according to Smith, "softened, improved, and embellished and stript to all that 
tendency to corruption and licentiousness which has disgraced them in their original 
author".83 This original author was Mandeville and in particular the second part of 
"The Fable o f  the Bees" which Smith thought was the source of Rousseau's 
Discourse ,84 However, their accounts are very much different when it comes to the 
question of the division of labour. For Rousseau the division of labour was the source 
for inequalities and thus was a determinate feature of his negative view o f civil 
society. For Mandeville it was the way of combining "private vice with public 
benefit" and essential for the advance of society as a whole.
Rousseau pointed out the split between the two senses of economy into general or 
political economy and the domestic or particular economy. Economy derived from 
oikos, to be traced in the Aristotelian thought, it "meant originally only the wise and 
legitimate government of the house" which looks after "the common good of the 
whole family". For Rousseau the subject for examination is what he calls the general 
political economy and from that perspective is to be examined the relation between 
the family and the state, oikos and subsequently the law of the family and the state
83 EPS 250
84 Colletti commenting on this debate argued that Rousseau's critique of civil society was not 
moralistic but historical. Smith's critique of Mandeville, he argues, was rhetorical rather than 
substantial (Colletti (1972) pp 209-210).
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law 85 Thus Rousseau draws the distinction between general or political economy and 
domestic or particular economy.
"Even if there were as close an analogy as many authors maintain between the State 
and the family, it would not follow that the rules of conduct proper for one of these 
societies would be also proper for the other"86
The need for regulation and law in Rousseau's thought becomes a question for the 
legitimation of government on the basis of the conflict between natural law and 
positive law, o r domestic government and civil government. This conflict in 
Rousseau's thought paradoxically resulted in making Rousseau known for his social 
contract theory rather than for his Discourses. The central theme in the Discourse on 
the Origin o f Inequality is Rousseau's inquiry into the source of inequalities in 
civilised society.87 Contrasted to the pre-civilised state of nature Rousseau attempted 
to explain these inequalities on the basis of property inequalities: first, in the given 
titles of the ownership of land and second, on the basis of labour and division of 
labour arising out of social and natural differentiations. In that sense, Rousseau 
offered a negative view of civilised society as the source that "ruins the human race” 
as opposed to the state of nature free of social inequalities.
Smith puts these questions in a different way, albeit the inequalities of civilised 
societies are characterised also by the general increase of the productive powers of 
labour, land and wealth in general, which is to the benefit, in one or another way, of 
the larger part o f  the population.88 Comparing civilised or commercial with primitive 
societies Smith observes that the social inequalities between higher and lower ranks or 
common people increase. In addition, people in civilised society with an established
85 The origin of th is distinction is to be found in the ancient Aristotelian thought as the 'oikos' based 
on the family law which "meant originally only the wise and legitimate government of the house” 
which looks after "the common good of the whole family".
86 Rousseau (1990) p. 117.
87 Rousseau (1990) pp. 84, 94.
88 See Adam Smith Letter to the Edinburgh Review in EPS, Colletli (1972), West (1971).
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social order are submitted "to restrain their judgement on social and political matters", 
according to the interest of society in general. Instead in the barbarous society "every 
man too is in some measure a statesman" but also "in such a society indeed, no man 
can well acquire that improved and refined understanding, which a few men 
sometimes possess in the more civilised societies". 89
In that sense the division of labour and the centrality he gave to it made Smith's 
analysis of commercial society very different from Mandevile's and Rousseau's. For 
Smith the disadvantages of the division of labour are not merely due to the division of 
labour but in their combination with the commercial spirit and mercantilistic policies 
which divided the population between privileged and unprivileged in commercial 
societies. Yet, the invisible hand as deus ex machina was to lead to the general 
increase of opulence. In the next chapter I shall move into a discussion of Smith's 
argument on the division of labour and the early challenges of his argument.
The importance of the modern form of the division of labour for the social theory of 
the eighteenth century, and in particular for Smith, is that, on the one hand, he pointed 
out the importance of the division of labour as a technical concept, but also, on the 
other hand, as a form of social relations which were the subject of change. In other 
words,: the division between agriculture and manufacture, country and cities, freedom 
of labour, disappearance of traditional forms of organisation of the guild system, 
expansion of the market, systematisation and generalisation on the international level 
of commodity exchange. The division of labour as division of branches of production 
and different forms of capital superside the division of labour in manufacture as 
subdivision of tasks.
89 WN pp. 303-307
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Chapter three
1. Division of labour: social or economic principle?
This chapter examines Smith’s account of the division of labour: first, what I call the 
complexity of the naturalism of the division of labour in relation to commodity and 
money exchanges Second, the different forms of the division of labour in modem 
society. Third, Smith's remarkably positive but also sceptical account of the effects of 
the division of labour in societies with social and economic inequalities. This 
examination of Smith's argument aims at highlighting the sociological elements in his 
thought as they are presented conceptually in the analysis of the division of labour
On the one hand, he points out its positive effects for the whole society as the source 
of wealth, multiplicity, opulence, liberality of mind, change of professional structure 
and thus as having a central economic and social role for modem society. The 
division of labour was more advantageous than other forms of organisation in 
organising the labour process but also as the social combination of resources and their 
use for the increase of the opulence of the whole is that very form of co-operation 
The division o f labour contributed to the intensive accumulation of stock and wealth 
but also resulted in the increase of the advantages for the nation as a whole.
On the other hand, the division of labour re-enforced social distinctions and 
inequalities. The application of the division of labour in the labour process led to the 
distinction of social classes, enforced the division of labour between the countryside 
and the cities, manufacture and agriculture.
Finally, the idea of natural coherence, cooperation and interdependence, as realised in 
the labour process, seemed to be threatened by the increase of the alienating effects 
for the "labouring poor" who were employed mainly in manufacture and under the
62
organisation of the division of labour. Thus the egalitarian idea of equal self - 
interested individuals was in conflict with the developments associated with the 
division of labour on the social level and social stratification. That is the limit but also 
the importance of enlightenment thought.
2. The "complexity" of the naturalism o f the division of labour and exchange.
"But when the division of labour has once been thoroughly introduced, the produce of 
man's own labour can supply but a very small part of his occasional wants. The far 
greater part of them are supplied by the produce of other men’s labour which he 
purchases with the produce, or, what is the same thing, with the price of the produce 
of his own. But this purchase cannot be made till such time as the produce of his own 
labour has not only been completed, but sold." (WN B II, p. 291).
The complexity of the modern division o f labour lies in its particular social character 
and it has a constitutive role for the comprehension of commercial society. Modem 
commercial society presupposes a developed division o f labour and exchange. The 
modem division of labour implies systematic exchanges and commodity production, 
but also a particular form of social co-operation and moderation of individuals' 
egoistic activity. Individuals produce, and thus satisfy their needs, by producing 
commodities in order to sell them in the market.
In book I in the WN the division of labour, "is not the effect of human policy or 
wisdom but is a natural’ consequence o f the common human disposition, altogether 
peculiar to men." The natural disposition to truck, barter or exchange, is the source 
of the division of labour between persons who act in concert on the basis o f their self- 
interest. Nevertheless, more than a natural disposition, it is an expression "of a 
disposition common to all men" and on this basis it is natural (WN B I, p. 17) 90 The
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foundation of individual's rights and the basis on which it is possible to exchange and 
distinguish "that is mine, that yours", may be the assumption of the simple idea of 
labour as effort and toil which is the source of property rights (WN B I, pp 17, 72, B 
II, p 136). The simple model of exchange of one thing for the other on the basis of 
persuasion and the mutual recognition of common interests is the natural disposition 
that gave occasion to the division o f labour. Therefore the division of labour and 
exchange are developed together.
The argument in favour of the division of labour is based on the practical observation, 
that "it saves toil and effort" to be skilful in the production of one product and then 
exchange it for something else, rather than producing all goods that one requires. 
Producing for others results in that not only effort and time spent on the production of 
one good is saved, but also more goods are produced and of better quality. Thus it is 
more advantageous for both the individual and the society as a whole to be specialised 
in the production of one thing and then exchange the surplus for something else. In 
turn, production in modern society is production for exchange, and more precisely 
production of commodities which have primarily an exchange value and are to be sold 
in the market
The paradox in a society based on a complex form of division of labour lies in that 
labourers produce primarily exchangeable values, rather than use values for the direct 
satisfaction of their needs Therefore, needs are complex, in the sense that their 90
90 The marxian critique of Smith lies in Smith's naturalism in the explanation of the division of 
labour, i.e. that it arises from the natural disposition to exchange and bargain but also of being in 
need o f  the assistance of others. Therefore, Smith did not distinguish between division of labour in 
manufacture and the social division of labour. Marx comments on that:
"While the division of labour in society at large, whether mediated through the exchange of 
commodities or not, can exist in the most diverse economic functions of society, the division of 
labour in the workshop, as practiced by manufacture, is an entirely specific creation of the capitalist 
mode of production" (Capital p. 480).
"But in spite of the numerous analogies and links connecting them, the division of labour in the 
interior of a society, and that in the interior o f a workshop, differ not only in degree, but also in kind. 
The analogy appears more indisputable where there is an invisible bond uniting the various 
branches of trade" (Marx 1988 p 474).
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satisfaction is mediated by exchange and exchange values. It becomes a common 
sense principle that it is more advantageous to specialise on the production of one 
kind of good and then acquire other goods through exchange. Producers produce to 
satisfy need in general as an abstraction, and produce products which do not have a 
direct use value. The very idea of individuals’ self-interest to satisfy their immediate 
or mediated need is subject to a social relation and not merely a relation between two 
self-interested individuals. Bargaining, although it does apply to a certain extent, 
cannot support on its own an argument for social theory.
The modem exchange relation is very much a specific social relation, rather than one 
merely to be found in a human disposition. For Smith the simple principle to exchange 
and bargain rooted in human disposition seems to be somehow the foundation of the 
complex exchange relations in modem society. That is not altogether wrong. The 
difficulty arises when trying to look at modern complex relations as what nature 
demands or as a natural law. Smith does not make much effort to analyse the latter, 
he rather uses argument such as the “invisible hand” to analyse the sources of wealth 
for modem society with the best possible use of natural resources. His analysis, 
although it had to comply to the laws of nature and perfect liberty, is not to be 
approached "naturalistically" at first sight. This gap is filled by his idea of practical 
reason as the individual's natural disposition. In addition, when conflicts arise Smith 
seems to return to the naturalism of the invisible hand as the deus ex machina for the 
justification of his argument. The latter can be read as the "naturalism of the social" 
as it appears in the particular historical form of social relations, instead of the natural 
justification of the social. Nevertheless, what is important to highlight is that the core 
of his analysis is based on the key role of the division of labour and exchange relations 
and in the way that they give occasion to modern commercial society.
There lies the difference from the natural law argument as the appropriation of nature. 
From that respect Smith reformulates the classic liberal contract and natural law 
theory of the "robinsonian" type, or of societies organised on a community basis, first
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by introducing his theory of the division of labour as the adequate conceptual basis for 
the analysis of commercial society.
Marx posits the question: "What is it that forms the bond between independent 
labourers and the cattle-breeder?". The bond between them is the fact that their 
respective products are commodities to be sold in the market 91 For the early 
developments of modem society this contradiction of the social being taken as natural 
or the natural as social raised the awareness that the expansion of the division of 
labour in its particular universal form indeed involved a complexity which laid in its 
very social form. The analysis of the latter led to the social critique of modem 
society One of the early provocative critiques was offered by Mandeville. By 
clouding the distinction between vice and virtue, Mandeville offered a provocative 
critique of the traditional moral theory and shifted the interest from a moral to a social 
critique. For Mandeville the complexity of commercial society on how to combine 
"private vice" with "public benefit" was resolved in the best possible way through an 
extensive system of division of labour and exchanges. He also suggested that 
sometimes vice should also be employed in social matters instead of employing good 
motives. Thus he described modem society in the following terms:
"... by society I understand a Body Politick, in which Man ... is becoming a Disciplin'd 
Creature, that can find  his own Ends in Labouring fo r  others, and each Member is 
render'd Subservient for the Whole, and all of them by cunning Managment are made 
to act as one. ... under one Head or other Form of Government each Member is 
render'd Subservient to the Whole" (emphasis added).92
For Smith the developed form of the division of labour also implied a civilised society 
with central civil government, even if its head for Smith is the "wise legislator". 
Social cohesion and peace as a social value can be seen as the common characteristic
51 Marx (1988) p. 475.
92 Mandevillc on division of labour Vol. I pp. 347, 356-8, Vol. II p. 284; and elsewhere, on civilised 
society Vol. II pp. 349-50.
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among men who wish to exchange, rather than merely rob one another and through 
the exchange of commodities acquire the goods they need to satisfy their individual 
needs, i.e on the basis of mutual self-interest. Exchange relations are based then not 
only on the individual's needs, but also on what Smith calls self-interest as the 
common sentiment of particular individuals participating in the process of exchange 
(WN B I, pp. 17-19). In other words, for Smith the complexity of modem society is 
resolved by the key role of the division of labour in organising conflicting self- 
interests, and resulting in co-operation than merely being disciplined under the burden 
of political power. There is where the difference lies between Mandeville or even 
Hobbes and Smith. The latter, in both his moral theory and his political economy, 
highlighted the importance of forms of social coherence either in the context of the 
system of sympathy or in the context of the division of labour.
The emphasis of the positive aspects of social coherence sets the context in which it is 
possible to satisfy self-love on the basis of moderation among self-interested 
individuals who agree to exchange on the basis of their common interests. Moderated 
in the sense that it presupposes a sort of commercial ethics and civility, but also as 
the very nature of the division of labour as rational and moderating form: as Smith put 
it in book I, using the means of persuasion rather than merely a relation of power and 
violence.
On that level his social theory introduced in the WN presupposes his moral theory and 
the structure of sympathy and recognition as social value and virtue. But I shall deal 
with this question in the examination of Smith's theory of moral sentiments in chapter 
IV where the locality of the small community is extended to the level of the nation 
state. The social form of the division of labour, suggested by Smith, is contrasted to 
earlier forms of societies where one community exchanged its surplus with other
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communities, as suggested by Hutcheson 93 The modem "spontaneously" developed 
division of labour, at the end o f the day, presupposed the fragmentation of 
"spontaneously" established social links and the reconstruction of social bonds on the 
basis of the system of sympathy in the moral philosophy or of the principle of the 
division of labour and commodification of labour.94 Labour becomes a commodity 
producing other commodities and not directly producing use values (WN p. 56). In 
that sense the traditional idea of productive labour as concrete labour applied in land 
was changed by its becoming manufacturing labour which was not merely an 
appropriation of nature but an appropriation of combined social and natural resources
The naturalistic justification of exchange and the division of labour on the basis of a 
natural disposition certainly finds its limits in international trade among nations, but as 
a form of justification of exchanges on the basis of a "universal" equivalent. When 
Smith deals with trade among nations, the balance of trade, monopolies etc. seem to 
create obstacles to the idea of perfect liberty. The latter may be achieved in the 
simple model o f the market on the basis of the national economy, but it seems to be 
more difficult on the international level. According to Smith, in the situation of 
perfect liberty both parties benefit, however, not to the same degree as practice has 
shown. Inequalities are presupposed and affect exchanges in general (WN Vol., I, pp. 
513-14, 519, LJ pp 511-513).
Summing up this section, I shall point out that for Smith the complexity of civilised or 
modem society is viewed from the perspective of the division of labour as the 
economic but also the particular social form of interdependence and moderation 
characteristic of commercial society. The virtue of Smith's argument is that he did not
93 As I have mentioned, Hutcheson also had an idea of a natural division of labour as the basis for 
simple social formations such as small communities, family and associations. He followed up the 
Aristotelian argument on the social and political nature of man (Hutcheson cited by Meek pp. 29-
30)..
94 See Smith's analysis of accumulation of the different forms of stock and capital, division of country 
and cities, agriculture and manufacture (WN Vol I, B II, III).
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merely assume and use the naturalism of a particular social form but that he went 
beyond this assumption to offer a conception of modem commercial society and its 
particular conflictual nature. The complexity of commercial society was made more 
explicit with the development of the division of labour in manufacture.
3. Division of labour in manufacture.
Smith used the example of the pin making manufacture to illustrate analytically95 how 
the division of labour improved the productive powers of labour and became the 
source of opulence and of the wealth of modem nations (LJ (A) pp 341, 6). In the 
Lectures, to make his speech more vivid, Smith used the example of the lecture room 
(LJ (A) p. 86) to demonstrate that co-operative work is more productive on the 
whole than is the individual's labour separately. The immediate results of the 
application of the division of labour in the labour process in manufacture are described 
as follows:
First, the division of labour improved the dexterity and skill and the quantity of the 
work that the individual workman could perform. That became possible by the 
simplification of the labour process into simple operations.
Second, by the concentration of the labour process in one place and the simplification 
o f the particular operations, time was saved which was lost by passing from one 
labour to another That at the same time minimised the work needed for the 
production of the product as a result of the combined activity of many tasks fulfilled 
by the labour of the particular workers.
Third, the machinery invented and applied in the process of production, simple 
initially, was invented by the workmen specialised in a particular operation and thus as 
a result of the application of the division o f labour invention was advanced. Thought 
was employed in production and thus judgement on how labour was to be applied.
95 Dugald Stewart emphasises the analytical aspect of this examination. See his essay in EPS p. 311.
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Invention in less developed forms of the "division of labour" was rather accidental 
Practical innovations and improvements have also taken place in other forms of the 
division of labour, where repetition and development of the skill led into discovering 
new simpler ways of accomplishing certain tasks.
Smith draws a distinction between accidental improvements by describing the modem 
form of the division of labour, which presupposes the application of thought to 
machinery and the use of inventions and speculation in a purposeful way. Apart from 
the employment of thought in production, the result of the division of labour is also 
the development of speculation in general, i.e. as the pleasure of speculating and thus 
inquiring "simply in the reason of things" which does not necessarily have a specific 
application (WN B I, pp. 19-20).96
Nevertheless, the application of thought and speculation to the labour process led into 
the gradual introduction of what Marx will call later, analysing the capitalist large- 
scale form of production, the use of science for the purposes of capital. Marx, in 
describing the difference between the labour process in manufacture and the way that 
it gave rise to the factory or large-scale production, emphasised the importance of the 
use of thought in the development of the labour process. In this way the modem 
form of the division of labour invented new forms for its reproduction and 
transformation into more simple subdivided but also advanced forms. In manufacture, 
the introduction of the division of labour in production led to further specialisation 
into particular branches and trades. Thus, innovation became the task of a particular 
class of citizens-machine-makers and philosophers and speculation was introduced 
into the process of production (WN B I, pp. 13-4). The multiplication of branches 
and skills is what Smith calls the liberal aspect of the division of labour, which
96 This speculative development as the result of the division of labour is what gave rise to the 
distinction between applied science and philosophy. This idea of speculation was already in Smith's 
TMS, where the idea of speculation in everyday life is connected with the aesthetic idea of the system 
and the order of the system. For the idea of the system in Smith see Ioannidou (1991) Dissertation 
(Ch II 2.1,2 2).
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resulted in the further specialisation among the different professions and thus created 
what he calls the liberal professions.
"Philosophy itself becomes a separate trade .. .The philosophers, having each their 
peculiar business, do more work upon the whole and in each branch than formerly" 
(LJ (A) p. 347).
The commercial society based on this form of division of labour increased universal 
opulence, and the multiplication of branches o f social production as a result of the 
social division of labour (WN B I, p. 15). This progress is considered not only on the 
level of social opulence, but also in the way that production and thought are socially 
used, divided and employed in the labour process. In the contemporary debates on 
the division o f  labour this development was the source for the separation between 
manual and intellectual labour.97
Overall, the introduction of the division of labour was celebrated by Smith due to its 
positive results in saving labour, at the same time that it increased the opulence of the 
country as a whole and the wealth produced by the employment and combination of 
its resources on the basis of the division of labour. Therefore, the division of labour 
was the primary cause for the increase of public opulence, but also was "proportionate 
to the industry of the people"98 and consequently the industry of the people was 
proportionate to the division of labour. To put it in a different way, it rationalised the 
use of labour and industry, but also increased the advantages arising from it.
97 Alfred Sohn-Rethel discussed the separation between manual and intellectual labour. Reading 
Marx of the Gotha Program Rethel argues that the question of the division of labour coincides with 
that of class divisions. However, this identification has to be examined historically and logically (p. 
7). He also deals with Smith's political economy as having offered a positive approach of the social 
good, and as having naturalised the production of commodities. In addition, the class antagonism of 
capital and labour is linked intrinsically with the division of head and hand (Sohn-Rethel (1978) pp. 
36-37).
98 This argument is to be found first in Hutcheson.
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The "technical" division of labour as a form of organisation of tasks in manufacture 
involved another aspect which was not clear in the earlier forms of the social division 
of labour In other words, this particular form of the division of labour, apart from 
increasing the revenues and the product, also highlighted the nature of production as 
co-operative. In that sense the social aspect o f the division of labour, which can be 
viewed with regard to its results, had a double effect: first, increased intensity and the 
co-operative character of production and second, this became "measurable" in the 
increase of benefits and wealth.
On the socio-theoretical level, that had a great impact on the division of labour, 
which, apart from being a form o f organisation of a particular branch of manufacture, 
was also the way of generating itself in more complex and developed forms resulting 
in economic progress. This progress is considered not only on the level of social 
opulence but it also effected different aspects of social and moral life in the 
implications of the intensification of the contradictions of private property as 
presented by the early liberal thought but also the intensification of social inequalities 
on the basis o f the inequality of revenues.
Therefore, the division of labour being the source of wealth, was also the source of 
intensification of social interdependence expressed in economic but also broader 
social terms as social and economic inequality. In economic terms the division of 
labour results in the increase o f the socially produced product, revenues, but also in 
new forms o f producing revenues. It also presupposed the accumulation of capital 
and centrally organised production which was presupposed to the subdivided, simple, 
technical form of the division o f labour These aspects of the division of labour were 
more specifically related with the division of labour in manufacture, and later with 
factory labour and mechanisation of the productivity released by the division of 
labour
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4. Division of labour as the particular social form of co-operation.
Smith's Early Draft on the division of labour saw co-operation and dependence 
between independent artists as follows:
"The woollen coat which covers the day labourer, as coarse and rough as it may 
appear to be, could not be produced without the joint labour of a multitude o f artists. 
The shepherd, the grazier, the clipper, the sorter of the wool, the picker, the comber, 
the dyer, the scribbler, the spinner, the weaver, the fuller, the dresser, must all join 
their different arts in order to make out this very homely production Not to mention 
the merchants and carriers, who transport the materials from one of those artists to 
another..." (ED p. 562).
The division of labour in manufacture made simpler and more explicit the 
interdependence between different skills needed for the production of goods The 
increase of the public opulence was due to the co-operative form of production on the 
basis of the division of labour on concentrated capital. The social aspect of the 
division o f labour is to be found; first, in the co-operative form of production as 
combination of tasks and skills. The organisation of production on the level of 
manufacture made private purposeful activity or particular tasks more explicitly 
social. Second, the combination of different branches of production in the labour 
process corresponds to the combination of the different forms of capital employed in 
the production process. Third, the distinction of the different forms of revenue on the 
basis of participation in the labour process as labour, land and stock, result in the 
distribution o f the opulence produced in this process being split into the money 
revenues of wages, rent and profit.
The division of labour as the co-operative form of production is the combination of 
the different operations and skills in the labour process. This co-operative form, in its
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social form, is represented as the purposeful activity which leads into the production 
of the final product and the increase o f the productive powers of labour. Also it is 
represented in the particular purposeful form of the organisation of production as 
subdivided into particular tasks.
The same principle "seems" to apply on the level of the separation of branches of 
production and the way that these branches are linked on the basis of their different 
operations The modern form of the division of labour that Smith examined was, on 
the one hand, based on the social form of co-operation as the combination of different 
tasks, skills and professions and branches, but also as the natural and social form of 
relations which resulted from the further accumulation of stock and capital
The organisation of the modern form of the division o f labour made possible a 
combination and development of the productive powers of labour and land, but also 
the accumulation of stock as circulating and fixed capital. This accumulation of 
capital was to be used productively on the basis of the division of labour. The 
division of labour was a form of organisation and use of socially accumulated capital 
and its further reproduction and accumulation. The social relations involved as a form 
of co-operation, but also as the form o f organisation of labour, can be considered as 
part of the constant of fixed capital. The social division o f labour is related to the 
developing and accumulation of constant capital and with the process of its primitive 
accumulation"
In Marx's analysis of the division o f labour in manufacture, it is pointed out that the 
labour process was formed on the basis of isolated groups o f workers who performed 
a particular specialised function which is made up of homogeneous tasks. These 
groups of workers constituted parts o f  a total purposeful co-operative "mechanism"
”  Perelman assumes the marxian view point where capital is viewed as a form of social relations and 
value is the expression of labour accumulated into capital (Perelman (1981-82) p. 43).
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"The organisation of its group is based on the division of labour, but the bond 
between the different groups is simple co-operation, which by using in common one 
of the means of production ... causes it to be consumed more economically"100
Co-operation in manufacture in its simplest form was the simultaneous employment of 
many people making parts of the same product. This form of co-operation arising 
from the concentration of the factors of production in a certain historical moment, is 
the expression of an organic relation, as a social form of co-operation which does not 
cost anything to the capitalist.
Smith was the first to point out the importance of co-operation as the particular 
factors participating in production which resulted in universal opulence. In addition, in 
making explicit the importance of co-operation he also highlighted before Marx the 
political economy involved in the appropriation of the increase o f the product under 
this form of production. Smith was optimistic that the division of labour results in the 
improvement of the position of the whole of the population on the national level, 
despite the social inequalities. In capitalist society, as analysed by Marx, this co­
operative "mechanism" is appropriated by the capitalist and it costs nothing to him but 
it results in a class society on the social level.
There is a number of questions raised as soon as the focus of the analysis o f the 
particular form of co-operation on the basis of the division of labour in manufacture 
shifts to the question of distribution of the product and its subdivision into different 
revenues. The co-operative production of opulence and wealth presupposes a 
particular form of property relations. Thus the division of labour, although it seems a 
rational form of distribution o f revenues, presupposes the accumulation of stock as 
private ownership and thus private property relations as formed historically. The
100 Marx (1988) p. 467.
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latter does not imply that the co-operative form of production which is the source of 
opulence on the national level can not be organised on a different basis On the 
contrary, although on the analytical level of the analysis of the division of labour this 
historical aspect of the distribution of revenue and of the social product is 
presupposed, it can either be appropriated by the capitalist or analysed on the basis of 
the "political economy" of the different interests involved.
Although overall Smith offers a positive analysis of the division of labour and of its 
co-operative form, he was also the first to offer a critical view of it in the particular 
historical form it takes in commercial society when looking at the different interests 
arising from different revenues and forms o f capital employed productively in the 
labour process In that sense the division of labour and distribution of revenues seem 
to put forward a complexity o f conflicting interests which lay claims on the socially 
produced product and through that of the resources appropriated in this process.
5. Accumulation and division of labour
What is assumed for the division of labour in manufacture, apart from "free" barter 
and exchange, is the accumulation but also subdivision of capital (WN B II, p. 291). 
This idea of capital includes the different forms of resources and combines productive 
powers in the labour process. It also presupposes, as Smith has shown in the third 
book of the WN, the separation of agriculture and manufacture, which was followed 
by the formation of cities and thus the separation of country and cities. This historical 
account is also to be found in the lectures, where the celebration of the positive results 
of the division of labour is conditioned by factors that slowed the progress of 
opulence. Therefore, although the immediate tendency of the division of labour is to 
improve the arts and increase opulence, this progress was slowed down due; first, to 
natural impediments and second, to the oppression of civil government (LJ (B) pp.
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521-541). By the former is meant that there can not be a division of labour without 
the accumulation and division of stock, and by the latter, the government was too 
weak and feeble to protect the industry and the individual's security which was in 
danger from the continuous wars among barbarous nations but also robbery on the 
highways. This "uncivilised" situation retarded the accumulation of stock required for 
the division of labour to flourish (LJ (B) p. 522).
Even after the establishment o f the first manufactures, progress was slow caused by 
several factors such as the type of labour used, which was initially slave labour. This 
form of labour did not encourage the improvements of the division of labour (LJ p 
526). Merchants were greatly obstructed to pursue trade and they had to buy their 
liberty to trade in particular localities as an irrational form of taxation (LJ p. 527). 
The imperfection of contracts, the protection of the monopolies of staple towns, 
intervention in exports and imports, were social and political obstacles to the 
development of the division o f labour.
After the fall of the Roman Empire the greatest part of the land was possessed by 
proprietors, but also there was a big part which was uncultivated. The practice which 
was followed as regards the succession of land ownership was that of primogeniture, 
which avoided the subdivision of land by alienation into small parts. The law of 
primogeniture was related to family distinctions, and this system benefited only one 
member of the family and kept the land undivided but left the others under the 
situation of beggary or free labour to be sold in the market .101 The cultivation of land 
was possible under a variety o f obstacles which did not allow further improvements. 
The production and use of the surplus product was restricted to the limits of the feud, 
and the restrictions of trade, robbery, lack of police made transport and 
communication difficult. Licences required for exportation and trade were sold by the
101 On the different forms of succession as forms of protection of the property of land see Smith's 
Lectures (LJ (B) pp. 460-464). On the inheritance law (Ibid., pp. 464-5)
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landowners of the feuds (WN B III, p. 418). The rise of the towns and the 
development of commerce led to the need for regular civil government. The
contradictions between the lords, princes, king and the burghers led to the support of 
the regular government whose territorial jurisdiction was extended further and gave 
rise to the need for the codification of law as the civil law.
In an agriculture-based economy the extent of the "division o f labour" was rather 
limited, compared to the division of labour which was properly introduced in 
manufacture. The process of the division of labour between manufacture and 
agriculture, town and country, was a historical process. It took place in Europe after 
the decline of the Roman empire and of feudalism, which was the system to organise 
agricultural production in the country and was connected to the guild system of 
towns, corporation and apprenticeships (WN B I, pp. 132-160).
Political intervention prompted the development of manufacture and commerce in 
turn prompted the development of agriculture. The latter offered the raw material and 
free labour for manufacture, and the former new markets for the surplus product of 
the more intensive and organised use of land. Instead of producing at the level of the 
feud and the local market, it was now producing the raw material to be further 
processed by manufacture in the towns. The systematic and extensive exchanges, 
foreign commerce and later colonisation led to what is know as the industrial 
revolution and the division of labour in its particular modern form.
For this relation between country and town Smith says that there was a mutual and 
reciprocal gain for both sides and for the different persons employed in various 
occupations (WN B III, 401). The surplus produced in the country was concentrated 
in the market of towns. But this already presupposed the progress of agriculture, 
increase of production and accumulation of surplus.
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The analysis of the modem form of the division of labour as examined in its simple 
form above, highlighted also its particular socio-economic and historical aspects. 
Historical, to the extent that Smith examines the transition o f one form of society to 
another, i.e. from the feudal form of organisation and the guild system of cities, to the 
modem extended market and division of labour in commercial society. Socio­
economic, in the way that Smith's argument compares different forms of societies on 
the basis of the degree of the development of the division of labour but also the 
analysis of the particular form of division of labour in commercial society.
The extension of the division of labour was very much dependent on the extension of 
the market and social and political developments, and in return contributed to its 
expansion since the purpose of production was to produce for the market The 
extension of commerce and the market led in turn to a further expansion of the 
division of labour (WN B I, ch III). The idea of the market which was located in the 
limits of the feud for feudal society was to be expanded on the international level. 
That meant the transition from feudalism to the modem nation state, but gave rise to 
the international division o f labour and the colonial system (LJ pp. 355-6).
6. Division of labour and distribution of universal opulence.
"It is the great multiplication of the productions of all the different arts, in 
consequence of the division of labour, which occasions, in a well-governed society, 
that universal opulence which extends itself to the lower ranks of people" (WN B I 
15).
In the WN book I the division of labour is the cause of the improvements of the 
productive powers of labour and the product of it is "naturally" distributed among the 
different ranks of people. The division of labour could be the natural way of 
distributing social benefits without any government intervention. However, as the
discussion of the earlier section and the above quote shows, these optimistic views of 
the division of labour presupposed what Smith calls a "well-ordered" society. Smith's 
celebration of the division of labour lies in that it was more than a form of production, 
it was also a form of natural distribution of the advantages and opulence arising from 
it to all ranks in the well-ordered society.
Smith's economic readings argue for the economic advantages of the division of 
labour such as the increase of productivity and universal opulence. This form of 
increase of opulence is also a form of allocation of resources in the particular way that 
it is beneficial for the society as a whole, taking for granted social divisions into 
different ranks and classes. The well-governed society occasions the universal 
opulence and multiplication o f production as a consequence of the division of labour 
and exchange between people in society.
Thus the modem division of labour offered the solution to social coherence and thus 
became a form of combining together different interests but also resources. More 
than being an economic principle, it also became an expression of the social bonds 
justified on the economic level and thus supporting the relations of interdependence 
on the basis of an idea of the social benefit.102 Nevertheless, this view presented in the 
WN is contrasted to earlier views in LJ and the ED.
Smith, rather than offering a purely positive analysis of the division of labour, was 
rather more critical. In both LJ and his ED, preceding the WN, he points out that the 
distribution of advantages arising from the division o f labour is not merely "natural".
"It is the division of labour which encreases the opulence of a country. In a civilised 
society, tho' there is indeed a division of labour there is no equal division, for there are
102 MacNally underlines that Schumpeter, Spiegel, and Meek, have praised W. Petty in relation to 
classical political economy that was the originator of the concept of interdependence through the 
division of labour and of modem income analysis (MacNally (1988) p. 35).
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a good many who work none at all. The division of opulence is not according to the 
work. The opulence of the merchant is greater than that of all his clerks, tho' he 
works less; and they again have six times more than an equal number of artisans, who 
are more employed. ... Thus he who, as it were, bears the burthen o f society has the 
fewest advantages" (LJ (B) pp. 489-90).
"... with regard to the produce of the labour of a great society there is never any such 
thing as a fair and equal division. ... on the contrary those who work most get least ... 
" (ED pp. 563-4).
The combination of the labour of many labourers working together led to the increase 
of the product o f their individual work but also the intensification of labour for the 
individual labourer. Under the division of labour, each individual confines himself to a 
particular branch of business, and can alone account for that superior opulence which 
takes place in civilised societies, and which, notwithstanding the inequality of 
property, extends itself to the lowest member of the community (paraphrase ED p. 
564).
Smith came across the "complexity" of the division of labour in a divided society 
based on the inequality of property and revenues, which though the inequalities in 
comparison to earlier forms of society seems to have improved the standards of life 
for the common labourer (WN B I, p 16). Nonetheless, that does not imply that his 
argument with regard to the division of labour loses its importance. Even in societies 
of inequality the opulence is to be distributed naturally to all social ranks. The degree 
of social divisions and inequalities is very much connected to the development of the 
division of labour, but also is subject to its limits. This idea is very similar to Hegel's 
comments on civil society, that is not rich enough since the increase of the wealth 
observed in modern society is followed by poverty and social and economic 
inequalities.
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Smith's originality is that by addressing the question of the social form of the division 
of labour, on the one hand, he offered an analysis of the co-operative form of the 
division of labour and its advantages but, on the other hand, this particular aspect of 
the division of labour presupposed a naturalistic view of society in conflict with the 
idea of a "well ordered society". Thus his analysis of the one division of labour on the 
social level, can be both a social critique but also an economic justification of modem 
society and of its social inequalities.103
The analysis of the positive and negative aspects of the division of labour in a primary 
schematic form led Smith to be read as sceptical. The politics of history is open, but 
what is to be acknowledged in Smith's analysis is that he was the first to offer an 
analysis of modem society on what was addressed by the literature as Smith's 
"materialism". What is meant by the latter is that he linked revenues with the 
particular formation of classes of the eighteenth century commercial society on the 
early development of division of labour in manufacture.
Instead of perceiving society only as an aggregate bound together by individual's 
common self-interest or under the power of the sovereignty or the wise legislator 
representing the general good, Smith, as other authors in the same period, saw that 
the division of labour in society in its particular form was related to the class division 
and the relations of interdependence on that basis The three different orders of 
people were constituted according to their mode of revenue: these who live by rent, 
these who live by wages, and these who live by profits. For Smith these three orders 
are the original and constituent orders of civilised society. This form of division 
implied the separation of the different revenues for the particular classes participating
103 Whether or not this approach is apologetic, it has been discussed by Macpherson (1973) pp. 195- 
203. See also Ioannidis (1989) pp. 10-11.
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in the production o f goods. For that reason Smith was dealt with as a "materialist" 
writer in the context o f the discussion of the Scottish historical school .104
7. The rationality of the division of labour dependence and interdependence.
The economic opulence and the liberating aspects arising from the division o f labour 
at the end of the day did not make modern society fair and rich enough. Instead it 
generated new social questions, new forms of social inequalities, poverty, and 
alienation. What the division of labour in manufacture realised was a wide web of 
social relations o f interdependence. These relations of interdependence do not 
immediately imply some form of solidarity, to be found in earlier communities 105 
Smith made central for his social theory the argument that the difference between 
savage and commercial societies is precisely the increase in the relation of 
interdependence mediated by money exchanges, and the division of labour (LJ pp. 
335, 340, 521, 527).
This idea was all the more necessary in what Smith calls the "age of commerce". Men 
confined themselves to one type of labour, and exchanged the surplus o f their own 
commodity for that of another of which they had a need. Therefore, occupations at 
this time are varied (LJ p. 459). In modern civilised society exchange gave rise to a 
diversity of employment through the division of labour, but also made the multiplicity 
useful. The latter had its basis in natural dispositions and talents, but also out of the
104 Hasbach (1897) finds in Smith a materialistic philosophy and history in a sense that the 
development of law is based on the economic conditions, i.e. different modes of production. 
According to Meek (1956) Smith's approach is "materialist” in the way that subsistence influences 
the other forms of social life, law, property relations. That was identified as the materialist 
conception of history p. 53. In the same lines argues also R. Pascal (1938).
105 On the role of the division of labour as a principle of social cohesion in the writing of John 
Maxwell, James Harris, Joseph Priestley, Cumberland cited by Milton L. Myers (1967). For the 
discussion of the division of labour as source of different types of solidarity sec the debate between 
Tonnies, and Durkheim Ioannidou (1993).
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new forms of employment liberated a multiplicity of people's dispositions and these 
differences are made useful and beneficial for the whole.
In complex exchange relations, but also in complex modem society, according to the 
well-known paragraph in the WN, it is in vain to expect the co-operation of others 
just purely from their benevolence or friendship as Hutcheson put it. These 
sentiments, although the most agreeable, can not be the basis for a social bond in 
extended "societies of strangers". Contractual relationships are not enough to secure 
social bonds. Nevertheless, individuals need "the assistance of the others" which can 
be offered on the basis of mutual advantage and exchange. "Mere love is not 
sufficient for it, till he applies in some way to your self love" (LJ p. 348) Smith 
introduces the principle o f the division o f labour as the characteristic of the civilised 
form of society arising precisely from the spontaneous common disposition of men to 
exchange with each other. The "original position", common to all men where each 
man produced on the basis of his own labour the goods for the satisfaction of its 
needs, is now viewed in the context of the division of labour.
This interdependence implies that in exchanges self-interests, different in content, do 
share the need for recognition from others and of non violation. The division of 
labour assumes the difference between needs and interests. This difference is the basis 
for exchange of one product for the other. The civilising effect of the division of 
labour and interdependence also results in the increase of the social product and the 
well-being for the whole of society. The division of labour in its social form is the 
principle that combines the differences arising from different needs and interests. 
Thus the division of labour as a social principle is not simply homogeneous, but 
presupposes the moderation of interests and thus the independence among individuals' 
interests and needs.
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Taking into account this aspect of dependence as interdependence of interests, Smith 
argues that it is better to turn the self-love of others in one's favour and show them 
that "it is for their own advantage to do for him what he requires from them... We 
address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their self-love and never talk to them 
of our own necessities but of their advantages" (WN I, p. 19). Smith offers at the 
same time a new perception of common nature in the way that it is expressed in the 
market among calculating self-loving individuals. Thus, Smith argues that the 
naturally common disposition to exchange is possible because of the sentiments of 
self-love and also rationality as instrumental rationality of individual persons (LJ p. 
348).
The conception of the division of labour in its particular social form, as dealt with in 
the LJ, ED and WN, is differentiated from earlier social forms of the division of 
labour, such as the division of trades or professions on the basis of the guild system. 
The traditional forms of the organisation of production and reproduction of skills 
required for a particular trade in pre-modern society were organised on the basis of 
the guild system and corporations. This system was connected with a particular 
system of privileges and rights, which under the modern form of the division of labour 
lost its power, or to the extent that it existed according to Smith was obstructing the 
natural development of the expansion of the new forms of the division of labour and 
the expansion of the market which was mainly based on the commodification of "free 
labour" (LJ (A) pp. 84-85). There lies the difference between the modem division of 
labour and its earlier forms: the former highlighted the importance of individuality and 
of self-interest, at least in the context of the market.
Smith's analysis of social relations and exchange on the basis of mutual interest 
presupposes a moral analysis based on his theory of moral sentiments In the TMS 
Smith mainly refers to the distinction of trades and ranks based on their particular 
habits, skills and practical morality (TMS pp 50, 61). He mainly focused on the
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analysis of private and public virtues as realised through individuals' skills and habits. 
The way that these differences of power and education are combined in his moral 
philosophy is through his system of sympathy, which has been examined also as "the 
source of natural deception". However, despite the deceptive character o f "imaginary 
identification" between people of different ranks and of inequality of power, society 
seems to achieve some sort of moral coherence.106
In both TMS and WN Smith's idea of society is not merely based on the moral nature, 
vicious or virtuous, o f self-interested individuals but also on the distinction among 
different independent orders. In the WN the constitution of different orders is 
according to their mode of revenue: those who live by rent, those who live by wages, 
and those who live by profits. For Smith these three orders are the original and 
constitutive orders of society. Therefore, Smith's argument concerning the division of 
labour and revenue made the shift to an analysis of social relations which were not 
merely relations among moral or amoral self-interested individuals. Smith's analysis of 
the form of production and distribution of revenues, which was important for political 
economy, also offered the conceptual means to comprehend the conflict between an 
individualist model of society and a society of class inequalities This reading of the 
question of class and the division of labour, but also of the importance of the self- 
interest in economic activities, made Smith both the predecessor of modem sociology 
and also the first to offer a liberal analysis of modern society.
8. Division of labour and the political economy of the general good.
The first appropriation of Smith on the continent gave rise to what was called 
Volkswirtschaft, but also influenced the philosophical critiques of the rise of the 
modem nation state. There were two main streams in this discussion the legal
106 See section on Sympathy.
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discussion: of the nation state which was followed by the emphasis on Smith's 
economics. In the context of the economics of the Volk the emphasis, was put on the 
increase of the national wealth and there was no distinction between the natural 
division of labour and social forms of the division of labour. Hegel was the first to 
offer a critique o f the modem form of the division of labour based on the modem 
conception of labour and need as well as to reconstruct the relation between civil 
society and the state. But I shall examine that in the second part of this thesis.
The discussion in the second half of the nineteenth century was more focused on the 
social aspect of labour and thus was part of the discussions in German historical 
School. The problem of the division of labour was linked with the formation of social 
classes and the particular form o f ethics related to it. These discussions later 
influenced Durkheim and the French sociological school. The characteristic of these 
discussions is that the idea of social unity on the basis o f  the Volk as a legal and 
economic unity breaks into its social, economic and political aspects rather than being 
dealt with as a natural unity.
Bucher (1892) deals with the question of the division of labour and what he calls the 
formation of social classes. In his analysis on the question what is the division of 
labour (Was ist Arbeitsleilung?) he distinguishes among: first, the division of labour 
on the level of production into "Arbeitergroupe". Secondly, the division of labour of 
distribution of the product among different classes (Smith). For Bucher the division 
of labour in the family is distinguished from the division o f labour on the level of the 
national economy (volkwirtschaftliche Arbeitsteilung) because the latter is connected 
with the division o f professions and classes.107 This process of social "Berufsbildung" 
seems to have its rootes in the middle ages, but things changed after the French 
revolution and the emergence of the idea of social justice.108 For the sociologists,
107 Bucher (1892) p. 17.
108 Ibid., pp. 39, 37.
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such as Schmoller and Philipovich, as well as for Bucher, society is dealt with as the 
result of the division o f labour (Ergebnisse der Teilung der Arbeit) '09 Society is 
constructed on the basis o f  the very idea of the division of labour .109 10
This hypothesis, which was essential for the early philosophical, economic and 
sociological debates, was used by Marx for the critique of classical political economy 
as a social critique. Although he analysed the question of the division of labour in the 
most "prudently homeopathic doses" he distinguished his critique o f the particular 
forms of the division o f labour from a merely positive sociology which appropriated 
the positive aspects of the division of labour as a form of social coherence. Marx, like 
Smith, pointed out the positive role of labour and the division o f labour for modem 
society More specifically for Marx the social division of labour was the force to 
balance the capitalist destructive tendencies of the over-exploitation of the labour 
force but also of the anarchy of the competition between the different branches of 
production and corporations.
Marx offered the most extensive critique of the question of the particular social form 
of the division of labour which works "behind the backs of the individual producers". 
Thus the division of labour in its modem form leads to some particular forms not only 
of the socialisation of capital but also of exploitative social relations as capitalist 
relations. Marx's critique has a double aspect: first, it is a moral critique of the moral 
degradation of the labouring classes which develops further into a social critique. It 
was linked with the particular form of the capitalist relations of exploitation not only 
of labour but also of the social organisation of labour which were utilised by capital 
for the increase of productivity, profits and for the production of relative surplus 
value. Thus social productive powers were developed but also exploited by the
109 Ibid., p. 16.
110 For Schmoller the division of labour is "die dauernde individuelle, das ganze Leben ergreifende 
und beherrschende Anpassung an eine spezialisierte Lebensaufgabe" (Bucher p. 16). Philipovich 
emphases the unity of the particular works towards a particular purpose (Zweck). See Simon Clarke 
(1991) ch V on the Methodenstreit.
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particular form of the capital relation. Marx's moral critique is based on the politico- 
economic analysis of the division of labour as the form of organisation of production.
Crucial for Marx's critical account in Capital is the separation o f the technical division 
of labour in manufacture, and later in the large scale production, and the social 
division of labour.“ 1 Following up Ferguson's discussion, Marx highlighted that it is 
the principle of the division of labour which is applied in manufacture is to be applied 
in society, it would turn society into a factory. In the same way Hegel realised that 
the "mechanism" which was developing under the organisation of the division of 
labour had to be controlled The response to these developments, as Marx pointed 
out, was this split between the social division of labour and the division of labour in 
the sphere of production and that allowed the formal existence of individual's rights as 
citizens.1 12 The opposition of formal rights and coercive relations of production 
reproduced the formal separation of the bourgeois economic interests and citizens on 
the level of the political sphere and the split between bourgeois and citizen, as 
Rousseau first showed and was then criticised by H egel113
For Smith's argument the Rousseauian influence of the general and particular interests 
resulted in the institutionalisation of the political economy of the general good. More 
specifically, in his argument on public welfare and moral education he attempted to 
balance the drawbacks arising from the division of labour for the labouring and less 
advantaged part of the population employed in manufacture. The introduction of 
universal education in particular for the labouring poor and the inferior classes of
111 On Marx and division of labour see Rattansi (1982). He contrasts the early Marx of the German 
Ideology, and Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts with the Marx of Capital. Early Marx 
"insists upon the complete dissolution of the division of labour as the central organising principle of 
the future society" (p. xii).
112 Marx (1988) p. 477.
113 Werhane (1991) underlined the corruption of courage, activity of the body, stupidity, ignorance, 
and mental deterioration which are generated through the organisation of the division of labour as in 
conflict to the liberal Lockean tradition of natural law and the equal rights to the advantages of social 
progress. Thus she contrasts the liberal individualist natural law theory to the immediate effects of 
the division of labour on the individual labourer in societies of social and economic inequalities.
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people became a substantial social question. The task of the sovereign was to 
"take(s) pains to prevent" the corruption of public morals and disorders that could 
affect the society as a whole. In particular, Smith suggested specific measures taken 
by the government for the education of the youth to moderate the corrupting 
influences of the division of labour.
Thus Smith had to account for the fact that even if commercial society was more fair, 
civilised and wealthy in comparison to earlier forms of society, that did not mean it 
was the case for the whole of its population. It gave rise to a particular type of 
corruption of morals, new forms of stupidity as a result of the employment on 
monotonous and specific skills, lack of education, ignorance of public affairs, 
corruption of the activity of their body, of intellectual activity, as well as social and 
martial virtues. The relation between private morality and public ethics for Smith 
changed in the way that the views of people were not merely inspired by public virtues 
but rather their interests were formed in relation to their position in the division of 
labour, which was subject to conflicts of economic interests.114
This conflict is taken up by the sociological, moral and institutionalist readings of 
Smith.115 These discussions have mostly put emphasis on the conflicting views in 
Smith's argument with regard to the division of labour. Smith of Book I is in conflict 
with Smith in Book V, but highlighting different aspects of this contrast. They argue 
that Book I of the WN underlines the positive economic benefits arising from the 
division of labour; the increase of social wealth, but also the distribution of economic 
advantages in the different social ranks and classes and the way that by their co-
114 For a detail account of Smith's critique of moral corruption see next chapter IV.
115 Werhane (1991) underlines the institutional views in Smith's account of the division of labour and 
puts Rosenberg in the same category as Samuel and Marrow. All of them seem to underline the 
importance of the institutional structure of organisation on the basis of the public principles of 
justice.
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operation the social product increases, as well as productivity, dexterity, skill, industry 
etc.116
Reisman (1976), similarly to West, deals with Smith's argument on the division of 
labour: first, as factor of economic progress for the whole but also as having negative 
effects on the individual workers, as psychological deprivation and narrowing of their 
horizons In that sense the paradox of the capitalist use of the division of labour is 
that innovation, creativity and speculation as the characteristic of the individual 
labourer, but also of the use and combination of resources, are essential for the 
increase of productivity and competitiveness. The immediate affect of the division of 
labour is to effect negatively the resources found in the individual labourer. The 
division of labour becomes a division between mental and physical labour and has a 
particular effect in the use of the human resources and thus creativity and innovation 
added to the divisions between industry and agriculture.117
According to Rosenberg, Smith tries to get to grips with the problem of industrialised 
societies as societies of inequalities. In that sense, more than the opposition between 
advantages and disadvantages arising from the division of labour, Smith pointed out 
the paradox that the "increasing creativity of the society as a whole grows while that 
of the labouring poor declines" .118
Sutherland (1993) finds Smith's "institutional” aspects of the division of labour. First, in that the 
division of labour is dealt with as the source of wealth and productivity. Second, in relation to 
distribution and the question of class. Third, in relation to productive and unproductive labour (p. 
xxxiii). Fourth, the division of labour, apart from resulting in stupidity, increases the exploitation of 
the less advantaged classes. The state is examined more than being the negative minimal state, as a 
moral social substitute at the point that the division of labour falls into conflicts on the social level 
(xl, xli). The institutional reading of Smith as related to his account of the division of labour is also 
stated by Skinner and Campbell (1976) p. 43.
116 West (1967) the "empirical illustration and an priori analysis in the form of the three propositions 
to account for the great increase in output which follows the division of labour" p. 23.
117 Reisman (1976) p. 155.
1,8 Rosenberg (1965) p. 139.
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Reisman finds the effects of the division of labour on values, distribution and 
solidarity as characterised by the clash of economic interests related to the division of 
labour. Thus social conflict is of two sorts: first, horizontal among the different 
tradesmen, second, vertical as a division between social classes.119 Universal 
exchange leads to economic interdependence and produces a form of "cohesion" 
which is subject to the conflict of economic and social divisions.
As opposed to this view Rosenberg (1965) argues that Smith is consistent with regard 
to his views on the question of the division of labour in book I and there is no 
opposition between the moral and the economic views in Smith. Thus he analyses the 
ethical and economic aspects of the division of labour as interwoven with each other. 
The increase of wealth as an economic category presupposes the use of the resources 
of innovation, the development of speculation in relation to the labour process, and 
that in its nature is not only an economic question.
The division of labour as a social question was a substantial part of the reading of 
Smith as a critical social theorist rather than merely as an advocate of the commercial 
society, although also the founder of the economic analysis of society.120 The 
institutional reading o f  Smith has as its essential part the discussion of the conflicting 
effects of the division o f labour and its alienating effects for the individual labourer.121 
In that sense, as Hyun-Ho Song (1995) put it "Smith is an early pioneer of 
institutional individualism" which is the "combination" of an institutionalist and 
individualist approach. Whichever way we look at Smith's argument on social theory, 
he offered the classic liberal formulation of social conflict on the basis of the 
individuals' self-interests, needs and resources realised socially. If that is possible then 
it has to be looked at on the basis of the division o f  labour and how individual's 
interest is actually realised or cancelled in relation to the particular historical form of
119 Ibid., p. 160.
120 Groenewegen (1977).
121 Heilbroaner (1975), West (Mar 1969), (1975), Rosenberg (May 1965), Viner (1968).
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the division of labour. The emphasis of the self-interest in relation to the division of 
labour offers an alternative explanation to institutionalist122, sociological and 
individualistic accounts. However, classic liberalism seems to fall under the historical 
"limits" of Smith's enlightenment argument with regard to the analysis of the 
conflicting aspects brought out by modem society and thus enlightened by modem 
thought.123
122 For the institutional argument, such as Rawls's, the importance of the division of labour for the 
theory of society appears under the label of "political liberalism".
123 For an analysis of the "limits" of enlightenment see Clarke (1993) and the critical discussions on 
the "dialectic of Enlightenment" see Adorno and Horkheimer (1972).
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Chapter Four
1. Is the "Adam Smith Problem" a pseudo-problem?
What is known in the literature as the "Adam Smith Problem" (hereafter ASP) is 
whether there is consistency or inconsistency between Smith's moral theory and his 
political economy. In other words, between the altruistic moral feelings of the TMS 
or the doctrine of consciousness and the self-interested motives of the WN in the 
context of the developed division of labour.124 Smith's moral theory as exposed in the 
TMS was found either consistent or inconsistent to the WN argument. For the 
German historical-economic school, the moral argument was claimed to be in contrast 
to the later materialist views. In other words, Smith theory o f society connected with 
Smith's theory of history and the economic analysis of commercial society .125
Main figures in this discussion were Oncken (1897), Hashbach (1897), Schmoller 
(1884), Hildebrand (1848) and Knies (1853). The latter two argued that Smith's visit 
to France between 1764-6 was particularly influential and made him reconsider his 
views under the French "materialistic" influences.126 This hypothesis, although true to 
the extent that it argues that the discussion on the continent had great influence on 
Smith, does not support the argument that there is an inconsistency between the early 
and later Smith. Already in the Letter to the Edinburgh Review (1755), Smith had 
shown interest in the discussions on the continent. For Smith political economy forms 
a part of the science of ethics and this can be supported on the basis of Smith's work 
in the way he treats political economy as a branch of the science of ethics.127
124 Hasbach (1897), Onken (1897).
125 Psychopedis (1992).
126 Cited by Macfie and Raphael.
127 Oncken claims that this was the way tiiat Smith was perceived by his students in Scotland, as 
Cannan also mentions (p. 449).
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On the whole the way that the ASP or pseudo-problem was addressed in the different 
historical periods and debates highlighted different aspects of Smith's argument and 
thus is interesting from the view point of the history of the perception of Smith's 
argument. The arguments are very much diverse and are formulated as follows; first, 
that the TMS and the WN are two entirely independent works as different systems, 
contradicting each other in their fundamental principles. Second, that TMS is a 
continuation of the WN in their moral and ethical principles, and third, that the post- 
TMS work had to be viewed as a comprehensive exposition of Smith's moral 
philosophy.128
Oncken's (1897) argument is that there is consistency in Smith's work, in the sense 
that he put moral questions on their practical basis and thus offered an analysis of 
commercial society as well. He argues from within the TMS, on the basis of the 
additions that Smith made in the sixth edition of the TMS in 1790 before his death. In 
the latter edition he laid emphasis on the connection between the two works by 
pointing out the primacy of social virtues for the realisation of self-interested motives. 
According to Oncken, Smith had developed forms of moderation of self-love in both 
TMS and in the WN and in that sense there is consistency in these works 129
In the contemporary debates there seems to be some sort of "division" between the 
authors who argue for the "Adam Smith Problem" and for its being a "pseudo 
problem". Also there are authors who argue that there are a number of paradoxes and 
inconsistencies in both the moral and politico-economic arguments of Smith, 
independent of the question o f whether there is an inconsistency or consistency 
between the TMS and WN.
128 Oncken (1897) p 444. Recently Dickey (1986) has reexamined the ASP as subject to 
continuity and change and thus historiciscd the ASP.
129 Oncken (1897) moderation of self-love part VII, sec ii, part VI conclusion, part VII ch. iv part 
VII ch. iii, part VI, sec iii. TMS shows that he docs not need the WN "materialistic approach” (p. 
447).
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Macfie (1976) and Raphael (1978), the editors of the TMS, offer a historical account 
of the question of the "Adam Smith Problem", and argue that Smith was initially a 
moral philosopher and then developed a historical and politico-economic account in 
order to analyse the particular aspects of commercial society, but also the modem 
systems of morality .130 Therefore they cannot see an inconsistency between the TMS, 
in particular the sixth edition, and Smith in the ED and WN with regard to the 
principles that Smith's argument is based on.131
Heilbroner (1982) also argues for the unity of Smith's work and analyses the 
contradictions to be found in both moral and politico-economic arguments separately. 
So the "inconsistency", rather than being an inconsistency between the two works, is 
investigated on the level of the conflicting views, i.e of the argument of the division 
of labour of the first book in the WN to the argument of the fifth book critical to the 
division of labour.132 In his moral theory the paradox of Smith's thought is to be 
found in the construction of a moral community on the immoral foundations of 
competitive self-interested individuals, i.e there is an implicit contradiction in using 
the self-interested sentiment such as self-love or self-regard as the basis for the 
realisation of general good. As have shown, while examining Smith’s moral theory in 
relation to his analysis of moderated interest, the indentification but also the mutual 
exclusion of self-interest and general interest is somehow avoided. Heilbroner rather 
reads in the first book Mandeville’s identification of "private vice-public benefit" and 
then contrast this with the book V of the WN.133 This argument that Smith was 
influenced by the Mandevillian doctrine is not completely wrong but Smith's argument 
is not identical to Mandeville's argument as I will show in chapter IV.
130 Macfie (1976) p. 73 see also Macfie's and Raphael's introduction to the TMS (1978) p. 20.
131 The ASP as pseudo-problem is dealt with by V. Brown (1993) (p. 23) and Waszeck (1986) pp. 
22-23.
132 Heilbroner (1982) pp. 438-9.
133 Campbell (1967) put it more clearly that Smith was in many ways Mandeville without the 
paradox (p. 536). The core of problem is how to channel self-interest into socially beneficial 
manifestations. Cohen (1989) connected self-interest on the basis of the division of labour and the 
invisible hand (pp. 61-2). Hayck (1967).
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Colletti (1972) formulated this conflict as follows: the common interest can be 
obtained while preserving self-interests. But then how can society be preserved as the 
society of strangers interested in their own self-preservation?134 In other words, the 
"socialisation of moral judgement" in commercial society leads to a "negative" form 
of socialisation.135 Society can keep together on the basis of the diversion of interests 
and needs and the way that these are related through exchanges. This way of putting 
the conflicting nature of Smith's argument does not necessarily imply the end of 
morality in commercial society, but its particular negative form.
This argument is to be distinguished from Lux's (1991) argument, according to which 
"a moral philosopher invented economics and ended morality1'.136 Thus it appears that 
the traditional conception of morality ended anyway by having a new "end" in the 
commercial and industrial society. It has fallen into contradictions and conflicts in 
favour of broader social freedoms and unfreedoms which highlighted its practical and 
ethical character. In that sense, Smith offered a critique of traditional views about 
morality, but this does not mean that he abandoned any conception of morality in his 
analysis of commercial society and o f the corruption of moral sentiments.
Dickey (1986) pointed out that there is a shift made from the naturalism of the moral 
sentiments to more critical views o f the relations of corruption in the social sphere 137 
The way that Dickey historicises the ASP is by underlining the importance of private 
virtues. In the sixth edition Smith argued for the primacy of public virtues such as 
justice over the private virtues such as prudence. Thus there seems to be a conflict in 
Smith's thought between private virtues such as prudence, self-command and the
134 Heilbroner (1982) ref. cited p. 436.
135 Colletti (1972) p. 215.
136 With regard to K. Lux (1990) argument see loannidou dissertation (1991) pp. 2-3.
137 Dickey (1986) p. 604.
public virtues such as justice which were added in the sixth edition of the TMS.138 By 
deepening his analysis of modern commercial society he realised that a theory of 
moral sentiments, although essential, had to be informed by an analysis of public 
virtues (TMS) and further supplemented with a politico-economic analysis (WN). 
Smith introduced the division of labour as an alternative to sympathy 139 Thus his 
theory of the division of labour is a different standpoint for the analysis of the forms 
of social coherence or incoherence.
Viner (1958) argued that the laissez faire  liberalism of the commercial society was in 
contrast to the analysis o f the moral sentiments of the TMS.140 Hont, Ignatief (1983) 
Pocock (1975), and Forbes (1975) look at this distinction from a different standpoint 
They argue that Smith was mainly a civic moralist and, as a moral philosopher, 
participated in the dispute over virtue versus commerce and luxury. The conflict of 
humanistic virtue versus economic freedom dates back to the Renaissance for 
Teichgraeber, III (1986).141 In other words the freedom realised in commercial 
society was mainly economic freedom, or as Macpherson put it, "possessive 
individualism". Smith as a moral philosopher, although he underlined the importance 
of economic and social freedoms among equal individuals, he highlighted their 
corrupting effects of unmediated self-love for traditional virtue, especially in a class 
society with unequal distribution of power and wealth.
138 The emphasis on the stoic influence in Smith, with regard to the importance of private virtues, 
self-command, prudence, and industry seems to be important for the recent post-modem discourse 
on Smith see V. Brown (1993).
139 Dickey (1986) p. 609, Cohen (1989) p. 66.
140 In that sense, the neo-liberal view of Viner (1958), is that there is a lack of continuity between 
the TMS and the WN analysis. Smith's view of the system of natural liberty as it was used to 
criticise the mercantilistic policies in the market, is used by the neo-liberal argument as the 
argument supportive of the minimal state policies. For the critique of the neo-liberal argument see 
Angelidis (1994).
141 Teichgraeber, III (1986) p. 113. See Pocock (1975) and Cropsey (1975) on the opposition of 
virtue and commerce (pp. 108-9). Forbes (1975) pointed out that liberty is important also for 
democracy and the way that political virtues were to be reconsidered (p. 111).
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For Stein (1979) the different works of Smith argue for different virtues The TMS 
was concerned with moral sentiments, i.e. sympathy, the WN stressed self-interest and 
rejected benevolence as a force in economic relations. Further he reads Smith's work 
on the basis of three principles which were dealt with in the TMS , i.e prudence, 
benevolence, and justice. The first is the principle important for the WN, the second 
for the TMS and the third was the subject of Smith's study of public virtue which he 
never completed.142
Hirschman (1977) argued that Smith is primarily an ethical thinker. Nevertheless, his 
conception of virtue is what still perplexes us. There is a philosophical gap between 
his moral theory and his economic theory 143 In the TMS feeling and passion seem to 
have a noneconomic origin, something that does not seems to be the case for political 
economy. In the WN welfare is best served by letting each member of society pursue 
its own self-interest.144 What seems to be shadowed by this liberal aspect o f  Smith's 
political economy is his reconstruction of the diversity of interests on the basis of the 
division of labour.
In short, the discussion of the "problem" or "pseudo-problem" in Smith's thought gave 
rise to a number of arguments which addressed the different aspects o f Smith's 
argument. In this chapter I shall argue that a sharp division between Smith's moral 
and politico-economic thought is bound to misrepresent what Smith's social theory is 
about, i.e. the articulation of conflicting and rapid developments of the commercial 
society which affected all aspects o f social life and made central issues of social theory 
individuals' morals, interests, freedom and unfreedoms. The political economy of the 
latter is to be found in its more complete version in the WN, although it is also 
discussed in the TMS and the LJ.
142 Stein (1979) p 622.
143 Hirschman (1977) pp. I l l ,  122, 123.
144 Ibid., p. 112.
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In chapter one I showed how the reading of Smith as a liberal economist 
misunderstood his political economy and social theory. In chapter three I examined 
how Smith analysed commercial society on the basis of the developed form of the 
division o f labour as a form of organisation of labour, of social reproduction, 
moderation of diverse self-interests. This aspect of commercial society was essential 
to articulate new forms of social coherence but also the limit of this approach in 
societies with social and class inequalities and alienation related to it. By the 
examination of the TMS in this chapter I shall show that self-interest is moderated not 
merely on the basis of "the division of labour", and on the social level by the 
distinction among the different ranks, but mainly by an analysis of the system of 
sympathy, of public and private virtues, when individuals become moral agents and 
their judgement has a particular universal moral value. Thus the correspondence or 
lack of correspondence to the general rules, but also the very nature of the universal 
ideas of the good, led Smith to his idea of the impartial spectator.
The traditional ideas of moral sense, or the identification of sympathy with altruism, 
were challenged by modern subjectivist ethics. Smith avoided both the relativism of 
taste but also the individualistic arguments, or what he calls one-dimensional systems. 
My argument is that this is due to the critical distance of what he calls one­
dimensional systems but also the very conceptualisation of modem society that his 
social theory offers. Therefore the question of beauty, moral or aesthetic judgement, 
in other words what make us approve or disapprove of the motive or the result o f an 
action is to be found in relation to that level, i.e. his idea of society.145
Some form of consistency is also to be found in the critique of commercial spirit as 
corrupting moral sentiments but also the natural system of liberty and the ways that 
nature prompts us to use its means and intervene for the sake of further improvement.
H51 shall come back to this question while examining Hegel’s science of the ethical life which 
somehow followed the discussion on moral sense.
The standpoint of these critical views is his practical idea of ethics and ideas of 
priority of the general good and justice. This will be the subject of the last chapter of 
the discussion on Smith.
Smith's moral theory is to be examined as part o f his social theory. That involves the 
examination of his system of sympathy, the impartial spectator and the way he 
embodied and differentiated his argument from his predecessors but also 
contemporaries. This difference lies in his idea o f society, and thus implies that moral 
judgement or the system of sympathy are neither an analytical device nor an empirical 
system. It is the way to articulate systematically the complexity of the relation 
between the modem idea of the moral agent and practical ethical relations in the 
context of a moral community That is illustrated by a critique of what Smith calls 
one-dimensional systems. This critical view is presupposed for the relation of 
interdependence and independence as social value in his political economy and the 
relations of money exchange. In the TMS, to the extent that Smith offered a critique 
of moral sentiments in the different moral systems from antiquity to the modem 
systems of morality, he examined the contrast between different principles of morality 
and he also offered an account of self-interest as distinct from self-love which is the 
presupposition of persuasion, exchange and bargaining in the WN.
Summing up, the distinction between the TMS and the WN approaches can be looked 
at from a different perspective than merely as the opposition between sympathy and 
self-interest in societies with an extensive division of labour. This chapter 
reconstructs this relation, viewed from the argument developed in the TMS, in other 
words, by an analysis of the system of sympathy which endorsed a critique of the 
modem systems o f morality which put forward a different conception of society 
altogether.
2. The system of sympathy.
Smith's system of sympathy sought to identify the social disposition arising from 
people's nature to sympathise with others by means of their imagination. The very 
idea of sympathy involves the question of propriety or impropriety of an action and 
thus of moral judgement and moral sense. In the first section of the TMS Smith offers 
an assertive account of sympathy in the sense that there is no sympathy for some 
passions in the same degree as with others. The propriety of an action is somehow 
the condition of our fellow-feelings. This has led to the misunderstanding that 
sympathy was often identified merely with altruism, i.e. the conception of sympathy 
with fellow feeling, but if that was the case for Hutcheson, it was not the case for 
Smith The fellow feeling which is the source of sympathy can very well apply with 
any passion whatsoever, provided that it is in the appropriate degree of moderation 
(TMS p 10).
Due to the identification of sympathy with the sentiments of fellow-feeling, the TMS 
is read as being merely a traditional moral theory, in contrast to the commercial self- 
interested principles as examined in the politico-economic writings under the influence 
of the systems of social theory and political economy. In the same way that Smith is 
not merely a moral philosopher in the traditional sense of moral philosophy, he is also 
critical of the modem systems of moral philosophy, dealing with the principle of self- 
love and unsociable principles as the basis of society and human disposition. Thus the 
system of sympathy can be read as an analysis of social sentiments, but also as a form 
of moderation of the self-interested motives which were celebrated by the modern 
systems of social theory.
Sympathy, as opposed to the one-dimensional systems which were based on the self- 
love principle or the idea of utility, is experienced by the spectator as follows: first, as 
the process of "changing places in fancy with the sufferer" or the person in the state of
fortune and pleasure (TMS p. 10), "by bringing the case home to himself, he (the 
spectator) imagines what should be the sentiments of the sufferer" or of the person in 
good fortune and situation of pleasure Thus Smith says:
"How selfish soever a man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his 
nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness 
necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it. 
O f this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion which we feel for the misery of others, 
when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner ... for this 
sentiment, like all the other original passions of human nature, is by no means 
confined to the virtuous and the humane, though they perhaps may feel it with the 
most exquisite sensibility. The greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator of the laws 
of society, is not altogether without it" (TMS p. 9).
Further, sympathy does not arise merely from the view of the passion but also from 
the situation that excites it. We some time feel for another a passion that he himself 
seems to be altogether incapable of. "When we put ourself in his case, that passion 
arises in our breast from the imagination" (TMS p. 12). Smith illustrates that with 
very vivid examples such as death or rather thinking about death (TMS p.12), the 
relation of the mother and the infant, or the situation of giving birth (TMS p. 317). 
Thinking of death and the dissolution of one's body is enough to make us miserable, 
although that is not the case for the dead body which is completely insensitive (TMS 
P 13).144
The aspect of sympathy which applies to a method of detecting is illustrated by 
Waszeck (1986), in a literary style, when he co-examines Smith's idea of sympathy 
with Chesterton's "secret" and the crime story of Father Brown. There Father Brown 146
146 This issue is examined from the point of view of the relation between spectator and actor in 
section 3. The illusory aspect that sympathetic sentiments may involve is addressed as the issue of 
illusive sympathy. In Smith’s words it is expressed as follows:
"our sense of merit is often founded upon one of those illusive sympathies, by which, when we 
bring home to ourselves the case of another, we are often affected in a manner in which the person 
principally concerned is incapable of ocing affected" (TMS p. 78).
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explains the method of his detective as a science. His secret is that he is not trying to 
get outside the actor but instead inside him Thus he says:
"I wait till I know I am inside a murderer, thinking his thoughts, wrestling with his 
passions; till I know I have bent my self into his posture ... " 147
This very ability that allow us to sympathise with a variety of feelings and situations, 
may involve illusion and deception as well as the subjective experience of a particular 
situation and the sentiments that excites in the particular individual. However, what is 
the key to the imagination of the sentiment of sympathy is that there is the need to 
have some correspondence of feelings between the actor and the person that the 
action was acted upon. The very position of the spectator is also based on its 
involvement in a particular sentiment or situation. That is precisely also the source of 
deception and illusion since there is bound to be a distinction between actor and 
spectator, rather than merely a relation of identity, even if actor and spectator are two 
different states of consciousness in the same person. What is important for the 
illustration of sympathy is that imaginative moment by which we are able to 
sympathise with others by being in the "other's shoes" by means of one's 
imagination.148 Upon the analysis of this ability to sympathise by means of one's 
imagination by seeing a particular passion or by observing a situation, Smith 
introduces his theory of sympathy, illusion and deception, but also of the impartial
149spectator.
The spectator imagines the happy/unhappy situation, but still from the point of view 
of his present situation of reason and judgement. In the system of sympathy Smith is 
aware that the identification of the agent and the spectator is in its nature impossible.
141 Cited by Waszek (1986) p. 29. Chesterton's stories were the source of inspiration for Bloch 
while writing his Hegel book in exile in Massachusetts, and of Gilson, an Aquinas scholar.
148 Smith refers to the relation between sympathy and imagination throughout the TMS pp. 9, 12- 
13, 21-2, 31, 51-2, 75, 116, 219, 317.
149 This is the foundation of Smith's social theory, which was not merely a theory based on the 
sentiments of moral agents.
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The agent is affected far more closely. However, the very "illusion of imagination" 
makes it possible to sympathise with the actor even if what the agent sympathises with 
does not always correspond to the actual situation (TMS pp. 13, 78).
"Before we approve of the sentiments of any person as proper and suitable to their 
objects, we must not only be affected in the same manner as he is, but we must 
perceive this harmony and correspondence of sentiments between him and ourselves 
... The approbation of propriety therefore requires, not only that w e should entirely 
sympathize with the person who acts, but that we should perceive this perfect concord 
between his sentiments and our own" (TMS p. 78).
Even the simple situation of communication presupposes some sort of sympathetic 
sentiments and the conscious correspondence between these sentiments. This is the 
double condition of the sympathetic feelings of the spectators. The lack of conscious 
correspondence between their fellow feelings may lead to mutual intolerance and lack 
of correspondence and thus absence of sympathy (TMS pp. 21-2). Therefore, what 
makes possible the correspondence of sentiments between the spectator and the 
person principally concerned is the attempt of the spectator to put himself in the 
situation of the other. The fellow feeling can be represented as an imaginary change 
of situation as perceived by the sympathetic feelings.
The evaluative aspect of the system of sympathy is expressed in the analytical 
distinction between direct and indirect sympathy.150 The explanation of the different 
degrees of sentiments and their moderation is based on the different types of relations 
which connect the spectator with an external situation or object. A benevolent action 
is approved directly by entering by the means of imagination into the benevolent 
motives of the agent. Indirect sympathy is what one feels by entering into the 
gratitude for those motives felt by the beneficiaries of the actions o f  the actor. In the 
case in which a benevolent action raises the resentment of the person that the action is 
acted upon, indirect sympathy is the sentiment felt and thus disapprobation and
150 For the use of this distinction sec the section on the impartial spectator and moral sense and 
also the critique of the one-dimensional systems.
-
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demerit In other words the distinction of direct and indirect sympathy involves a 
sense of merit and demerit (TMS p. 75).
The perception of fellow-feeling turns out to be more a question of merit or demerit 
than merely fellow-feeling. The sense of merit is analysed in a twofold way. Firstly, 
the propriety of conduct arises from the direct sympathy with the affections and 
motives of the person who acts. Secondly, the sense of merit arises from the indirect 
sympathy with the gratitude of the person to whom the action is acted upon. In other 
words, the sense of merit is a compound sentiment, and is made up of two distinct 
sentiments; a direct sympathy with the sentiments of the agent, and an indirect 
sympathy with the gratitude of those who receive the benefit of his/her actions The 
merit corresponds to the social passions on which sympathy is founded. The sense of 
demerit is also a compound sentiment, the "direct antipathy to the sentiments of the 
agent, and an indirect sympathy with the resentment of the sufferer". This 
corresponds to the structure of the unsociable passions (TMS pp. 74-5) that I shall 
deal with in section four of this chapter.
Finally, there is the distinction between habitual and universal sympathy. The former 
is to be noticed in the family or among people in a group. The first is a more precise 
and determinate and the latter a more abstract and universal form of sympathy. It 
requires not only a sentiment excited by habit, but one which ought to be universal. 
However, sympathy could be better comprehended on the basis of mutual friendship, 
which is distinct from both habitual and universal forms (TMS p. 219).
In short, sympathy for Smith is a more complex sentiment than it was thought to be in 
Hutcheson's moral theory, as the analysis of the sentiments of the members in a 
natural community and of relations o f  love and altruism. For Smith it is not merely 
identical with the particular content o f  the fellow-feeling but is the system that gives 
rise to a variety of contents and feelings but also of deception and thus Smith
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underlines the illusory aspects of sympathy.151 That lead Smith to his theory of the 
impartial spectator and his account on moral sense.
151 The use of the argument of natural deception is illustrated in the context of Smith's social 
theory as an examination of the doctrine of consciousness, nature and reason. See also Oncken 
(1897) p. 445. Smith expounds the origin of ambition or of the distinction of ranks, a thesis 
known in the literature as the illustration of the doctrine of practical consciousness. See secUon 
five.
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3. The impartial spectator, moral sense and reason.
The idea of the impartial spectator did not appear in its complete form in the very 
first edition of the TMS but was further developed in the later editions as a reply to 
questions that the first edition raised Raphael, who edited the TMS, offers a detailed 
account of how Smith modified his ideas on the impartial spectator from one edition 
to another. What he did have in the first edition of the TMS was a theory o f moral 
judgement based on Hume's and Hutcheson's ideas of morality and moral sense. The 
idea o f the impartial spectator became more important in relation to the questions of 
justice and the need to make a judgement about the quality of a particular action, but 
also the idea of the just punishment .152
More precisely, in the first edition the impartial spectator is a state of imagination and 
due to imaginative impartiality it is possible to approve or disapprove of one's 
contact. In the second edition, in reply to the comments he received on the first 
edition by Sir Gilbert, Smith modified his views that the impartial spectator "as the 
man within" may judge differently from the actual spectator, "the man without".153 
The voice of consciousness is not purely a reflection of actual social attitudes, and it is 
not merely identified with popular opinion. Although in the first edition society has a 
priority to the individual's imagination, in the second edition he reverses this relation. 
In the sixth edition he distinguished between the vanity to be praised and the 
praiseworthiness of an action, and that is the argument that he employs to criticise the 
one-dimensional systems. Overall, the judgement of the impartial spectator 
presupposes the possibility of imagining oneself in the position of the impartial 
spectator and thus the system of sympathy.154
152 Raphael (1972) p. 9.
155 Ibid., p 11
154 Ibid., p. 16.
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Raphael, in his attempt to connect Smith's theory with contemporary discussions, 
seems to rule out the practical and ethical aspects of Smith's argument and reduces 
Smith's theory to an empirical theory of individual consciousness. In other words, if 
the idea of the impartial spectator is not to be merely viewed as a moral imperative, 
then it must be looked at as the process of the formation of judgements and of 
consciousness and not either as a normative or as an empirical concept.155 The 
practical content of moral judgement involves both the empirical aspect of the 
individual and public opinion but also conceptions of the good as subject of practical 
ethics.
In studying the TMS the reader finds out that the idea of a spectator is mentioned on 
several occasions and somehow it does have an important role to play in Smith's 
system of sympathy. Impartiality and disinterest seem to be the condition of both 
sympathy and of the possibility for the formation of moral judgement. The measure of 
fitness or propriety of affection can be judged by means of the sympathetic feelings of 
the impartial and well-informed spectator; first, about the motives that led to an action 
and second, of the way that this action was received by the person who is acted upon. 
In addition, every moral actor can be an impartial spectator by means of his/her 
imagination, and by being well informed about the motives and the effects of an 
action.156
However, impartiality in the case of the immediate action is only possible provided 
that the moment of the action is not identified with the reflection upon the action 
(TMS p. 110). According to Smith, the impartial and real spectator can judge an 
action by examining the situation of someone who is about to act or after somebody 
has acted. In the first case, all justify themselves under the veil of self-delusion, hiding 
from view the deformities of their conduct (TMS p. 158). The standpoint of the
155 Ibid , pp 19-21.
156 The impartial spectator may be seem to correspond with the role that Kant's categorical 
imperative plays as the criterion and condition for the formation of moral judgement.
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impartial spectator could appear in the second level when the action is done. Mainly 
it seems that the impartial spectator is identified with the third person who perceives 
both the motives o f the actor and the result of the action in the person that the action 
was acted upon or of the object of action (TMS p. 135). The impartial spectator, by 
means of the imagination, enters into all the motives which may motivate an action. 
Despite the possibility to enter into others' motives by means of one's imagination, it is 
difficult to achieve identification with the actor or the agent of action. Since the only 
means of sympathising with the agent's position is by imagination, there is always the 
possibility of illusion and natural deception involved In terms o f  Smith's social theory 
there lies the possibility of deception and corruption o f moral sentiments, as shown in 
sections two and three. Even so, for the person acting, it is difficult to be so detached 
as to see his action with the imaginary distance of the spectator, in particular at the 
moment of action. This may happen only after the action is over, i.e. when the agent 
could enter into an earlier state as a past moment and by means o f reflection.
What is important to underline is that the impartial spectator, either as the internalised 
spectator to judge one's action or as the third person, has to be looked at in relation to 
the system of sympathy and of direct and indirect sympathy. This approach was what 
distinguished Smith from the tradition which related sympathy and indifferent moral 
sentiments with the concept of moral sense.
Moral sense is addressed as "the peculiar power of perception" (TMS pp. 321, 266) 
wherefrom arises the "faculty of judging" (TMS p 158). For Shaftesbury and Butler 
it was discussed in terms of the motives of the moral agent. For Hutcheson, the basis 
of moral judgement was disinterested motives 157 For Hume, moral sentiment became 
the sentiment of approval or disapproval of pleasure and displeasure, and it arose 
from sympathy as the basis of moral approval 158 Smith raises the question of the
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formation of general rules of morality founded upon the experience of what, in 
particular instances, one's moral faculties approve or disapprove of When these rules 
are universally known and established, they become standards of judgement. Though 
general rules are important for judging a particular action, they can not simply be 
imposed on a particular action (TMS p 160). In the case of moral sense the general 
rules arise in relation to particular relations, i.e. to the natural disposition which is 
propagated by the sentiment of sympathy and confirmed by education.
From the moral viewpoint, the source of moral distinction between good and bad 
seems to precede all law and does not seem to arise directly from reason or feeling. 
This distinction does not merely arise from human nature either, as natural law 
theories argue.159 According to Hobbes's natural law theory, the state o f nature is the 
state of war, therefore the civil government is the supreme magistrate to avoid mutual 
destruction and preserve society. "The laws of the civil magistrate, therefore, ought 
to be regarded as the sole ultimate standards of what was just and unjust, of what was 
right and wrong"(TMS p. 318). The Hobbesian view underlined the importance of 
the law laid by the civil magistrate and no other authorities, such as ecclesiastical or 
moral.160 The counter argument against Hobbes was that the civil law imposed by the 
magistrate is not the source o f moral distinctions and its indifference can not judge 
moral matters.
However, Smith uses some aspects of Hobbes's rationalism. Although reason can not 
decide about moral issues, there can be a presentation of the distinction between vice 
and virtue on the basis of reason In distinction to vice, virtue is the conformity to 
rules o f reason which are the source of moral maxims and of general laws of morality
159 Smith offered a critique of rationalism by criticising Hobbes's views in VII. iii. 2. 1, while 
examining the different systems of moral philosophy. Hobbes's system is one of those that make 
reason the principle of approbation.
160 Hobbes's natural law theory liad as its purpose to support the idea of order in society. In a 
situation of civil war Hobbes thought that political power was the one that could guarantee this 
order. Verbung (1991) p. 139.
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It is rather with respect to virtue as the conformity to reason, and vice as the violation 
of it, that judgement is made. In some respects the faculty of reason may very justly 
be considered as the source and principle o f approbation Thus, by means of this 
approbation the general rules of justice which ought to regulate one's actions are 
formed (TMS p. 319).
Smith introduces an idea of reason according to which the general rules are formed 
from experience and by means of induction from particular cases under a general idea 
or maxim Although reason is important for these general ideas and maxims to 
regulate the formation of the greater part o f our moral judgements, reason is not the 
source of the first perception of right and wrong. The latter source is the immediate 
feeling and moral sense, rather than reason, which is indifferent to moral and assertive 
content, i.e. pain and pleasure or objects o f desire and aversion of the immediate 
feelings and sensation. Thus Smith did not rule out the Humean views on the 
formation of judgement, which is also influenced by the immediate feeling. But the 
critique of this approach applied also to the critique of utilitarianism.
Smith endorsed Hutcheson's argument against the moral systems that set as their main 
principles self-love and reason, and distinguishes between moral sense and reason and 
the degree in which they affect our judgements (TMS p. 321). Moral sense for 
Hutcheson is the power of perception, which is illustrated by the distinction between 
direct and indirect senses. The indirect senses are related to the faculty of "reflect 
senses" as opposed to the "direct senses", which refer to the direct perceptions such 
as colour and sounds. To perceive harmony or beauty we need the former rather than 
the latter, which reflect indirect senses rather than the direct senses (TMS p. 322). 
That is what Locke calls reflection or internal sense.161
161 It may be argued that there lies the distinction between direct and indirect sympathy.
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According to Hume's sceptical approach, the first perceptions upon which the general 
moral principles are founded are the object of immediate feeling and utility.162 But 
these first perceptions on the level of sentiments, although possible, do not have the 
means of distinguishing virtue from vice. These perceptions are accepted for their 
own sake. Therefore, the actuality of the immediate sentiments is presupposed for the 
possibility of the distinction between both: immediate sentiments and reason But the 
consciousness o f the difference between them is only possible by means of reason. 
However, reason in a certain sense may justly be considered as the principle of 
approbation or disapprobation. As Hutcheson argues, all moral distinctions arise from 
reason but in some respect are founded upon immediate sense and feeling.
Smith's argument on approbation is summarised by the identification of four different 
sources of approbation: first, we sympathise with the motives of the agent; second, 
we enter into the gratitude of those who receive the benefit of his actions; third, we 
observe that his contact has been agreeable to the general rules by which those two 
systems generally act; and last, when we consider such actions as making a part of a 
system of behaviour which tends to promote the happiness either of the individual or 
of the society, they appear to derive a beauty from this utility, not unlike that which 
we ascribe to any well-contrived machine (paraphrase TMS p. 326).
"After deducting, in any one particular cases, all that must be acknowledged to 
proceed from some one or other of these four principles, I should be glad to know 
what remains, and I shall freely allow this overplus to be ascribed to a moral sense, or 
to any other peculiar faculty, provided any body will ascertain precisely what this 
overplus is" (TMS p. 326).
This articulation between sentiments is what is called moral sense, which is not only 
an abstract articulation. Moral sense is decisive to judge whether the action is 
virtuous or vicious, and whether it should be accompanied also by the sentiments of
162See TMS part IV.
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self-approbation, i.e. the consciousness of the motives of the agent and the 
approbation or disapprobation o f them (TMS p. 178). Therefore, the concepts of 
reason, approbation, and moral sense, in Smith's terms, are connected with the faculty 
of perception but at the same time are distinguished from it. It is reason which brings 
the consciousness of the distinction between the faculty of the perception of 
sentiments, the faculty of reason the moral sense and the cause of approbation But I 
shall come back to this issue when discussing the question of propriety.
4. Propriety, utility, beauty and the formation of a iust order.
This section contrasts the ideas o f utility of beauty and argues that Smith is not 
simply an utilitarian, as has been misread in some of the contemporary discussions.163 
The question of propriety-impropriety, as of merit-demerit, approbation and 
disapprobation, of an action and virtue involves an analysis of the system of sympathy 
and the idea of practical moral judgements. Thus Smith in part IV o f the TMS argues 
against the argument which bases moral judgement on utility, since what is at stake is 
the appearance of utility rather than utility itself. Hume argued that utility can be the 
source of beauty, convenience and efficiency and thus becomes the source of pleasure 
and has an effect upon our sentiments of approbation. In social matters Smith 
examines the appearance of utility and its deceptive effects about social matters, as 
shown in section two.
163 Rawls (1973) highlights that Smith's argument noted the difficulties with the principle of 
utility. These difficulties were resolved either into utilitarianism or into rational intuitionism, i.e. 
the argument of human nature and disposition (p. xv). The basic contradiction of the utilitarian 
argument, according to Rawls, is that it "adopts for society as a whole the principle of rational 
choice of one man. Once this is recognised, the place of the impartial spectator and the emphasis 
on sympathy in the history of utilitarian thought is readily understood” (p. 27). In that sense the 
classic utilitarian argument did not take into account the distinction between persons. Van 
Holtoon (1993) argues for the utilitarianism in Smith's thought without even pointing out the 
problematic nature of utilitarianism (p. 48).
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There are three levels which are presupposed for the actual approbation or 
disapprobation of a particular action: first, the level of sentiments, second, the actual 
perception, third, the result of utility or disutility. These moments are distinct and 
essentially different from the perception o f beauty. The enhancement and enlivenment 
of "the sentiment of approbation always involves in it a sense of propriety quite 
distinct from the perception of utility" (TMS p. 188).
However, the question is still open How does Smith relate the sentiments o f  
propriety to that of perception of the beautiful and taste? He offers an account of 
Buffier's ideas and argues that habit and custom is not the only source of our sense of 
beauty or deformity, as Buffier argued What Smith underlines is the utility of the 
form which is perceived on an aesthetic basis;
"the utility of any form, its fitness for the useful purposes for which it was intended, 
evidently recommends it, and renders it agreeable to us, independent o f custom" 
(TMS p. 199).
In other words, it is not only custom and habit that have impressed upon our 
imagination our ideas of beauty and deformity. The very nature of a particular form 
and its end, as its indispensable content, may as well be independent of custom and 
habit.
The feeling of pleasure and the ability to  sympathise with others according to one's 
disposition is the basis for sociability even for the most selfish person, as I have shown 
in the examination of the system of sympathy. In other words, there is a difference 
between the sentiments of sympathy and the perception o f utility.164 This difference, 
more than having its basis in habit, custom, or merely usefulness, is to be perceived on 
the basis of the purposiveness of a particular form. It is also a disposition of our 
mind, the tendency to usefulness, and is the ground "for the sentiment of approbation
164 Introduction in TMS by Macfic and Raphael (p. 14).
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which involves the sense of propriety quite distinct from the perception of utility" 
(TMS p. 188).
To illustrate the pleasure arising from beauty Smith uses the example of natural 
beauty or the observation of a well-ordered machine in which there is co-ordination 
between its parts and its ends. At first sight, sympathy is that sentiment which arises 
from the perception of the beauty of a well-ordered and harmonious system (TMS p. 
87). By the analogy of the system in the WN, Smith means that "different 
observations are connected with a few common principles" (WN B V, 291). This 
conception of the system finds an application also in moral philosophy. Sympathy for 
Smith's moral system illustrates the difference between the perception of the 
harmonious relations (between parts and ends) and the sympathetic sentiments of 
approbation which have a social and moral origin. This distinction between 
naturalism and the natural idea of beauty and harmony is important for the aesthetic 
foundation of Smith's moral theory.
The two faculties, the perception of beauty and the sentiment of propriety and 
approbation, do not necessarily run counter to each other. They are different in the 
same way that understanding is different from reason. The latter faculties find their 
application, for example, in higher mathematics and science, but if they are to find 
public admiration they must be accepted as the utility of science, otherwise their 
sublime discoveries are depreciated as useless (TMS p. 189, WN B V, p. 293). In 
other words, utility does not exclude approbation and the perception of beauty.
The system of sympathy is central for the explanation of the sense of propriety and 
approbation, and due to the latter sympathy is distinguished between direct and 
indirect sympathy. The question of beauty and taste in nature is related to the 
question of the social, moral order as what "would be" is related to "what is". The 
perception of harmony in nature arises from the cooperation of all its parts to one
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principle according to an end. This perception of the beauty of nature is at the same 
time the perception of the end of nature as the beautiful and harmonious order.165 In 
the case of moral nature it is the relation between our moral sentiments and the 
general principles of reason.
Smith re-examines abstract formalism and reason from the point of view of the moral 
sentiments and the way they are formed. However critical he may be, he does not 
reject reason or moral rules altogether. Instead he deals with the process by which 
rules are established on the basis of one's experience and the sense of propriety as 
arising from action, impartiality and moral sense (TMS pp. 159-161). This process of 
establishing moral rules presupposes the rationality of the division of the different 
human faculties and their uses according to their particular nature. The faculties of 
perception are separated, but also co-ordinated according to an end which is the 
progress of human nature in a way that is just and desirable. In this way human 
nature is expounded as the process that improves nature according to its 
understanding of nature and man's moral principles. There seems to be a strong 
conception of "rationalism" in the analysis of moral sense and of the sentiments of 
nature and thus Smith avoids the contrasts between natural moral sentiments and 
moral sense.
While examining the general laws on the level of society Smith underlined the 
importance of them being in correspondence with human sentiments. That is the way 
for Smith that public spirit is advanced. But also in relation to natural teleology and 
how things are, Smith does not merely offer a descriptive argument. He holds that
"Thus man is by Nature directed to correct, in some measure, that distribution of 
things which she herself would otherwise have made. The rules which for this
165 This teleology of nature is developed also in Kant's Third Critique as Zweckmässigkeit. Kant 
explains this teleology as the "conformity to the law without law". This law is the necessity of the 
understanding which should be "at the service of imagination" (par. 22). Ioannidou (1991).
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purpose she prompts him to follow, are different from those which she herself 
observes. She bestows upon every virtue, and upon every vice, that precise reward or 
punishment which is best fitted to encourage the one, or to restrain the other" (TMS
p. 168).
This distinction seems to reflect the different degrees of the distinction between "is 
and ought", as Hume put it, but also the practical need of evaluation of an action. In 
addition, for Smith it is natural and proper for man to change the order and 
distribution of nature in the way which brings it into accordance with the standards of 
propriety. This need seems to be found in nature itself and therefore persons are to 
change the distribution of things, i.e. the natural course of things. These changes may 
as well be in favour of virtue The possibility of change in the distribution of things 
lies in their natural course, which, as is pointed out, "is rapid and difficult to control". 
Nevertheless, ends should be acquired only by the means nature has established. This 
is unavoidable and necessary, but also there lies the possibility of virtue (TMS p. 169). 
The principle of virtue in its actuality promotes order in society, and thus Smith, in 
contrast to earlier systems of moral philosophy but also of the modem systems, 
underlined the relation of moral judgements with practical questions in a just well- 
ordered society.
5. Moral sentiments and the critique of their corruption.
Smith's ideas on the well-ordered society as expressed on his account of public virtues 
was an essential part of the TMS. However, in societies of inequality of wealth and 
power he observes that luxury and power can be more likely to be the motivation for 
an action than public virtue. This moral observation was associated with the rise of 
commercial society and is also to be found in Ferguson's Essay on the History o f Civil
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Society (1767), where he pointed to that the separation between higher and lower 
classes as the result of the division of labour, to be found also in the LJ and the WN.
The emphasis in the TMS is on the analysis of the principle of authority and the way 
that, in combination with the principle of utility, it can result in the corruption o f the 
moral sentiments. In both TMS and the LJ Smith argues for two principles which 
induce men into society, and more specifically in civil society (L p. 9). The relations 
of authority and dependence are exposed on the basis of an argument of social 
interdependence but also on an argument based on the corrupted aesthetic sentiments. 
In other words, the way that individuals utilise the socially accumulated perceptions 
and wealth as part of their individuality is the basis for the distinction of authority and 
non-authority. The difference consists in the socially mediated relation to the 
advantages or disadvantages that the social position of individuals implies.
Smith observes in both TMS and the WN that it is in human disposition to admire the 
persons who have power and are subjects of social approbation. The means for 
acquiring it in commercial society is wealth (WN I p. 35). In the TMS Smith is more 
extensive in his analysis of the difference between the public and private person. He 
says that the man o f rank and distinction is the object of sympathy and public 
attention. His actions are the object of public care, the object of observation and 
fellow-feeling. This becomes the object of desire and the source of anxiety, because 
one's imagination draws in those delusive colours the abstract idea of the perfect 
happy state. In this way, spectators feel a peculiar sympathy with those who are in 
this situation. The spectator "feels in his breast more compassion and resentment" for 
anything that would put an end to their perfect enjoyment (TMS p. 52). The reasons 
that give occasion to this abstract idea of the happy state are supported by the idea of 
propriety and education for their public activities which leads people into submission 
to authority, as supplementary to rank and pre-eminence, in the same way that the 
power of a king is supported by his educated talents and his virtues. Therefore, the
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public man has the combination of authority, means, and education, which are 
approved as what is proper to public activities and he is recognised through that as a 
public person
In contrast, the private man ought to have virtues different from the public person 
The people's dependence on the rich and powerful should be balanced with their 
private capacities and virtues, such as the labour o f their body, the activity of one's 
mind and superior knowledge and industry. The lower orders' virtues are professional 
abilities, and their respectful relation to the law arises from the fact that they can never 
be great enough to be above the law. Therefore, for them the rules of justice are 
important. Although as a matter of fact it is a human disposition from which the 
admiration of the superior power, wealth, etc., arises, this disposition is constructed 
according to the already existing social orders and ranks. The propriety and 
admiration of a certain public activity should be in accordance with the social duties 
that it has to serve. As Smith points in the LJ the poor support themselves by their 
work and though they expect no benefit from rich and wise, they have a strong 
propensity to pay them respect (LJ 1964 p. 9). What the people should wish is to 
gain love, friendship and esteem among their equals (TMS p. 66). However, the 
persons of distinction and higher rank know that they do not possess these private 
talents and virtues. That makes them unwilling to expose themselves to danger or 
even to meet duties which need a certain type of private virtue. In this way Smith 
describes the interdependence between the different ranks that arises from their 
different roles and duties in an ordered society.
On the whole Smith does not see much difference between the satisfactions of the 
beggar and the king, even if the means for their satisfaction are different, even though 
it is in the human disposition to try for the bettering of one's condition. The reason 
for the latter has its source in the desire of being the object of attention, sympathy, 
and approbation. The paradox is that people's nature has a tendency to deceive
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Their moral sentiments are dependent on the means of the rich and the powerful, and 
their dependence at the same time impels them to the development of some other 
private virtues which are proper for the tasks which they have to serve This relation 
between means and ends is illusory. According to the doctrine of nature, they are 
dependent on the means (wealth, power) which excite their sympathetic sentiments 
The dependence on this means, impels them into the development of virtues which 
lead to a sense of self-importance.
According to Smith, moral corruption does not come from the separation of means 
and ends, but from vanity and the impropriety which is related to empty ambition. For 
Smith “natural illusion” involves the identification of the motive for social 
approbation, by achieving greatness which is concedered to be the end, with the 
means such as wealth. The corrupted ambition and vanity leads to disorder and the 
violation of the laws.166 Therefore, the reason why this natural illusion and the 
corrupted ambition exist lies in the fact that there is more respect and admiration for 
wealth and greatness than for wisdom and virtue. These societies in which the above 
virtues are held in the utmost contempt and derision are corrupted.
Smith's argument, though it starts from an analysis of human disposition, seems to be 
in harmony with the social need of stability. The origin of the distinction of ranks and 
of the order in society is founded in the "natural" disposition of the people.
166 This primacy of public utility is what supports Smith's argument of justice and peace in society 
in the L (L ed. 1964 p. 10). On the basis of the difference of the principles of utility and authority 
Smith distinguishes between the different forms of constitution such as monarchy and democracy. 
His argument goes as follows: men in general have their own reasons to follow these principles 
according to their natural dispositions or because it is right to do so, because they see others do it, 
because it is a sin against god or because of their sense of obedience. The power of government is 
not bound to these subjectively viewed motives for obedience and the sense of public utility. The 
foundation of a duty or of obedience in this case cannot be a principle with which mankind is 
entirely unacquainted. Individuals must have some idea, however confused, of the principle upon 
which they act (L 1964 p. 12). What Smith argues for in the Lectures is the principles of utility 
and authority in the way they arc perceived by individuals. Contract is rejected as inadequate to 
support obedience to civil government and thus secure public benefit. Instead the principles of 
authority and utility which are perceived as subjective reasons for the individuals can be the 
source of public utility and thus the safeguard of public peace (L 1964 p. 13).
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"Upon this disposition of mankind, to go along with all the passions of the rich and 
the powerful, is founded the distinction of the ranks, and the order in society. Our 
obsequiousness to our superiors more frequently arises from our admiration for the 
advantages of their situation, than from any private expectations of benefit from their 
good-will. ... We desire to serve them for their own sake ..." (TMS p. 52).
In this way the order in society is best supported But the paradox is that "even when 
the order of society seems to require that we should oppose [the rich and powerful], 
we can hardly bring ourselves to do it" (TMS p. 52).
"This disposition to admire, and almost to worship, the rich and the powerful, and to 
despise, or at least, to neglect persons of poor and mean condition, though necessary 
both to establish and to maintain the distinction of ranks and the order in society, is, at 
the same time, the great and most universal cause of corruption of our moral 
sentiments. That wealth and greatness are often regarded with the respect and 
admiration which are due only to wisdom and virtue; and that the contempt, of which 
vice and folly are the only proper objects, is often most unjustly bestowed upon 
poverty and weakness, has been the complaint of moralists in all ages" (TMS pp. 61- 
2).
The hypocrisy of beauty when this beauty is based in the dependence or admiration of 
the means is an expression of moral corruption, and in social matters leads to the 
violation of the laws, which are treated merely as means to wealth and greatness. The 
latter form of corruption is associated with the rise of commercial society where the 
principles of virtue and wisdom seem to play a secondary role (TMS pp. 61-2).167
In terms of the system of sympathy, the excited sympathy in the above case is only 
indirect sympathy with the means, rather than redoubled sympathetic sentiments. The 
excitement of the sympathetic sentiments and the approbation of propriety of an
167 Phillipson (1983) points out the attitude in commercial wisdom to identify the means with 
political wisdom and virtue. He points out the importance that the latter have for Smith, who is 
critical of this type of identification (p. 181).
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action or situation, requires not only that the spectator should sympathise entirely 
with the person who acts, but he/she should also perceive this perfect concord 
between his/her sentiments and the spectator.
The disposition to admire and to imitate the rich and the great is what Smith calls 
fashion. This results in hypocrisy and the pretension to be what one is not. This 
situation creates suspicion and corruption (TMS pp. 64-5). Ambition, splendour, and 
prosperity are the results of the desire for the sympathy of the others, but also the 
sources of vanity, tumult, injustice, and avarice.
The doctrine of reason and philosophy is unlike that of nature and fashion and in that 
sense the given social order is not best possible. The person of fashion who seems to 
be more admired according to the doctrine of nature is different from Smith's 
legislator or philosopher who is the person of virtue. According to the doctrine of 
reason and philosophy "that kings are the servants of the people, to be obeyed, 
resisted deposed, or punished, as the public conveniency may require" (TMS p. 53).
In the chapter on the character of virtue Smith says that the political speculators and 
sovereign princes are most dangerous when they consider the state as made for 
themselves, and not themselves for the state According to Smith, the task of modem 
political authority is the reform and removal of obstructions on the way to a well- 
ordered society. This means the reduction of the authority o f  the nobility, the 
abolition of the privileges of cities and provinces, and the prevention of the conflict 
between individuals and the orders of the state by rendering them incapable of 
opposing its commands. For Smith the independent state is divided into different 
orders which, according to the way of their composition and the particular distribution 
of powers and privileges, forms what is the constitution of the particular state (TMS 
p. 230). The stability of the constitution guarantees the security and protection of the 
different orders dependent upon the state (TMS p. 231).
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For Smith the idea of achieving the best possible harmony in social matters is a 
combination of what is and of what would be. Thus the "is" "ought" conflict is to be 
bridged by the political activity of the wise legislator. Thus political intervention is to 
resolve the conflicting and corrupting tendencies in society of inequality and wealth, 
even though the intervention has to follow the principle of the motion of every single 
part in society. Smith uses the metaphor of the chess board to describe the different 
motions which have their own rules and the intervention, if it is to be successful, has 
to co-ordinate the motion of the part rather than merely being imposed in them (TMS 
p. 234).168
6. The moderation of passions and public virtues.
Private passions may as well become private virtues provided that are to be on the 
appropriate degree, as Hutcheson had shown. The key issue is the moderation of 
particular private passions A list o f private virtues characteristic of the private 
person may be the habits of economy, industry, discretion, attention, and application 
of thought, which in general are cultivated out of self-interested motives and, in 
addition, are known to be praiseworthy qualities in society. At first sight public 
virtues seem to be in contrast to private virtues but also to self-interested motives. 
What differentiates private virtuous habits and activities, and self-interest is their 
degree and propriety which is the condition for their approbation (TMS p. 304). In 
the same way, self-love is a principle which is not always vicious but its moral quality 
is to be judged in its relation to the idea of the general good.
Therefore, passions in general are not rejected or contrasted to virtue, but could 
advance to virtue when they are in the proper degree, as Hutcheson argued 
Consequently, the impartial spectator is disposed to sympathize with every passion
168 For an account on society viewed as the chess board see Ibid., chapter V.
124
which accords with propriety (TMS p. 242). For Smith it is important to notice that 
the most agreeable degree of passions, emotions and habits, for the impartial 
spectator, is likewise most agreeable for the person himself That implies that the 
impartial spectator judges as i f  he had the knowledge of the motives of the person 
who acts. This correspondence seems to be the result of the propriety and knowledge 
which is essential for individual moral dispositions In this case the moderation of the 
sentiments o f self-love arises mainly as a capacity of the person to be practical and the 
possibility o f the actualisation of virtue.
In TMS Smith offers a typology of human passions and, as has been argued, one 
source of his ideas of moderation was a stoic influence. Principles such as prudence 
and self-command seem to be central for Smith's conceptions of private virtues. Self- 
command is the source of the moderation of passions, and it is essential for the 
articulation of private virtues and the moderation of selfish passions. Moderated 
passion excites the sympathy of the impartial spectator, and in general is the subject of 
approbation. Self-command is a private virtue, and other virtues seem to derive their 
principal worth from it, as the possibility of the actuality of other virtues (TMS p 
241).
Smith says that the virtue which concerns the happiness of the person is the virtue of 
prudence The virtue arising among related persons is the virtue of justice and 
benevolence These virtues come out of the position of the supposed impartial 
spectator and have a moderating effect on our sentiments, and out o f our moderated 
self-love, which is expressed through our self-command. The moderation of self- 
interest is introduced in parallel with the moderation of the opposition of "what is" 
and "what ought to be". This moderation is described along with what "would be", 
the sentiments of other people in such a way that allows the impartial spectator to 
enter into and sympathise with those sentiments. Smith argues for the approbation of 
self-command which has a strong sense of propriety in it (TMS p 264).
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However, the question of self-love arises in its general actuality as a part of the issue 
of the propriety of action. The sense o f the propriety of action leads to sympathetic 
sentiments. Therefore, the typology introduced in the second section of the propriety 
of action is important. What is the "degree" that makes the motive of an action 
proper? What is the criterion for this and how does it arise? These questions are 
important because this is the standard that excites the approbation or disapprobation 
of the impartial spectator. If the passion is too low or too high the impartial spectator 
cannot enter into it, the sentiments that the spectator can go along with, are of a 
certain mediocrity (TMS p 26). Here the issue of the "propriety of passion" reveals 
that what is at stake is the mediocrity o f a certain passion, which changes in relation 
to the particular quality o f the different passions. There are passions for which there 
is little sympathy and others for which there is great sympathy (TMS p. 27). What is 
the reason for this? The typology that Smith introduces is as follows: there are 
passions which have a natural cause and others that take their origin in the 
imagination (TMS p. 29). Mainly in the second case (which is more important for 
Smith's system of sympathy), what we sympathise with or not is not the object of the 
senses but the idea o f  our imagination.
Unsociable passion excites "unsympathetic" sentiments, or to put it in terms of the 
system of sympathy, there is an opposition between direct and indirect sympathy. 
Unsociable passions such as hatred and resentment exacerbate the opposition between 
direct and indirect sympathy, and thus sympathy appears as a divided sentiment. In 
other words, there is a lack of correspondence between the motives of the actor and 
the person who is object o f them (TMS p. 34). The selfish passions hold a middle 
place between the social and the unsociable passions, and they are in their constitution 
neither social nor unsociable (TMS p 40).
In the case of social passions, the division between direct and indirect sympathy is one 
of correspondence since the feeling or motives of the actor and those of the person
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that the action is acted upon are in correspondence. To put it differently, there is a 
coincidence between the motives and the desire of the agent and its effects in the 
person who is the object of it. Therefore, the divided sympathy instead of being led in 
opposition is redoubled and renders agreeable sentiments. This type of sympathy is 
the one which promotes the public spirit in the social constitution.
7. The principle of self-love and sympathy.
"The idea, in short, which those authors [Hobbes, Mandeville br. added] were groping 
about, but which they were never able to unfold distinctly, was that indirect sympathy 
which we feel with the gratitude or resentment of those who received the benefit or 
suffered the damage resulting from such opposite characters: and it was this which 
they were indistinctly pointing at, when they said, that it was not the thought of what 
we had gained or suffered which prompted our applause or indignation, but the 
conception or imagination of what we might gain or suffer if were to act in society 
with such associates" (TMS p. 317).
Having dealt with self-love as neither a social nor an unsociable passion, Smith 
examines the modem systems of moral philosophy which are based on the principle of 
self-love, i.e. they deduce any activity or judgement from self-love.169 Both Hobbes 
and Mandeville, despite the differences in their approach, argued that all sentiments 
have their source in the principle of self-love. For Smith self-love is a fundamental 
principle to understand and explain individual action but also the basis for 
communication among strangers on the social level. However, Smith's approach
169 Psychopedis (1990) emphasises the difference between a critical approach that Smith 
introduces and a Hobbesian approach based on egoistic action. According to Psychopedis, Smith 
disputes the Hobbesian stand-point of an unmediated selfish principle. Smith, by having a 
virtuous social model, from which approbation and disapprobation arises, brings about moderation 
of the one selfish principle from which, according to Hobbes, the approbation or disapprobation 
arises. This moderation for Smith is not necessarily a result of the fear of the law, but of the 
knowledge of the law and of the relation to the other members of society. From the stand-point of 
the politico-economic analysis, the moderation of selfishness leads to the theory of the division of 
labour which is the initial presupposition but also the condition and criterion for the success of the 
selfish purposes (p 12).
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goes beyond it by articulating the system of sympathy and by analysing the structures 
of illusion (TMS p. 14 f). Smith's analyses of sympathetic sentiments avoids the 
confusion which arises from Hobbes's idea that every quality arises from the principle 
of self-love, which is the principle of every human action (TMS p. 314).
Smith's critique of Hobbes and Mandeville, as it is put in terms of his system of 
sympathy, is that they identified sympathy with indirect sympathy and thus missed the 
relation of direct and indirect sympathy and the different qualities that are illustrated 
through that (TMS pp. 75-6). Direct sympathy is the sentiment that someone feels for 
the agent who acts; indirect sympathy, the sentiment for the object of the action. 
According to the system o f sympathy, the quality o f the principle of self-love is 
rendered as indirect sympathy.
What is less felt is that we sympathise with the agent by imagining ourselves in his 
position (this is direct sympathy), and by means of indirect sympathy with those to 
which the action refers. When someone feels direct sympathy for the motives of the 
agent, he actually feels indirect sympathy for the sufferer or the one who benefits from 
the action. In short, the only sentiment that could be felt is indirect sympathy, which 
is different from taking the sentiment of self-love as the principle. For example, the 
fact that the well-ordered and harmonious society benefits people who participate in it 
because of self-love does not mean that sympathising with the beauty of the harmony 
of parts and ends is the same as sympathising with the selfish motives of the 
individuals.170 The sentiment someone can feel for the self-love of the individuals is
170 Pufendorf and Mandevillc were to be put under the same category as Hobbes with regard to the 
principle of self-love.
"According to Mr. Hobbes and many of his followers man is driven to take refuge in society, not 
by any natural love which he bears to his own kind, but because without the assistance of the 
others he is incapable of subsisting with ease or safety" (TMS p. 315).
On this account, society becomes necessary for man and its interest becomes the individual's own 
interest. The self-love sentiment applies in the calculation of the utility that the individual finds, 
through refuge in society. The selfish individual sympathises indirectly with the benefit that is 
received from the well-ordered system of society. Smith insists that sympathy to the idea of the 
well-ordered society is different from the benefit that this could provide to the individual, i.e. it is 
based on the pleasure of observing the order in society and this argument is an essential part of his
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indirect sympathy, but not the sympathy which arises from the synthesis of direct and 
indirect sympathy.
The sympathy Smith argues for cannot in any sense be regarded as a selfish principle 
It arises from an imaginary process in which the spectator takes the position of the 
person who is principally concerned Thus imaginary sympathy cannot be the one­
sided quality of self-love when its source is, first, the imaginary change of position 
with the other and, secondly, the consciousness of the correspondence between the 
sentiments of the agent and the spectator. The imaginary change of position might be 
possible by means of self-love (feeling the other's position as if the spectator was 
agent), but it is not necessarily identified only with this sentiment (TMS p. 317). 
Thus, the sympathetic sentiment in this case, which may not arise out of selfishness, is 
what Smith articulates in his system of sympathy.
8. Smith and Mandeville on "private vice and public benefit".
In Smith's examination o f  the different systems of moral philosophy, their differences 
have an effect on the habits which are important for moral and practical matters. 
Their importance lies in that they encourage a praiseworthy disposition and 
discourage a blameable one, and there lies the importance of the science of ethics, but 
also the philosophical and practical aspect in Smith's argument. The subject of 
Smith's examination of the systems of moral philosophy was a historical account of 
virtue. In most pre-modern systems virtue appeared as a positive principle For the 
ancient systems, such as Plato's, virtue is propriety, for the stoic Roman systems it is 
prudence, for Hutcheson's system virtue is benevolence. Instead, for modem systems 
self-love was to be the primary principle. This account reflects on the way that the
moral aesthetic argument. For a more extensive account of this question, sec the account in the LJ 
and Smith's account on authority, utility and justice. Ioannidou (1994), also fot. 27.
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moral distinctions between vice and virtue, propriety and impropriety of any affection 
and any quality are made.
As I have pointed out in the introductory section of this chapter, Smith was 
particularly critical of the modern moral systems that posited self-love as the primary 
motive for action and thus as the primary virtue in modem society. This issue is 
broadly disputable since a number of authors have read Smith as "Mandeville without 
a paradox". In the TMS Smith deals with Mandeville's argument as “not fulfilling the 
philosophical standards” because it does not provide the possibility for the distinction 
between vice and virtue. Mandeville rejected as hypocrisy the fact that there is a 
distinction between vice and virtue, since both these qualities are identical. He denied 
that other sentiments apart from self-love can inspire a public- spirited action. All the 
distinctions of moral philosophy such as "a sense o f propriety", or "from a regard to 
what is commendable and praiseworthy", are what he calls "vanity". The motive for 
action is, therefore, only a selfish motive which aims at the improvement of one's 
position, happiness and prosperity. Whatever appears to be other than that is only an 
appearance which is imposed on the people. His proof is that when this imposition is 
absent our disposition tends to selfish motives and vanity. What appears to the 
spectator as self-denying or disinterested is an action no less selfish than by motives of 
self-love in which flattery and delight of praise are not expected. In the first delusive 
situation (where the motives of self-love are not obvious) what is expected could be 
only praise and approbation. Therefore, Mandeville is rejecting the possibility of an 
act of self-denial or a public action (e g. heroic action) in relation to others, which has 
as its motive something other than utility for a self-seeking individual.
According to Smith there could also be a consideration of self-love even in the most 
generous and public-spirited action. For Smith an action that is based on selfish 
motives may frequently be a virtuous action. But the question of the quality of 
someone's action does not give an answer to the problem of the reality of virtue, but
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examines virtue as appearance. On that level Smith's argument separates the reality of 
the principle of virtue from the means by which it is realised For Smith this 
separation differentiates moral philosophy from sophistry and natural philosophy.171
Smith recognises that there is an affinity between vanity and love of virtue or love of 
glory. Both these passions aim at acquiring esteem and approbation. The difference 
between them is that the one is a just passion and the other is unjust. The one would 
be easily satisfied, the other is never to be satisfied The basic difference in the 
affinity of these passions is that the just passions are not only an abstract desire, but 
have reference to the sentiments of others (TMS p 310). They are somehow socially 
moderated passions rather than merely being self-loving passions, but are also the 
condition and the possibility of the desire for virtue and its satisfaction.
On Mandeville's account, it is not only that the source of moral action is vanity and 
therefore there is no real virtue, but that to the extent that virtue is human it is 
imperfect. According to Smith, Mandeville represents every passion as wholly vicious 
in any degree and direction (TMS p. 312). He does not draw the distinction between 
"what is" or "what ought to be" or "what would be" out of the sentiments of others or 
the relationship with others. This is the core of Mandeville's sophistry, which 
concludes in the identification of private vice with the public benefit and lacks the 
mediated imaginary or "impartial" moment related with his system of sympathy that 
Smith introduces. Further, Smith shows that Mandeville's argument can be used to 
argue for popular asceticism which turns out to be opposed to any improvement of 
arts and science, as leading to luxury, as well to an idea of the public benefit. The 
idea of public benefit for Mandeville is only an appearance, and the only situation in 
which there is no illusion involved is when private vice is identified with public 
benefit. For him, every appearance of public spirit is "cheat or imposition upon
171 See Smith's comment on Descartes and French natural philosophy in (TMS p. 313).
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mankind". In this sense to argue for the possibility of an action which is inspired by 
the public spirit is hypocritical.172
For Mandeville the distinctive line between reality and appearance is imposed upon 
mankind. For Smith the philosophical task starts from the illusion in the 
understanding of "nature" and claims to show not only the actuality o f this distinction 
between reality and appearance, as all the moral systems had shown, but also how the 
principle of virtue is real and actual in social affairs. For Smith, the starting-point is 
not an imposed "ought" or an externality which might be apparent, but the desire of 
doing something which renders ourselves the object of approbation. What for 
Mandeville is vanity, for Smith can be the best passion in human nature and he defines 
it as the love of virtue. This is realised through the relation between the desired 
object and the satisfaction of the desire through the realisation of its object. Instead, 
in Mandeville, this type of realisation of the love of virtue is the source o f the guilt of 
vanity precisely because of the desire of being praised.
Smith deals with Mandeville's system as a sophistry which he distinguishes from 
philosophy. He attacks Mandeville's notions, saying that they
"are almost in every respect erroneous, however, [with] some appearances in human 
nature, which, when viewed in a certain manner, seem at first sight to favour them. ... 
These, described and exaggerated by the lively and humorous, though coarse and 
rustic eloquence of Dr. Mandeville, have thrown upon his doctrines an air of truth and 
probability..." (TMS p. 308).
Smith says that Mandeville's system is the only system that at least taught vice which 
avows the corruption of motives, although it does not reflect on the causes from
172 In Smith's words: "All public spirit therefore, all preference of public to private interest, is 
according to him, a mere cheat and imposition upon mankind; and that human virtue which is so 
much boasted of, and which is the occasion of so much emulation among men, is the mere 
offspring of flattery begot upon pride" (TMS p 309).
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which it arises. In Mandeville's system vice can be imposed in a great number of 
persons, but it cannot be referred to men in their social relations. This latter problem 
becomes the subject of Smith's inquiry. Further, Mandeville does not offer a positive 
theory of society in the sense that he merely deals with society as an aggregate of 
selfish individuals.
Mandeville's system, in addition, seems to be closer to a system of natural philosophy 
which appears plausible. However, its plausibility does not mean that it actually has a 
foundation in nature, which is different from natural appearance and thus lacks the 
resemblance to truth. At this point Smith draws the distinction between natural 
philosophy, which is concerned with the appearances in nature, and moral philosophy, 
which mainly explores, first, the relations among people, second the origins of the 
motives of human action in relation with others, and third, the source of the opinion 
of others.173
But it may seem contradictory that natural philosophy is not founded in nature and 
moral philosophy is concerned with principles founded in nature. It may as well be 
questioned why is the foundation in nature important? Smith answers by arguing that 
the subject of moral philosophy is not an abstract question. It is rather a practical 
question concerning people's moral sentiments in relation to others Therefore, the 
nature of the subject of moral philosophy is a practical subject and has its foundation 
in people's social existence.
The naturalistic elements in Smith's thought, are represented in his TMS as the natural 
order but also later in the WN in his idea of the perfect system of liberty and natural
173 For Smith, the principle of virtue, passions, and desires are articulated and are possible as 
objects of the public opinion of the approbation or disapprobation of others. But this 
independence of the approbation or disapprobation could mean the end of the individual's own 
desire or the repression of individuals' desires by what is called public opinion. The criterion in 
this case is not only public opinion but also the relation of the passion with the love of virtue. On 
the issue of public opinion, sec Winch (1978) pp. 168-170.
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justice of the invisible hand. Nature is related with social matters as a dynamic and 
teleological concept which is endorsed and has a share in the enlightenment 
philosophical discussions.174 But if the question of imposed distinctions arises, it must 
at least have some resemblance to the truth or some foundation in practical aspects of 
people's lives and in the things that are really our domestic affairs This is the 
practical part of Smith's moral philosophy. In this sense, every imposed principle 
which is supposed to be in the nature of our sentiments and has no resemblance to 
another principle is characterised not only as abstract, but as injudicious and 
ridiculous.
Smith's critique of Mandeville is mainly focused in the way he relativises morality and 
values and by endorsing his argument he offers a philosophical treatment of the 
subject o f social virtue in commercial society. Smith's discussion of virtue in the TMS 
led him to highlight the importance and priority of public virtues as the real 
precondition of private virtues. Next I shall examine Smith's discussion of the 
principle o f justice as a moral and political principle as discussed in the TMS and the 
LJ but also in the WN.
174 Smith considers as the constitution of nature its purposiveness. The idea of the invisible hand, 
is paralleled in the secondary literature on Smith and Hegel with the idea of the cunning of 
reason. For both authors the contradictions of morality and of modernity led them to find the 
ethical quality of the teleology of nature. In return that effected the practical role of morality in 
social matters.
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Chapter five
1. Justice and the political economy of natural law.
In chapter IV I have examined Smith's moral theory, his account of sympathy, the 
impartial spectator and the way that he contributed to the discussion of virtue and 
moral judgement, which was mainly based in the “different” conceptions of moral 
sense I have shown that in the TMS argument, and in particular in the sixth edition, 
Smith discusses the type o f priority of the public virtues o f justice in relation to 
private virtues in modem society.
This principle of justice as a moral, social and, in its effects, political principle is "the 
pillar of social order". The idea of justice as the main public virtue is supplemented by 
a number of other conceptions of justice such as natural justice, as the primary virtue 
in relation to people's moral sentiments, which are illustrated in an exemplary form 
and articulate further Smith's idea of justice.175 There are three conceptions of justice 
that I shall mainly distinguish; first, justice as a natural teleological concept. Second, 
justice as founded in the natural sentiment of the people's self-interest or an idea of the 
good. Third, justice as the modern conception of justice, i.e. based on positive law 
and thus the argument of the political economy of justice as "justice imposed".
Smith is in favour of the modern rationality posited by the system of law and 
individuals' rights and he is critical of traditional forms of restrictions of individuals' 
liberties by moral constrains. The key question is how to endorse to a certain extent 
natural law demands in the modern institutional conception of justice. For the latter, 
the need of modern stable institutions is essential in order to avoid an "imposition" of 
the modem institutions and laws. As argued in the TMS, laws need to have their
os The exemplary form of presentation is addressed as the "method that Smith uses in contrast to 
examinations which arc based on the exposition o f 'th e  concept per sc". Buchanan (1979) p. 122.
135
foundation in the ideas of the good that correspond to people's sentiments. 
Nevertheless, the content of the modern law has to be put in a modem positive form 
The first part of the LJ concerns the idea of justice which is the first subdivision of 
Jurisprudence.
Justice is essential for Smith's idea of the well-ordered society and that is reflected in 
both his lectures and the WN. His theory of Jurisprudence is based on the notes of his 
students, and a first set was first published by Cannan in 1896. These lectures were to 
lead to his third book on virtue and the history of jurisprudence, which was never 
published, and instead led to the writing of the political economy .176 Thus my view of 
his Jurisprudential theory of justice is based on the reconstruction of the student's 
notes, but also I compare the conception of justice in the TMS and the WN In the LJ 
Smith offers a history of the laws of society which is introduced on the basis of the 
well-known "four stage-theory" and the need to analyse the political economy of 
commercial society. That leads to the second subdivision of natural Jurisprudence 
and an account o f police which is an analysis of the politico-economic aspects of 
commercial societies with a developed division of labour.
In the WN the conflict of natural law and of the modem institutions of justice is to be 
examined in the particular form of commercial society as arising from the pre-modem 
forms of organisation of rights of labour. The problem is how to balance an idea of 
the system of perfect liberty, set on the basis of an idea of natural justice, with 
particular questions arising from the modem form of the division of labour, the 
"tasks” of the sovereign as political institutional regulation through policies of 
education which reflect the politico-economic relations in modem institutions
ne Stein (1979) p. 622.
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2. Justice moral and public virtue.
The concept of justice as moral principle in the TMS is modified from the first to the 
sixth editions. An idea of natural teleology and justice is further developed into an 
idea of justice as public virtue. In the sixth edition, published before Smith’s death in 
1790, Smith added part VI, where he offers an analysis o f the character of virtue.
Part IV starts with an analysis of private virtues such as prudence and self-command 
These private virtues, when directed by benevolence and justice, increase the 
"splendour of those other virtues" (TMS p. 241). The moderation of passions seems 
to be the key for transforming private passions into public virtues, which are the 
source of motivation for an action. What needs to be highlighted is that Smith does 
not merely identify or reduce private virtues to public benefits. This relation seems to 
be a social relation and it has a natural foundation in habitual and basic social 
sentiments such as friendship and sympathy. This moral basis is reconsidered in the 
way it became important in the commercial society o f inequalities and in the modem 
nation state.
Smith's moral philosophy led him into his social theory, as is shown in particular in the 
sixth edition of the TMS. The last part of this edition offers an account of the idea of 
the well-ordered society which secures individuals' well-being and also reinforces 
somehow private virtues as public virtues in the way that private are conditioned by 
public virtues. In the context of the modern nation public virtues are put forward 
such as that of the patriot, which is the source of motivation of heroic action based on 
the love of the country, but does not necessarily show a love of mankind. Somehow 
the security of the internal tranquillity of the nation state seems to be compatible with 
the idea of the love of mankind. The love of one's country involves two principles: 
first, the establishment of the constitution and the second principle concerns the idea 
of the good citizen with respect to the law and promotes the welfare for the whole
137
society and of his fellow-citizens These principles are rather the result of a brief 
account of the type of divisions to be observed in society as division of different 
orders in societies of privilege and inequalities. For Smith all these orders, for their 
protection and security, have to count on the stability of the state. Thus the idea of 
love for one's country, if looked at from the perspective of its utility, seems to be the 
love of stability as the essence of the public spirit. That is what I call the "public 
utility" argument, which was also used in the LJ for the critique of contractarian 
arguments of society and secures public order (LJ (B) pp. 401-4).
For the Smith of the sixth edition the development of public institutions has to be also 
supported by moral virtues such as beneficence. Elsewhere in the TMS, and also in 
the different parts of his work, Smith, although recognising the importance of 
beneficence and other public virtues, points out that in societies of inequalities society 
can be led to disorders if basic ideas of justice and public spirit are not employed for 
the promotion of social order and peace. Therefore, if living in just societies that all 
human beings should desire is taken as a social value then that should also be in 
accordance with a rational and desirable formation of the economy of nature, and the 
promotion of public spirit is an essential part of it. This moral naturalistic teleology is 
a common feature of the enlightenment tradition.
Justice, being distinguished from other social virtues such as prudence and 
benevolence, is a primary social virtue necessary for the well-ordered society (TMS p. 
80). Prudence, although fundamental for individuals, is not a directly social virtue, 
having a binding element that is the distinctive element of justice. The virtue of 
benevolence is, in the same way as justice, founded in the moral sense of persons.177
1,7 Raphael (1969) analyses one of the unpublished manuscripts by Smith, appendix II of the TMS 
(1976), where Smith offers a natural, Christian view on justice. This is where his idea of justice to 
our neighbour seems to lie (TMS p. 392). This conception of justice in this manuscript are taken 
from Aristotle and Grotius. For the former, justice is dealt with as distributive and commutative, and 
for the latter justia attributrix and justia explentrics.
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To illustrate this, Smith uses the example of fair play and the spectators. Smith 
analyses the sense o f justice by referring to the conditions of the competition in the 
race for power and wealth. The competitors in this race can use all their powers "but 
if... (one) should justle, or throw down" any of the other competitors, the indulgence 
of the impartial spectators is entirely at an end. The motive leading to the violation of 
the play is the self-love of the offender and that does not meet the sympathy of the 
spectators. However, every person with regard to his own happiness is more 
important than that of his competitors. From the standpoint of the impartial spectator 
this does not justify the violation of the rules of justice and that would end the 
indulgence of the public spectators (TMS p. 83). The sympathy for the player who 
has been violated requires the punishment of the offender. However, it should be kept 
in mind that the principle of self-love is not condemned in general. It is approved in 
its moderated form, i.e. by taking account of it in an idea of public utility to secure the 
conditions of a fair play.
Therefore, an action motivated by benevolent sentiments, patriotism or what Smith 
calls "public spirited" action is the subject of approbation. Nevertheless, this is not as 
necessary as is justice, at least for the "society of strangers" which is connected with 
the political economy of the modern state. Benevolence among self-interested, equal 
individuals cannot be binding in the way that justice is.178 Thus justice as social virtue 
is more important than the virtue of prudence or the traditional moral view arguing 
for beneficence and benevolent sentiments.179 Justice for the Scottish enlightenment 
natural Jurisprudence was a "strict obligation". Smith put the question of justice in 
practical terms and thus he underlined the importance of justice as the "primary social
178 Smith introduced justice as the primary social virtue instead of benevolence, which was 
religiously taught and commonly accepted among the Scots moral philosophers (see Hutcheson's 
moral philosophy). Thus, much earlier than his WN, and although including some naturalistic and 
theological elements, a more systematic modem argument to civilised society is developed, based on 
justice among equals.
<79 Campbell argues that Smith was a Mandcvillc without a paradox in that he developed the ways 
that self-interest was channelled into socially beneficial manifestations (Campbell (1967) p. 571).
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virtue" in his examination of merit and demerit in chapter II (TMS p. 80). In dealing 
with Hutcheson's argument, Smith agrees that benevolence is one of the most 
agreeable virtues, but not as essential as justice for the constitution of society. The 
distinction between justice and all the other social virtues is founded in the sensibility 
of the person and their relation to the others, which either prevents or punishes an 
unjust action Thus the principle of justice is that primary social virtue which 
corresponds to the natural moral sentiments of people (TMS p. 80). This sense of 
justice is an essential social virtue as the principle which is based on the sentiments of 
propriety in acting according to justice. It indicates the particular quality that social 
relations are based upon and this can avoid public disorder and work in favour of 
public utility.
The public utility argument on justice is illustrated by the example of the idea of 
society among merchants, which is also used in the LJ in the account of public 
jurisprudence, while inquiring into the principles of government. To constitute a 
society among merchants mutual love is not required as it is for the constitution of a 
community as argued by Christian natural law. The nation state can be based on the 
love of one's country, i.e. patriotism but what is needed for stability and thus order in 
a democratic society is a sense of utility. In a democratic society although there is no 
legislated moral or political obligation in the traditional sense, there seem to be 
important a mercenary value, i.e. exchange of good services according to an agreed 
valuation as the basis of stability and order (TMS pp. 86-87). The possibility of 
reaching agreement requires, apart from self-interest, a sense of justice which does not 
reduce self-interest to self-love. From that standpoint, although benevolence appears 
as the "ornament which embellishes" society, justice is the "main pillar that holds the 
whole edifice".
Smith argues along the same lines in part III of the TMS when examining the sense of 
duty and justice. Comparing justice with other social virtues, he points out that the
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rules of justice are distinguished for their exactness and accuracy, which is not that 
essential for other social virtues such as prudence, charity, generosity, gratitude and 
friendship. Justice is paralleled to the rules of grammar, and on that basis Smith 
explores the sense of duty as it was discussed in the scholastic moral tradition. That 
can not just be imposed by the government, but is subject to practical ethical rules in 
the way that they prompt the idea of justice and have their moral foundation in moral 
sentiments.
I shall use Smith's metaphor by which he deals with society as a chess board "An 
ideal plan of government is bound to fail if the imposition of a particular form of 
motion intended to be imposed is not co-ordinated with the principle of own motion 
for the parts". If that is the case then the game will go successfully and happily if the 
principle of motion of the legislator is harmoniously related to the principles of motion 
o f the different pieces. The political aspect of this argument intended a critique of 
policies of political speculators who thwart the public good when imposing privileges 
o f cities and provinces and thus "render individuals and the greatest orders of society 
as incapable in opposing to their commands, as weakest and most insignificant" (TMS 
P 234).
Smith closes his account on virtue and moral philosophy by offering a historical 
analysis of virtue from antiquity to the modern systems of moral philosophy.
3. The critical and the Scholastic view of justice.
A comparison o f the way that the different systems of moral philosophy dealt with the 
practical rules of morality in comparison to the rules of justice led Smith to the 
conclusion that the rules of justice had to be more strict than the moral rules (LJ p 
327). In part three, published in the early edition of TMS, Smith examines the sense
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of duty and points out that moral rules are subject to individuals' views and 
sentiments, experiences, and tastes In that sense morality, although related to 
people's ideas of justice, does not imply that the rules of justice and moral rules are 
identical. One can not be punished for their moral views, but when these views lead 
to an illegal action or to the injury of the rights of others, then this action ought to be 
punished. However, the link between moral philosophy and natural law theories of 
justice was always problematic since, as Kant’s liberal thought pointed out, 
individuals' freedom and thus moral freedom is a negation of itself if it is not realised 
publicly. If moral beliefs lead to illegal actions then the realisation of one's freedom is 
realised as negative freedom.
Smith distinguishes between two categories of the different systems in the history of 
moral philosophy and jurisprudence, which dealt with the rules of justice and morality; 
the "critics" and the "grammarians" (LJ p. 327). In the first category he puts the 
ethical systems of antiquity, such as Aristotle's idea of justice as presented in his 
Ethics. The disadvantage in these systems, although they are more useful in practical 
matters, is that they
"describe, in a general manner what is the ordinary way of acting to which each virtue 
would prompt us . .. It is indeed, scarce possible to describe the internal sentiments or 
emotions upon which it is founded, without doing something of this kind. It is 
impossible by language to express, if I may say so, the invisible features of all different 
modifications of passions as they show themselves within... the way of making and 
distinguishing them ... is by describing the effects which they produce... (TMS pp. 
328-9).
In the second category he puts the casuists o f the Christian church, the natural 
jurisprudence, and under the same heading can be put the third book of Cicero's 
Offices where he offers an enumeration of the rules of justice. The problem with this 
approach is that it reduces justice to police, which according to Smith of the LJ are
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distinct. Thus the discussion of Smith's moral principle of justice led to his theory of 
Jurisprudence But I shall deal with that in the next section.
That was examined in detail while examining the sense of justice internalised by 
individuals' consciences in relation to the idea of merit and demerit of an action, but 
also in relation to the sense of duty. In this sense of justice Smith sought to find also 
the foundation of just punishment, which was mainly the subject o f the "grammarians" 
approach to justice. For this analysis the analysis of the agent's consciousness and 
motives had a great part. To put it in a nutshell, the criminal is not a criminal if he is 
not made conscious of his action and its consequences and thus proved to be criminal 
In Smith the idea of the impartial spectator plays an important role for the 
internalisation of moral rules assisted by public education.
According to Smith, the violation o f the laws of justice ought to raise the feeling of 
evil for the violator of just laws in the same way that an action in accordance with the 
public spirit creates the feeling of approbation.180 But this feeling links also with the 
"law dictated to us by nature" (natural law), which is the retaliation and punishment of 
the offender. Smith describes the feeling and the remorse that the wrong action 
creates in the offender. The emphasis on the consciousness and the sense of guilt of 
the agent provides the subjective justification of the punishment of an unjust action. 
For the offender the most offensive element of an unjust and punished action is the 
feeling of solitude which is more horrible than society and just punishment. The core 
of the remorse in this sense is exposed by means of the relation between the agent's 
moral sense and society (TMS p. 84).
iso Raphael (1973) underlines the difficulty of the combination between moral judgement concerning 
ourselves and the moral judgement concerning others (p. 22). This difficulty is considered as part of 
the question of the impartial spectator and the theory of approval. What is at stake is mainly the 
relation between the theory of consciousness and approval (pp. 18-9). He points out that the source 
of the trouble is in the theory of approval (p. 22), which I described earlier as the "system of 
sympathy".
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This is Smith's idea of penal justice which in the TMS posits the question of 
opposition between laws of justice and individuals' consciousness in the case of the 
violation of other's life and property.181 The modem laws of justice mediate the 
relation between the agent's moral sentiments and the moral social standard. 
Nevertheless, the institutionalised justice in a system of positive law does protect the 
offender from the unexpected revenge of the persons injured by the agent's action (LJ 
pp. 107-9). This constitutes the difference between the natural law of pre-modem 
societies and the general law of modem society. It is possible to build up an idea of 
just punishment based on the agent's moral sense and impartial sentiments. However, 
the idea of "just punishment", although it is based on the sense of justice, is 
introduced in "contrast" to the principle of self-love. The latter principle as an 
expression of indirect sympathy is moderated in Smith's system of sympathy, and not 
simply restrained. I shall illustrate that by recalling Smith's conception of justice as 
fair play (TMS p. 8 3 )182
What makes the difference in Smith's system of sympathy is his idea of social virtue to 
act in an approved way but also the particular character o f the "obligatory" element of 
justice, i.e. common recognition of mutual utility. Thus only justice among other 
social virtues implies a social binding character and thus results into the moderation of 
self-love or an idea of just punishment.
Smith holds that the greatest evil, the one that excites the highest degree of resentment, is the 
injury or murder of someone. The second greatest evil is the breach of property and possession that 
are also one of "the most sacred laws of justice ... whose violation seems to call loudest for vengeance 
and punishment". Thus justice as protection from injury and the right to life but also to the right of 
property seems essential to Smith's concept of justice, and also to his idea of just punishment and 
thus of penal justice (TMS p. 84).
>82 According to Cropsey, this idea of fair play docs not develop into a consistent theory of 
distributive justice in Smith's later work, although it docs develop an idea of a regulative but not 
cohesive institutional organisation (WN B V) to preserve the fair conditions of fair play (p. 81). 
Also, the negative concept of justice for preventing injury of rights contributes to the idea of fair play 
(Cropsey (1975), pp. 43-44).
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4. Natural jurisprudence and the negative conception of Justice.
Jurisprudence is the science that inquiries into the general principles of law and 
government; "which ought to be the foundation of the laws of all nations" (LJ (A) p. 
1, (B) p 397). The subject of Jurisprudence is divided into justice, police revenues 
and arms The last two subdivisions are not really fully developed and the emphasis is 
mainly put on justice and police as part o f the analysis of commercial society. Under 
the heading of justice can be put a "theory of the rules by which civil government 
ought to be directed" (LJ (A) p. 5). These general rules and their normative content 
are the end of justice which concern public jurisprudence and private law, i.e. personal 
and domestic rights
What was the issue for modern jurisprudence is the division between the system of 
modem positive law, and a system of natural jurisprudence.183 The main body of the 
first part of the Lectures examines natural jurisprudence as taken by the natural law 
theory of Grotius, and Pufendorf.184 Smith pointed out the need for a historical 
account of jurisprudence, which seems to have been influenced by his reading of 
Montesquieu (LJ). The examination of the approaches to justice in the TMS as the 
critique of the "grammarians" scholastic views, but of the critical approaches in the LJ 
as well, shifted towards a historical view of the different forms of society's law and 
property relations.
The modem developments in commercial society are not viewed through the "fiction" 
of contractarian thought but presuppose an analysis of the historical politico- 
economic relation and their critique. For this critique Smith suggests that what 
induces men to enter in society is not the mutual consensus of the contract theories
'«5 For a discussion of natural law and rights and the relation between Smith and physiocrats see J. 
Bonar (1967).
184 On this issue see Forbes (1982), Haakonsscn (1982).
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but the principles o f utility and authority.185 The principle of utility is the 
characteristic of democratic government and the principle of authority as autocratic.
In natural Jurisprudence Grotius distinguishes, as did Locke, Hobbes and Rousseau, 
between the state of nature and war as presupposed by the constitution of the states 
Pufendorf argued that even in the state of nature there are some natural rights such as 
the right to one's body, right to life, right to the fruits of one's labour which was the 
foundation of private property (LJ pp. 107,127,136). This argument is of particular 
importance in both the natural law tradition and Smith's Lectures, who offers a 
historical analysis of the different forms of slavery and the master-servant relation. (LJ 
pp. 175, 180-81, 184 -93) The abolition of slavery and the increasing importance of 
free labour made contracts important and the policing role was part o f the duties of 
government (LJ p. 215, LJ (B) pp. 317-8, 323, 397-8).
For Smith a natural conception of justice was to protect these basic rights, and thus it 
has its roots in the natural law tradition. "Justice is violated whenever one is deprived 
of what he had a right to and could justly demand from others" (LJ p. 7). He offers a 
list of the types of injuries to one's body, which is equal to hurting one's liberty, (LJ p.
8) and then distinguishes between perfect, and imperfect rights. The perfect rights 
correspond to commutative justice and imperfect rights to distributive justice (LJ p.
9) .
"Commutative justice consists in abstaining from what is another, and in doing 
voluntarily whatever we can with propriety be forced to do so". "Distributive justice 
... consists in proper beneficence, in the becoming use of what is our own, and in 
applying it to those purposes either of charity or generosity, to which it is most 
suitable in our situation that it should be applied" (LJ p. 9).
185 On Smith's critique of contract theory see Ioannidou (1994) part I section 3.
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Personal right is considered as the real right Property is to be considered as an 
exclusive right. The second species of real rights is inherited and acquired by the civil 
law. The right of inheritance as a real right is the same as the rights of monopolies. 
All these rights are creatures of the civil law, let us say the right of the author to his 
book or of the inventor to his machine These rights as real rights appeared at the 
time the first civil codes of rights were created. Personal rights may precede the 
contract (LJ p 12).
With regard to natural rights Smith examines their foundation and origin, which "need 
not be explained" (LJ p. 13). One's natural right is violated when injured and that 
implies the injury of one's liberties. Injury to one's body is injury to one's liberty and 
natural right. Injury to one's natural rights also involves injury to one's good name 
and fame.
The origin of natural rights with regard to property "is not altogether plain". There 
are five causes from which property may have occasion: first, occupation, by which 
we get anything into our power. Second, tradition by which property is voluntarily 
transferred from one to the other. Third, accession. Fourth, prescription or 
occupation. Fifth, succession of a testamentary heir.
It is in his discussion of property that Smith examines the distinct states know as the 
"four stages theory" which mankind has passed through: the age of hunters, age of 
shepherds, age of agriculture, and the age of commerce. This historical view offers 
an examination of the evolution of the laws of rights and property and different forms 
of societies which are presented on the basis to what is known as the "four-stage 
theory"186 or the different "modes of subsistence" as Robertson called them.187 * The
186 For a critique of the contractarian thought on society Smith was influenced by Hume,
Montesquieu and the historical context in which he was writing. On the exposition of the "four-
stage" theory see (LJ (A) pp. 14, 201, 207-224).
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examination of the history of property and law on the basis of the four-stage theory 
had its parallel in the historical examination of law in Montesquieu's Spirit o f the 
Laws.
This historical view results in the last stage of development and the formation of the 
commercial society and that is the one is the focus of the LJ and later of the WN.188 
The latter stage presupposes an increase o f the population, development of 
agriculture, and exchanges of commodities among nations It seems that then is when 
"history properly starts", in other words with the development of the commercial 
society. In this form o f society are observed more regulations and laws that support 
justice and prevent the infringement of the right o f property
The impartial spectator is used in the LJ "as the judge that could join with the one 
who protects his possession against violent attack" (LJ pp. 17-19, 42 sympathy). The 
impartial spectator by principle can sympathise with moderated passions of the 
appropriate degree.189 What is at stake here is the replacement of the natural law 
tradition of revenge and vengeance190 with the modem positive system of penal law 
and the modem state which acts in the interest of individuals. That implied the 
transition from a natural conception of justice to a modem one related to the property 
law.
Smith was influenced by Grotius and natural jurisprudence which connected natural 
rights with property and that led into a negative conception of justice as a protection
1«’ Meek (1954) p. 89. According to Meek the "four-stage" theory was very much influential for 
Marxist sociology, but also offered a materialist theory of history and society.
'88 The idea of historical analysis is modified, although not in principle, to the extent that Smith 
refers to the transition of pre-modern forms of reproduction and subsistence in comparison to the 
modem ones related to the different forms of the division of labour, 
is» Paphacl (1969) p. 238.
190 In Odyssey the friends of Odysseus, or the ones who arc close to his environment, decide for his 
life and his rank. The idea of justice in natural law societies is related to revenge than to justice as a 
positive principle (L ed. 1964 pp. 107-8).
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from injury and security of property rights as the expression of one's natural rights. 
Therefore the role of the government was a necessary requirement for a well-ordered, 
civilised society and the foundation of modern civil order in the same way as 
individuals' rights (LJ pp. 3, 4). In the Jurisprudential tradition justice lies in the 
examination of justice as a negative principle for the prevention o f the injury of the 
person's life, property, and private rights. Being so, justice becomes essential for the 
foundation of the political sphere, but also the modem constitution o f government is 
the guarantee of individuals rights' against privileges and monopolies o f rights.
This argument is related to the modem developments, i.e. a system of positive law 
constituted in accordance with practical, moral demands.191 The idea of public good 
or utility is also related to the question of social order and stable government on the 
basis of law. The constitution of modern institutions lies in this idea of the general 
interest represented by the government and the expanded legal system which has the 
monopoly of political power and the right of enforcing it. The constitution of the 
political sphere is based on the exclusive right of enforcement of the practice of justice 
as the prevention of injury and use of violence.
However, Smith is critical of the monopoly of power which may lead into its abuses. 
In the LJ he shows this by analysing the relation of man as a subject of rights and the 
sovereign, but also in his account on police, and in the WN he is concerned with the 
particular political regulations. In other words, individuals' rights and the failure of the 
government to protect them leads to public disorder, but also instability of the
191 This idea of public or general utility could and has been challenged many times. The recent work 
on Smith by Shapiro (1993) is a challcncc of this idea in the sense that questions the idea of "social 
bond" in a distinctive negative mood. The analysis of the social bond as an expression of general 
interest turns to be the bond of terror. The "social" turns out to be an artificial economic form 
function by the logic of the "interpretative economics" and thus constituted (p. 131). The social bond 
in the age of "mechanical reproduction of images" becomes the idea of the spectacle. The idea of the 
impartial spectator becomes simply that of "spectators" (pp. 108, 110) or the observer-as-consumer 
(p. 111). The politico-economic nature of modern economy is identified with the question of 
sovereignty and trades in the money market of the EMU.
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government. The negative conception o f justice based on property right created a 
new category of aliens and thus raised the question of citizenship and the restriction 
that property relations implied (LJ p. 430).
The abolition of slavery and of the medieval relation of the master and its dependant 
in commercial society created a new form of aliens, people that did not enjoy the 
rights of owning property and of being citizens in the state In medieval Europe this 
category of aliens, which was mainly merchants, could buy their rights to trade in 
particular areas. In the nation state that was replaced by the modem system of 
taxation. The most important aspect o f  not having citizenship was that they did not 
have political rights, and their freedoms were based in their economic power.
In the LJ Smith analyses extensively the transformation of the idea of natural rights of 
man, and also of citizens, and the transition from slave to free labour (LJ (A) 176-7, 
181, 235, (B) 431, 432). The form of exclusion based on the consideration of rights 
or non rights of slaves and aliens was subject to change since the traditional forms of 
organisation of society and also of labour (guilds system) were rapidly transformed 
under the new forms of division of labour and commercial society, but also under the 
formation of the modem nation state. The other form of aliens were mainly the new 
working classes that did not own property but only their ability to work.
The negative conception of justice relates mainly to individuals' rights as the rights 
based on property and economic power and thus protected and secured by the laws of 
justice. This had a number of drawbacks in societies of inequalities o f wealth, 
property and power With regard to the concept of Justice it had shown that the 
negative conception of justice had to be broadened.
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5. The political economy of modern justice and natural law.
The perception of natural right as property right and also the modem conception of 
justice as protection of these rights, put justice in societies with property inequalities 
at stake. In other words, modern institutions were to support particular interests 
instead o f the idea of the general good. Due to these developments, which where 
enforced by the development of the division o f labour, Smith included in his analysis 
of jurisprudence the subdivision of police as distinct from justice. Police was to carry 
the execution of justice in the streets and o f the application of regulation for the 
prevention o f crime and the policy to keep the city guard. Historically police had its 
roots in the ancient Greek idea of the "politeia" which signified the policy of the 
government of the polis. The modern sense o f police meant only the regulation of the 
inferior parts of the government (LJ B p. 486) and concerned the security of 
communication, exchanges, commerce and also the regulation of the prices of 
commodities and crimes.
In the WN this account of police is integrated in chapter III on the accumulation of 
the wealth o f nations and the role of police and commercial ethics enforced by police 
were essential for the accumulation of the wealth of the nation.192 These institutional 
developments were parallel to the expansion of the division of labour and thus 
influenced the politico-economic role of the political institutions, which were in 
relation to the expansion of the division o f  labour and its influence in all social 
spheres. Smith of the WN, although pointing out the importance of political 
interventions for the accumulation of the wealth of the nation, is also critical of 
policies which supported monopolies of particular rights and retarded the natural 
opulence arising from the division of labour. On that level he puts forward two 
arguments: one concerns the utility of particular policies in relation to the ideas of the
' h  Cannan (1961) introduction in the WN p.xxvii.
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public utility and the second concerns the idea of natural justice which should 
influence the policies of the "wise legislator".
There lies his idea of the system of natural liberty. Smith's political economy is 
precisely the historical articulation of the politico-economic relations which were 
presupposed and were integrated in the modern system of the division of labour. 
Thus the natural tendency of the modem developments meant the increase of social 
freedoms compared to previous forms of society. There is an increase of opulence 
and wealth but then also o f new forms of inequalities and political obstacles
Smith's conception of justice in the LJ, but later also in the WN, takes the following 
forms; first he is critical of the reduction of justice to police and thus the casuistic idea 
enforced by positive law. His idea of justice involves an idea of the general good as 
the necessary condition for social peace and thus the development of commerce and 
public opulence. Second, an idea of just exchange and civility is presupposed for 
commercial relations and virtues such as punctuality are the virtues associated with 
the development of commerce. This idea of justice in market ethics is a subject of 
negotiations between individual merchants and of the function of the market. Smith, 
although not an advocate of laissez faire , thought that bad policies imposed in the 
natural course of things can only retard progress. There lies his conception of natural 
justice in the context of his system of perfect liberty.193 The system of liberty is a 
combination o f natural tendencies observed and systematically presented as a 
combination o f  natural tendencies and of philosophical speculation or of the "wisdom 
of the legislator".
Third, justice in relation to the tasks of the "sovereign" on the level of just modem 
institutions, as the branch of the administration of justice. In that sense expensive 
government and civilised society with a developed division of labour go together.
193 See Billet L. (1976) and Wienfield (1984, 1988) on the just economy argument.
152
Thus, new branches for the administration of justice were arising out of the expanded 
division of labour and the increase of wealth implied by it. Taxation and the use of 
the public funds were to be used to correct the failures of the invisible hand Smith 
does not really offer a theory of justice as distributive justice, and at the end of the day 
he does not offer a systematic theory of justice.
With regard to justice and exchange among self-interested individuals, in the second 
chapter of Book I Smith bases his analysis of equal exchanges on his idea of justice 
developed in his TMS. In other words, he offers an idea of justice as the 
presupposition of cooperation, but also as the possibility of exchanges Thus equal 
exchanges presuppose some kind of social order and moderation of self-love. In the 
WN this idea is also supported by his theory of the division of labour that I have 
examined in chapters two and three
Perfect liberty and justice as the "sacred rule" of modern society became the economic 
expression of natural teleology. The system of perfect liberty and justice was the view 
point from which Smith criticised the particular mercantilist policies and the expansion 
of the commercial spirit supported by mercantilism. What he criticised in 
mercantilism was that the political institutions were used for the interest of one class 
of people and resulted in the misery for the labouring classes which actually with 
labour contributed towards the public good.194 In the WN Smith employs this 
argument for the critique of monopolies and mercantilist policies, which obstructed 
the natural tendencies of civilised society, but also of physiocracy which I examined in 
chapter one In that respect, although there is an overlap between Smith's theory o f 
civilised society and the physiocrats, Smith's account of modem society differs in 
many respects.
On public deliberation see (WN pp. 276-7 ).
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In relation to his idea of perfect liberty Smith points out the tasks of the sovereign and 
analyses the question of justice on the level of the administration of justice Despite 
social inequalities, some sort of social freedom and public opulence may as well be 
guaranteed in a certain degree, which, in the WN introduces an idea of justice 
resulting from the particularity of modem political organisation.195 A natural idea of 
justice and articulation of interests emerges naturally from the development of 
exchanges and the division of labour, market institutions, system of price etc. As 
regards injustices, moral corruption is not simply approved as the result of the 
invisible hand, nor is it in conflict with the impartial spectator's sentiments or, in the 
WN, the legislator. Therefore, a modem concept of justice has to comply with what 
Smith calls the general good, which has a political and moral, i.e. practical basis.196
In the TMS the conception of justice is examined in relation to economic inequalities 
and to inequalities of power. The capricious and selfish attitudes of the rich could 
benefit their employees in a way that they could never have done according to their 
benevolent feelings (TMS p. 184). In this case, justice is considered as the justice 
achieved by means of the "invisible hand". This idea of the invisible hand is 
supplemented with a sense of moderation of what the person needs for life. At the 
end of the day, the man of higher rank has the same basic needs as the one of lower 
rank. Based on this condition and the relation of their interdependence, an "invisible 
hand" connects them, in such a way that even the beggar in the street possesses 
something, i.e. some sort of security that kings could not possess, despite their having
i9s I use the term "particular" in distinction to individual and universal or general.
>9« Shapiro offers an evaluation of Smith's argument as follows:
"if Smith's discourse on moral sentiments, like his subsequent treatment of political economy, 
functioned as an accommodative narrative that welcomed the new industrial society, what was so 
revolutionary? It was his emphasis on society, which moved the locus of morals from a 
transcendent, spiritual realm to the common life. To appreciate the politico-moral space in the 17th 
and 18th centuries, the period immediately prior to Smith's writing, was organised around an estate- 
dominated society in which the social domain was understood as a set of formal prerogatives 
authorised by God. Imagination, reasoning, discussion, and any other social process were irrelevant 
as founding bases of morals. Society was not a dynamic of human interaction but a structure 
regulated by a pre-existing, formal system of authority" (Shapiro (1993) p. xxxii).
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wealth and power. The fear of losing their advantages is the great source of their 
insecurities.
Nevertheless, this idea of a naturally achieved justice raises a demand for a virtuous 
distribution of social benefits. Thus the prudence of nature and man's virtuous action, 
is to change the distribution of things (TMS pp 168-9, 180) in a way that it should be 
virtuous. If the most important virtue in human affairs is justice, the change of the 
distribution of things should be according to justice. What this justice is, or should 
be, is a concern of moral philosophy, rather than of natural philosophy and taste
Therefore, justice in the LJ is the main subject of modern jurisprudence and natural 
law and its rules are considered as the rules of grammar. Justice for Smith is the most 
important public virtue and the requirement for public stability. As a moral principle it 
has to correspond to people's natural feelings and ideas of the good. The conflict that 
may arise between the general ideas of the good and imposed policies in civilised 
society has drawn the distinction between police and justice as the guarantee of social 
peace.
Nevertheless, this conception of Justice as moral and public principle is mainly to be 
found in the last edition of the TMS and the reconstruction o f Smith's and students 
notes on his lectures on Jurisprudence. In that sense, Smith does not offer an 
extensive theory of justice as a normative merely principle, but is linked to his 
"rational" analysis of society among equal rational merchants in the WN and the TMS.
Smith integrated the natural law and moral elements of his argument in his political 
economy and thus offered a practical conception of justice than merely a normative 
one. He avoided Hume’s distinction between "ought" and "is", "artificial" and
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"natural".197 His analysis of the modem politico-economic relations and practical 
ethical life embodies his natural law conception of justice and forms his idea of the 
public good. Therefore, Smith's political economy grew out of his system of natural 
law, either in the form of the "invisible hand" or in the form of justice as public 
principle endorsed in the analysis of the politico-economic relations.198
is’ Hume (1975) part III i 2, III ii 1, 474-5, 484 on the natural artificial distinction. Smith avoided 
the dilema between artificial and natural but offering an analysis of the political economy that is 
involved in this dichotomy. There is the difference between Smith's and Hume’s argument, although 
the overlapings. That made Smith more than an "enthusiast of plagiarism" and thus his "ethics a 
weak copy of Hume" (Cannan (1896), Hasbach (1897) p. 686).
198 Hasbach (1897) p. 686.
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Part II
Introduction
The second part of the thesis deals mainly with Hegel's NLE, SDS, the JR and the PR. 
In these texts I focus on how Hegel develops his ideas of modem society by an 
analysis of morality, ethical life, property, contract, labour and the division of labour. 
I contrast his early views to the later formulations and I focus: first, on the way that 
he was influenced by the development of political economy and second, on his 
philosophical reconstruction of the politico-economic relations in civil society by 
offering a reconstruction of earlier contract liberal theories.
In chapter six I examine the philosophical critique of modem ethical life through the 
critique of the formalist and empiricist science of natural law. Also I offer an account 
of how in this early NLE Hegel formulated the relation between natural law and 
morality, natural law and positive jurisprudence but also political economy. The latter 
developments are the core for the negative analysis of modem ethical life, in contrast 
to the idea of living ethical life and the unity of the ethos in the polis. Hegel's 
negative approach to the way in which modern science grasps modem ethical life falls 
back on the idea of the republic and of the living ethical life as realised in the nation 
state (Volk).
Chapter seven follows up this discussion and highlights Hegel's idea of modem ethical 
life in the SDS and the Jena Writings, known as the Realphilosophie or the 
philosophy of Spirit. In these writings Hegel shifts from the romantic ideal of the 
Volk and the distinction between relative and absolute ethical life towards a systematic 
and philosophical, i.e. conceptual analysis of modem ethical life. For this turn the 
influence of political economy is profound, based on the mediating role of labour, on 
mechanical labour as a form of recognition, and on the realisation of right and will
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through the subject-object dialectic and of the mediating role of labour. In the SDS 
the emphasis is put on the analysis of the relation between subject and object and as 
the social form o f recognition and misrecognition in parallel to the analysis of right, 
property, exchange and also of social classes In the philosophy of spirit, property, 
contract and exchanges are examined as universal structures in parallel to the 
mechanisation o f labour. This analysis draws the distinction between Hegel and 
contract or liberal thought and underlines the politico-economic aspect of his 
argument but also highlights an early positive form of social theory on the basis of the 
division of labour and social classes as part of the constitution.
Chapter eight deals with the analysis and reconstruction of the contract, formalist and 
critical accounts of abstract right, morality, property and the idea of subjectivity and 
negative freedom in the PR. In this text the early analysis of morality, contract and 
abstract right appears in its most complete form. The philosophical exposition of the 
subject matter is reflected in the very content of the argument and the transition from 
morality to the analysis of the modern ethical life.
Chapter nine examines the political economy of civil society with a particular focus on 
labour, division of labour, right becoming law by being secured as the modem 
institution of public welfare and the rule of law. Hegel offers a conceptualisation of 
the conflicts in civil society by using politico-economic categories. Furthermore he 
offers a critique of modern society put forward by Smith's political economy but also 
by the liberal contract theories of society. His theory of the state is different from 
both social contract theories and similar to political economy in underlining the 
particular nature of the political as a positive sphere in commercial societies and 
distinct from policies and police. The argument is that his conception of politics is 
bound to his theory of society and civil society which is viewed as an ethical 
articulation of the rightful existence of individuals through social, economic and
158
political estates. That is what draws the decisive line between the individualistic 
liberal argument and the politico-economic analysis that Hegel and Smith put forward.
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Chapter si».
1. E th os  and the modern ethical life.
The young Hegel was led to the study of the problems of property and labour as the 
fundamental mode of interaction between individual and society.199 The source for 
this study was the physiocrats's and British political economy, but also history and 
literature such as Hume, Montesquieu, Locke, and Ferguson which were available in 
the German language 200 Ferguson's Essay on the History o f  Civil Society was 
translated into German (1768) soon after it was published in English, and Hegel 
became familiar with this text before going to Bern through Carve's translations 201 
Smith was translated into German between 1796 and 1799, although Hegel had 
owned a copy of the WN in English in the Basel edition since 1791.202 Steuart's 
mercantilistic political economy was translated into German in 1799.203 Rosenkranz 
mentions that Hegel read that book and took extensive notes, but this document is 
now lost.204
The study of political economy was very quickly absorbed by the academic circles in 
Prussia. The University of Gottingen was an important centre for the transmission of 
Smithian ideas, where he had a number of followers According to Hasek they were 
very interested in the sufficiency of self-interest with all its consequences and this 
idea, according to Hasek, offered a solution to the breakdown of the economic system 
of Frederick II but also a remedy in the darkest period of the Prussian history. The 
spirit of economic liberalism, as well as the physiocratic doctrines, had noticeable 
influence in particular after the collapse of the 1807 and the defeat of Prussia by
199 Lukács (1976) p. 99.
200 Harris (1972) p. 138.
201 Waszek (1988) Harris (1972).
202 Harris (1979) intr. in the SDS p. 95.
203 On the relation between Steuart and Hegel sec Camley (1963).
204 Lukács (1976) p. 169, Roscncran/ (1844) p. 86, cited by Harris (1972), p. 435.
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Napoleon, led into social and economic reforms.205 Hasek's research has shown that 
there was a serious study of Smith's political economy, in contrast to cameralism 
which represented the old regime of the Prussian state. Lukacs's and Harris's research 
have also shown how this influence was experienced by Hegel, but also refer to the 
philosophical discussions which were more concerned with the idealisation of the idea 
of the Volk and religion (Hegel's theological writings) than the "Volkwirtshafl" 206 
After the Frankfurt period (1797-1800), according to Harris, there was a "revolution" 
in Hegel's thought which brought him in Jena to edit a critical journal with 
Schelling.207
There has been a lot written on the historical development of Hegel's thought which 
puts his thought in its historical context and debates.208 I will focus on how Hegel, in 
his political and philosophical writings after 1801, became more interested in 
conceptually grasping modem reality and its particular ethical and political nature. 
This shift is expressed in the NLE in the study of the scientific of ways of dealing with 
natural law.
As early as the Bern period (1793-6) Hegel was concerned with the unity of the 
ancient Greek polis and the undivided ethical life of the Jewish state.209 Some 
commentators argued that Hegel took the idea of Sittlichkeit from the ancient Greek 
idea of the ethos in the polis, as the community of citizens 210 In the Introduction to
205 Hasek (1925) pp. 6-7, Ch IV p. 95. Avineri (1972) offers an analysis of this historically formative 
period, "the new era", and mostly highlights the political developments and the struggle for 
modernisation of the Prussian state which was played in the wars between Napoleon and the Prussian 
state. Therefore, the defeat in Jena paved the way to the reforms inaugurated by Stein and from 
which emerged the liberalised and modernised Prussian state, Ch IV p. 64. For a recent account on 
the introduction of Smith's doctrine in Germany see Waszcck (1993).
206 Harris (1972), (1984) Lukács (1976).
207 Harris (1972) p. 253.
208 Lukács, Harris, Avineri, Marcuse.
209 Avineri (1972), p. 3, Lukács (1976) p. 40.
210 Harris (1991) underlines Hegel's close readings of the Republic and Plato. Riedel and Ilting also 
investigated the influence of Aristotle on Hegel by putting emphasis on the natural law aspect of his 
argument. Inwood (1984 ed. Pelczynski) offers an account on the topic and the difficulties in the 
concept of the ethical life itself (pp. 40-55). Instead, Pclczynski (1971) argues in favour of Hegel's 
"communitarian" idea being taken from Plato's idea of the Republic (p. 9). For recent research on
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the Lectures o f  History Hegel compares the modem and the Hellenic ethos and he 
points out that the difference between the Greek and modem subjective philosophies 
is that the Greeks "had perfect peace and satisfaction in the appearance", while the 
modem subjective philosophies "long for a beyond" or subjective knowing. For the 
former there was no opposition of thinking and being "Appearance itself was the 
entire sphere o f knowledge. Here subjectivity is self-aware, but it puts itself into 
identity with the substantial and the concrete". The knowledge of truth is immediate 
for the Greeks, while for the modem subject the unity of knowledge and truth is 
indeed present only when the subject rises above sensation and the immediate mode of 
knowing and solely by thinking, makes himself what he is and attains truth.211 Hegel 
sought to find a philosophical examination of the modem science of right, the civic 
ideals of antiquity and the conception o f the Greek ethos, with the development of 
personality, the relation between subjectivity and objectivity, ways of treating natural 
law and moral philosophy as subject of the positive science of law and right.
This shift is reflected in the very structure of the NLE, which seems to split into two 
parts: first the methodological critique of empiricism and formalism and the last part 
which deals with modem ethical life in comparison to the classic ideas of ethos. 
Dickey comments on the structure that there is an "organizational problem". He reads
the relation between Hegel and Plato which deals also with the above discussions see Browing 
(1991).
POggeler (1972) commenting versus Avineri argues that Hegel even in his later writings offers more 
than a critique of the positive state, of morality, their elevation in beauty, love, religious elevation. 
In the NLE Hegel according to POggeler is still calling for the living organisation of the people as 
"the most beautiful form" of moral political life pp. 216-7. POggeler looks back on romantic Hegel 
and says that Hegel hoped for the ideal of the Greek polis actualised anew. The bourgeois can grasp 
the sense of life only as mediated by the work of others contra to the classic ideal where the highest 
task of the citizen is that of the philosophising and of political activity (p. 217). The later Hegel's 
that offers the analysis of modern society discovered poverty and political economy (p. 219). The 
same line of argument is followed by Arendt (1958) in the sense that her analysis of labour in 
modem society points out that the national economy in modern society seemed to repeat however the 
differences the division of the oikos and the polis. The advantage of this way of looking at the 
question of labour is that the cconomism of the modern society is not extended to the political sphere. 
However, the politics of modern political economy as Volkswirtschaji is rather an open question and 
has not been resolved by the creation of political community of the state or the republic of citizens. 
In modem thought it gave rise to the science of political economy and its critiques.
211 ILH (1988), pp. 250-1.
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the first part as the part where Hegel derives a positive set of methodological 
guidelines from the line of philosophical criticism developed in the first half of the 
essay. At the same time, Hegel expresses dissatisfaction with regard to the 
"scientific" method concerning natural law in the late 18th century. Second, 
according to Dickey, Hegel translates his own positive methodological convictions 
into a language that will allow him to discuss philosophical method substantively 
rather than abstractly in the concrete context of socio-economic and religious 
experience 212 "Finally., he offers substantive solutions to the problem . .He runs two 
arguments together and the result is that there is much confusion in the second half of 
the essay".213
By contrast, Rose examines this "confusion" of the second part of the essay 
philosophically by pointing out that the break between the first and the second part is 
the result o f the perception of modern ethical life as divided, and thus grasped on the 
basis of the relation of identity and non-identity. This is the content of Hegel's 
speculative method, which substantiates the structure of the divided ethical life into 
"relative ethical life", the "system of reality" and the absolute ethical life. In Rose's 
words:
"In the second half of the essay this epistemological lack of identity or relation must 
be understood as re-presenting a real social relation, which he calls 'relative ethical 
life’ or the 'system of reality'. The 'system of reality' is the system of political economy 
of bourgeois property relations in which law is separated from the rest of the social 
life".2'4
The NLE sets some of the most important problems for Hegel's "system" of political 
philosophy, which are not resolved in this essay. The virtue of the NLE is that it
212 Dickey (1987) paraphrase his argument.
213 Ibid., p. 209.
214 Rose (1981) p. 56.
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offers insights into the more complex developments of Hegel's politico-philosophic 
argument with regard to the relation of the system of reality, not merely separated 
from the rest of the social life, but also explores the particularity of the modem form 
of ethical life. Therefore, the NLE is identified with Hegel's turn to the 
conceptualisation of modem economic and political reality from a philosophical 
standpoint, which was also subject to the development o f the modem science of right 
by liberal natural law, contract theory and political economy.
In the second part of the NLE (1802/3) Hegel introduces an examination of the 
modem ethical life in comparison to the classic idea o f ethosw  The idea of the 
ethical life and absolute ethical life becomes central for the conceptualisation of the 
modem form of social and political relations, but is also a critique of the empirical and 
formalist accounts of natural law science, positive jurisprudence, and political 
economy which offered a scientific investigation of modem society. That at the same 
time meant the transition from metaphysical approaches which characterised the 
classic philosophy of Plato and Aristotle towards " Realphilosophie" and the system of 
reality.216
The classic idea of ethos is represented as the unity achieved in the city state of the 
polis of the citizens and is contrasted with the fragmentation of the modem world into 
self-interested individuals and the subdivided positive sciences. The polis of antiquity 
allowed the existence of free citizens living according to the laws of the city. In 
contrast, modem society is characterised by divisions between bourgeois and free 
citizens and by the reformulation of the relation between the public and private
215 Ritter (1983) refers mostly to the Hegel of the PR and the link to Aristotle's Nikomaxeian Ethics I, 
1I-X where Aristotle deals with the foundation of human praxis and modes of right conduct. In the 
Politika I 3-18 Aristotle also looks at the idea of oikonomia as the economy of the household oikos 
(pp. 164-5).
216 "Realphilosophie" meant also Hegel's theory of nature and spirit (FPS, A 2 p. 264). In the NLE 
the idea of the spirit is represented in absolute ethical life and real relations in the "system of 
reality". This distinction seems to be central for Hegel's early writings from the NLE  to his Jena 
Realphilosophie. In the FPS real existence is the transition to the examination of the people (FPS p. 
242).
spheres and the idea of subjects' right. The modern subject is determined by divisions 
which for Hegel have to be analysed and thought in the unity of the absolute ethical 
life as a living relation (NLE p. 104).
Hegel's early writings, such as the NLE, and the SDS, attempted to put forward the 
idea of the absolute ethical life as a form of economic, political and ethical 
organisation. In the NLE  Hegel explicitly contrasts the idea of the ethos to the 
different aspects of the modern ethical life, profoundly influenced in highlighting their 
contrast to modem science. Another favourite example is the way that ethical and 
social conflicts are represented in the artistic productions of comedy and tragedy. The 
metaphor of the artistic representation of the different forms of the ethical life is the 
way that Hegel illustrates the difference between the Greek, medieval and modem 
ethos by defining the characteristics of the Greek tragedy, the divine Dantian comedy, 
and the modem comedy, as different forms of reconciling ethical conflicts. The first 
form of tragedy underlines the lack of subjectivity, in the sense that the actors of the 
tragedy are merely members of an organic unity and suffer as part of a particular form 
of ethical life where the struggle between divine, moral and political powers takes 
place. Aeschylus's tragedy "The Eumenides" is the metaphor that Hegel uses in the 
NLE to underline the tragedy of "subjectivity” as being part of the ethical and divine 
struggles which appear as its fate. Individuality in the homogeneous world of the 
polis is possible in the citizen who is a member as part of the unity of the polis
Tragedy is the performance and reconciliation of the conflicts in the polis and 
therefore its role is to educate the citizens of the polis and thus it has a reconciliatory 
character. The tragedy performs on the stage the tragedy of the ethical life as split 
into its organic and inorganic elements. This split needs to be faced and
acknowledged and thus objectifies the involvement of inorganic and organic elements 
Further it leads to the reconciliation and the particular form of unity achieved in the 
ancient Greek polis.
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"This reconciliation lies precisely in the btowledge o f the necessity, and in the right 
which ethical life concedes to its inorganic nature and to the subterranean powers by 
making over and sacrificing to them one part of itself. For the force of the sacrifice 
lies in facing and objectifying the involvement with the inorganic. This involvement is 
being solved by being faced; the inorganic is separated and recognised for what it is, is 
itself taken up into indifference while the living, by placing into the inorganic what it 
knows to be a part of itself and surrendering it to death, has all at once recognised the 
right of the inorganic and cleansed itself of it" (NLE p. 104 emphasis added).
The opposition and reconciliation of the "organic and inorganic aspects" as parts of 
the same objectivity, since they are organic parts of a united ethos, posits itself as the 
unity of the organic and the inorganic. In the ancient tragedy the hero/ine is only a 
member of this ethical unity and not a subject of rights. In that sense, the city accepts 
the conflicts and "the ethical nature segregates the inorganic nature, . . as a fate, and 
places it outside itself; and by acknowledging this fate in this struggle against the 
ethical nature is reconciled with the Divine being as the unity of both" the law of the 
divine and the laws of the polis (NLE pp. 105-6).
Fate, as Hegel dealt with it in The Spirit o f  Christianity and its Fate (1798-9), is not 
merely "blind fate", i.e. the belief in irrational and uncontrollable ruling forces, and in 
that sense it does not mean the necessity of fate. The causality of fate is used in two 
senses which correspond to what is meant by the way we can experience that 
necessity as the experience of consciousness.217 In other words, fate in the first sense
reflects the rationality of the whole society. In the second sense it is taken as the 
"destiny of what happened to that first visible rationality, its determination as 
subjective consciousness which can no longer see the law of its determination, the 
rationality of the whole, because the whole has been its concrete existence" .218
217 On the Divine comedy see also the First Philosophy o f  Spirit Appendix 2, where the action of 
man annihilates itself and his consciousness is only a dreamy one and his character is only a 
powerless past (FPS A 2, p. 252). Also in the NLE pp. 105-6, Faith and Knowledge, p. 146.
218 Rose (1981) p. 155.
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This identity is the characteristic of the ancient tragedy. In contrast, the modem and 
divine comedy is generally characterised by the absence of fate. Comedy:
"Either [it] falls within absolute vitality, and thus presents only shadows of clashes (or 
mock battles with a fabricated fate and fictitious enemies), or else it falls within non­
life and therefore presents only shadows of self-determination and absoluteness; the 
former is the old, or Divine, comedy, the latter the modem comedy" (NLE p. 105).
The origin of the split of civil society as the split between the economic and political 
sphere is to be sought in this articulation of what is called the "tragedy of the ethical 
life”.219 However, the formulation of the relation of the modem ethical life is 
contrasted with the ethos of the polis. This is the limit of the metaphor of comedy 
and tragedy to illustrate that difference The "modem comedy" of natural law 
becomes modem science rather than merely a product of art or the artistic 
representation of the ethical life
An essential part of the critique of modem science is the reformulation of the idea of 
Sittlichkeit. This conceptual comprehension involves the scientific and philosophical 
search the formation of modern rights and, for Hegel in particular, the investigation 
of the foundation of natural right {Rechi) and the speculative science of right. Thus 
Hegel was led into the examination of antiquity through its art and philosophical 
production and then to modern practical philosophy and the science of natural law 
which led into the theories of the social contract and to the positive sciences of law 
and political economy.
In the NLE the critique of natural law is only negative and resolves into the absolute 
ethical life and the positive science of law. The NLE postulates absolute ethical life 
and examines its organic-inorganic relation in comparison to the relation between 
absolute and relative ethical life. Thus, first, it highlights the form of "real relations",
219 Riedel (1984) p. 119.
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"state o f nature", more systematically expressed as "system of reality" as subject of 
examination for the modern practical sciences Second, Hegel addresses the question 
of the form of modem science and abstraction as it is articulated by the relation of the 
science of morals, political economy, and jurisprudence. The emphasis is put on the 
subject as being the "living relation", which in this essay is represented by the unity of 
the people (Volk). This living ethical relation is the subject matter o f  the absolute 
ethical life and relative ethical life as conditioned institutionally and as being subject to 
historical change
The importance of the NLE  lies precisely in the fusion of the early romantic ideal of 
the return to the Greek polis, which is not experienced as a loss but in its actuality in 
the idea of the Volk. Though more than the idealisation and actualisation o f the unity 
of the polis of the citizens, Hegel offers a critique of the modem science of natural 
law220 and the science of positive law, practical critical philosophy (which posited the 
question of the reformulation of practical morality in a formalistic though way), and 
also the critique of political economy which seemed to endorse some o f  the natural 
law principles. I shall deal with the latter in the following sections.
2. The critique of empiricism and the science of natural law 221
The first part of the NLE offers a critique of the different ways of approaching natural 
law by empirical natural law and contract theory, by critical philosophy but also by the 
earlier metaphysical views of antiquity contrasted with liberal and critical modem 
philosophy. With respect to the modern systems of natural law, Hegel examines the 
different types of formalism and empiricism in the modern systems of natural law, i.e.
220 Peperzak in his article on the relation between Hegel and Hobbes points out that although Hegel 
very often alluded, to Kant, Fichte and Rousseau (in the later writings), he never mentions Hobbes 
(Peperzak (1995) p 205).
221 Compare with later Hegel on formalism and empiricism PR par. 189, Philosophy o f  Mind p. 26.
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the different forms of formalism of Kant and Fichte and the different types of pure 
empiricism which reminds us very much of the Descartian natural philosophy applied 
to social matters, as was attempted by Hobbes and Locke, and the common sense 
scientific empiricism of political economy (Smith, Steuart).
The pure and scientific empiricism is very much influenced by the Descartian view of 
science. The enlightenment's natural law liberal thought, in its attempt to criticise the 
theological approach to natural law, attempted to apply the new scientific principles 
which had been advanced by the natural sciences to political and social science. Thus 
instead of presupposing a community of God, as for traditional natural law theory, 
Hobbes started his analysis from "the state o f nature", of the war of all against all. 
The pure empiricism of natural law and contract theories offers a theory of society 
and an argument for the foundation of the modern sovereign. The social is 
reconstructed as the multiplicity of the state o f nature or what is called chaos Chaos 
is indeterminate, it is a multitude of particularities and oppositions according to an 
empirically posited necessity (NLE p. 64). Society is perceived as being in the state 
of nature and thus as an aggregate of individuals.222 23 Moreover man is considered as 
an abstraction in a negative relation to other atoms. The relation among individuals is 
reduced to the state of mutual destruction, similar to the relations of clashing atoms, 
to use the metaphor from the science of physics.22’
That was identified by the natural law theories as "the state of nature", the "war of all 
against all", where the weaker is subject to the power of the strong (NLE p. 65). In 
other words, the state of nature is viewed as the precondition of the social and thus of 
the political contract which leads to the establishment of the modem sovereign. The 
contractual agreement among individuals is possible on the cognitive rational basis of
222 Chaos and the state of nature in NLE is the way o f representing multiplicity through the empirical 
science of natural law. On the question of the state o f nature and struggle for recognition see also the 
Jena Writings 1805-6 (pp. 110-111).
223 On natural science and its influence in the enlightenment thought Skinner (1965).
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rational self-interested individuals. On this condition the rational foundation of the 
power of the modem sovereign is established, and this is also reflected in the way that 
the power and the limits of the power of the monarch are constructed (NLE pp. 123- 
124, 127, 130).
In the pure empirical science of natural law the relation among individuals as a 
rational relation is represented on a cognitive level. The social relation of 
interdependence is represented and guaranteed by the external power of the 
sovereign, but also it is the source of the justification of the modem sovereign. Hegel 
holds, in his early critique of contract theory and scientific natural law, that this 
representation o f  the "state of nature" is merely a fiction in the sense that it is an 
abstraction A positive evaluation of this abstract formulation of the social is that it is 
based on the idea of the original qualities and potentialities of the social multiplicity of 
interests.
The difference between pure empiricism and the scientific empiricism of political 
economy is that the latter draws its criteria from the multiplicity of "the system of 
reality" and thus seeks the rationality of the mass of relations and interests in this very 
multiplicity and in real economic relations.224 What necessarily arises merely from this 
multiplicity and the distinction from the accidental is its formal, analytical, logical 
unity as an absolute negative unity. At this point it resembles pure empiricism. This 
formal unity already encloses a determinacy which has been placed by thinking and is 
characteristic o f  modern science in general. Therefore, it has the appearance of 
necessity and is only a negative formal, and in addition a systematic representation of 
the whole. Formal necessity is only analytical necessity (NLE p. 61), which in the 
case of political economy offers an analysis of the real relations of interdependence in 
the "system o f needs" as developed in its more complete version in the PR
224 See Hegel's discussion of political economy in the PR.
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The empirical science strives for a formal negative unity which includes a determinacy 
posited only by thinking. This determinacy offers to the empirical science the 
appearance of necessity and instead of representing the whole, is only one 
determinacy among others. Nevertheless, it lies in a formal and analytical necessity as 
the unity of a fragmented multiplicity (NLE p. 61). Empirical science falls into 
contradictions when it "asserts" its principles which result from empirical observation 
as absolute or even objective. It is rather in a relationship with something external 
that is possible to achieve unity and then merely in its negative form Empiricism 
constructed the science of natural law in such a way that the idea of the absolute 
emerged in a complete, albeit distorted way, in contrast to formalism that absolutises 
one single moment of the absolute. At the end of the day both philosophies posited 
the absolute as only one-sided and as negative absolute.225
However, empirical science as a negative science, in the sense that it presupposes an 
internal contradiction, acquires its inner necessity as an autonomous science. 
Scientific development is independent and free.226 But only through the negative 
formal aspect of the absolute does science become science in its form. In this way, 
science is under an externally posited necessity, although it enjoys an internal freedom 
and autonomy in the realm of the particular science and the principles that it posits. 
This form of science is characterised by the distinction of the fixity of its concepts, 
and intuition227 in tackling its subject matter. Its rationality lies in the united picture, 
with the logical element which takes it up to the purely ideal, and the rational element 
of pure empiricism.
For scientific empiricism the subject matter is the system of needs and the politico- 
economic relations involved I shall examine the split between political and economic 
spheres in a separate section. In section three I shall look at the critique of formalism
225 Gmyberghs (1989) pp. 82, 93, Dickey (1987) p. 209.
226 Sec Aesthetics VI p. 138 on the conformity to the law and geometry.
227 On intuition (Anschaung) and the concept sec NLE 56, p. 436.
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which seems to resemble pure empiricism in that it posits some a priori principles 
which for formalism are assumed. In other words, what Hegel criticises in Kant and 
Fichte is their idea of morality and practical philosophy based on reason as the 
legislative power (Kant), and the formalist separation of morality and legality (Fichte). 
What should be kept in mind is that both these critiques are part of Hegel's inquiry 
into the foundation of the speculative science of law, as differentiated by empirical 
natural law theory, the science of morals and critical practical philosophy, and lastly in 
relation to modem politico economic developments.
3. Critique of formalism or of the "trickery of reason".
Both Kant's and Fichte's theories of natural law are formalist since they set their 
principles a priori. Kant's critical transcendental philosophy derives its principles a 
priori according to the universal idea of legislative pure or practical reason as exposed 
in the Critique o f  Pure Reason and in the Critique o f  Practical Reason. This 
aphorism results in the subjectivism or negativity o f reason. It belongs to the middle 
realm between nothing and reality, to a mixture of being and not-being, and thus it 
belongs only to the sphere of empirical thinking (Meinen). The positive effect of 
critical philosophy has turned out all the poorer, and has not been able to recover 
philosophy. Critical philosophy has placed the absolute wholly within practical moral 
philosophy, as Kant put it in the critique of practical reason Critical philosophy, 
according to Hegel, by deriving its a priori principles in a critical relation to empirical 
reality, does not avoid, when practical matters arise, resolving into formalism or 
empiricism.
In other words, the "trickery" of reason is that it confuses the absolute with the 
conditioned character of the content of its maxims where lies pure reason's practical 
legislation (paraphrase NLE p. 79). Kant's apriori universal principles of legislative
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reason are tautological, by demanding the unity in the form and resulting in an analytic 
unity. At this point formalism is comparable to pure empiricism. In Kant's critique of 
pure reason this unity presupposes the transcendental categories o f pure reason, 
which are synthetic categories (NLE p. 79). In the critique of practical reason 
universality is to be found on the level of the moral and rational nature of the 
individual, but also on the maxim of the categorical imperative. The latter derives 
from the moral and rational idea of individuality in abstraction from historical content, 
particularity, and moral conflicts. On that level of generality it is possible to have 
criteria which are valid for conflicting perspectives and viewpoints. But since the 
truth concerns the content, the principle of judgement is set up by practical reason as 
duty and right. Practical reason has no other content apart from moral duty and its 
moral legislation. This lack of other content leads to moral or amoral tautologies by 
justifying different or even conflicting actions, which are nevertheless supported by 
the doctrine of the categorical imperative, the central feature of Kant's practical 
philosophy.
The antinomies of practical reason which are analysed in both the critiques of pure 
and practical reason are further illustrated by the critique of the categorical imperative 
and the example of the deposit.228 In other words, somebody entrusts something to 
somebody else. Should the one that received the deposit keep it or should he return it 
if there is no evidence of him having it? The last proposition could be read as, one 
should keep his/her promise At the moment that the particular question reaches the 
level of universality of the categorical imperative, i.e. people need to keep promises 
and therefore respect deposits, Hegel argues that it cancels itself in the universality of 
moral law and is turned into something else if it is to be valid from a universal 
standpoint (NLE p 81). The idea of keeping promises with regard to the deposit 
which is "entrusted to you" as moral agent is conditioned by the private property
228 The critique of the idea of moral duty and the deposit is for many commentators the way that 
Hegel illustrated the difference between morality and the ethical life. The moral task is a tautology 
because the concept of deposit is presupposed. Fctscher (1973) p. 195.
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relations presupposed by the idea of the deposit. In other words, the individual's 
judgement of one’s moral duty to keep a promise and return a deposit is not subject to 
individual's morality but to the laws of private property Hegel's point is that Kant's 
moral imperative presupposes that the law of property is important, even if it appears 
as the second nature of the moral agent and part of the individual's internalised 
morality 229 The law of property becomes a content for the moral commands One's 
action to return the deposit to whom it belongs, and thus keep one’s promise, Hegel 
would argue, is not merely a moral decision according to one's moral duty, but is 
somehow involves an idea o f  respect of the law of property.
Further, the action of returning the deposit, apart from being a relation to somebody's 
moral duty, to one's friend, is also a form of recognition of the law of property. To 
avoid the identity of morality (i.e. action according to one's duty, and thus according 
to moral law) and legality, (i.e. action according to the law or to avoid punishment) 
Kant says that the action o f not returning the deposit would cancel the idea of the 
deposit and thus relations o f trust which are not altogether subject to property and 
penal law. Practical reason can lead to an action which is acted for the sake of law 
but also is moral and generally acceptable. However, the distinctions are not very 
clear and that led Kant to his third critique, The Critique o f Judgement. In the 
context of practical reason Kant employs the idea of the autonomy and self-limitation
229 Nietzsche, in the Genealogy o f  Morals, following Hegel, criticizes the dialectic of reason, 
expressing his antipathy to domination. He shows reason and morality in its relation to the former 
codes of punishment: how cruel was the process which educated people into the feeling of guilt, and 
so by which Germans became a "nation of thinkers". For Nietzsche, reason is dealt with as follows: 
"Ah, reason, seriousness, mastery over the affects, the whole things called reflection, all these 
prerogatives and showpieces of man: how dearly they have bought! how much blood and cruelty lies 
in the bottom of all good things'!" (p. 62)
The reason to which Nietzsche refers is the reason of the "free" man who possesses his will and his 
measure of value (Ibid., #2). This free man comes to "reason" and participates to the advantage of 
society. The punishment for the criminal is the requital which is paid back, based on his will for 
action and his guilt. The free man can give promises, although the suspicion of the other is 
presupposed (Ibid., #5). Thus he is part of the contractual relation between "creditor and debtor 
which is old as the idea of "legal subjects" and in turn points back to the fundamental forms of 
buying, selling, trade, and traffic" (Ibid,. #4).
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of practical reason by which it preserves its relative freedom and autonomy.230 For 
Hegel, although Kant's critique of reason in its different forms is conflicting and 
antinomical, the idea of the moral subject as subject of moral consciousness is central 
for his critique of morality in his political and phenomenological writings as the 
experience o f  the different forms of consciousness and also the characteristic of the 
modem subject.
Kant's discussion of morality and legality as action according to the law is 
distinguished from Fichte's. Both views, moral and legal, thus become possible and 
are equally positive (NLE p. 84). Hegel examines Fichte's logic and ironically takes it 
to its extremes Legality, as represented by the state which also enforces the law, 
leads to the identification of the state with a coercive mechanism of punishment on the 
basis of the civil or penal code which protects property. According to this syllogism 
the state is compared with the market mechanism, and its laws with the laws of the 
economy and of market. The state appears as the juridical power that trades in 
specific wares (Markl mit Bestimtheiten), called crimes for sale in exchange for other 
specific wares, i.e. punishment (paraphrase NLE p. 92). The legal civil code is the 
price-list.
And Hegel continues:
"But however null this abstraction and the relation of externality arising from it may 
be, the moment of the negatively absolute or infinity (which is indicated in this 
example as determining the relation of crime and punishment) is the moment of the 
Absolute itself and must be exhibited in absolute ethical life" (NLE p. 92).
In other words, this mechanistic view of the question of punishment assumes a 
particular relation between the economy of the market and the political. However, 
punishment o f crime also assumes an idea of justice or the need for objectively 
evaluating the relation between an action, i.e. crime, and the punishment it deserves
2,0 Kant's Essay on Orientation in Thinking, Critique o f  Pure Reason, Rose (1981) pp. 187-190, NLE 
p. 57.
175
The need for judging represents the negative aspect of the absolute as possibility in a 
negative form. This for Hegel will lead us to the true concept and relation addressed 
by the practical sciences (paraphrase NLE p. 92). In short, the nullity of dealing with 
the legal code in its abstraction is that it is not presented as an independent system or 
mechanism, but as the negative formal aspect of the absolute ethical life, which in the 
particular case of crime and punishment corresponds to the idea of justice, which in 
the above case is considered as negative.
In short, Hegel argues that the moral autonomy postulated by practical reason is 
institutionally conditioned. Thus what is posited as "absolute" moral law is subject to 
ethical life, and in particular to the modem idea of the subject in relation to positive 
law. Thus, when it is to judge on a particular matter it results either in the 
cancellation of the particular into the universal, where the conformity to the law 
identifies the content to be judged with the form of the rule, i.e. tautologies, or in the 
idea of moral autonomy on the basis of the conflicting nature of the universal maxim. 
I shall illustrate further in the next section how Hegel is critical of this distinction, 
which reproduces the opposition between the legal forms of the modem coercive 
legally-defined state, and the moral autonomy of the individual supported by the idea 
of reason being part of the individual's moral nature.
4. The science of morals and of natural law.
The dichotomy of legality and morality from the standpoint of the relation between 
natural law science and the practical science of morals is presupposed for Hegel's 
speculative science of right. For the latter, what is at stake is the relation of right and 
positive law and the way that individual morality is dealt with. In other words, his 
critique of the tautological nature of morality on the basis of the legislation of 
practical reason neither implies that the natural law science is also tautological (NLE
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p. 112), nor that morality, because of its conflicting nature, is to be abandoned by the 
science o f natural law altogether. A formal separation into morality and legality and 
the reduction of natural law science to positive law would impoverish both sciences.
Both natural law and the science of morals are represented as the negative aspect of 
the absolute ethical life and wrongly posit laws which are conditioned as being infinite 
and absolute. Thus the problem with formalism and formal moral law is that it 
absolutises what is conditioned historically. Nevertheless, individual moral virtues 
such as good will, courage, moderation are also the subject matter of morality, but are 
not necessarily identified with the subject matter of the natural law science These 
virtues are the reflection of the pure consciousness or the real empirical 
consciousness. Bourgeois consciousness, "preoccupied with the fixed reality, with 
possession and property", reduced morality to the morality of the private individual.
The relation of natural law and individual morality is a product of modem times. In 
the sense that in the ancient city state individuals are primarily citizens o f  the state and 
the conflict of natural law and state law is the fate of the hero/ine, who is not yet the 
individual in its rightful existence. Property relations are excluded from the matters of 
the city and the relations between citizens. The citizen "owns" his slave and the 
relation between slave and the master is not a moral relation but a relation of 
dependence. The particularity of modem society lies precisely in that it develops the 
relations of property into an ethical relation mediated by formal right and positive law. 
The equality among citizens is extended to the equality among human beings who 
could buy their freedom by owning property and thus become private individuals. 
The science of morality, although historically conditioned, is not merely reduced to its 
particular content or to a tautology.
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"A science of this morality is thus, first, a knowledge of these relations themselves, so 
that insofar as they are studied with reference to ethical life, a reference that can only 
be formal owing to their absolute fixity, the above-mentioned enunciation of tautology 
finds its place here: this relation is only this relation. ... At the same time, the true 
sense of tautology directly implies that this relation itself is not absolute, and thus that 
morality too, which is dependent on it, is something contingent and not truly ethical. 
This true sense, according to what was said above, emerges from the fact that only 
the form of the concept, the analytic unity, is the absolute, and hence the negatively 
absolute, because the content, by being specific, contradicts the form" (NLE p. 114).
The science of morals
"properly deals only with the area of the inherently negative, while the true positive 
belongs to natural law as is implied in its name. Natural law is to construct how 
ethical nature attains its true right" (NLE p 113 emphasis added).
This is a crucial distinction between the science of morals and natural law science. 
The construction of the ethical nature o f right must explain how natural law becomes 
positive law, and the positive science o f jurisprudence examines how it acquires the 
power to enforce right and law. Hegel reverses this relation, and after establishing the 
difference in abstract terms he says the essence of natural law is formal and negative 
and the essence of morality positive and absolute (NLE p. 116).
The determination of the relation between natural law science and morality in the 
NLE is orientated towards the relational character of the ethical which in the first 
place appears as the positive or negative aspect of the totality o f the absolute ethical 
life. It is what Hegel calls relative ethical life.
In the SDS fragment, written after the NLE and published only after Hegel's death, 
Hegel is more explicit in defining the difference between the sciences of morals and of 
natural law. It is not that the former is sundered and completely excluded from the 
latter, as a formalist approach would suggest. For the subject matter of morality is 
contained in natural law, in such a way that the moral virtues represent the negative
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subjective aspect of the ethical life which also reflects subjectivity in its singularity. In 
other words, modem subjectivity involves the examination of the individual's morality 
who is also subject of law. Therefore, the appearance of the ethical life is singular, 
and negative. It is the possibility realised through the subjectivity of the individual 
(SDS pp. 146-7). For the NLE this singularity is a living relation, which is 
approached as the subject of the science of law and political economy, and the 
particular form of social relations in modem ethical life.
5. Natural law and positive Jurisprudence.
The transformation of the relation between natural rights and positive law is the 
distinctive element of the modern ethical life (NLE p. 93). The modem science of 
rights differs from traditional jurisprudence to the extent that it addresses the relation 
between modem jurisprudence and political economy. Both systems of positive law 
and political economy appear as negative and distinct systems. Hegel draws attention 
to the relation between the modem economic sphere and Jurisprudence as the basis of 
the modem science of law, but also as a form of rationality which informs the modem 
science o f right. It has been argued that political economy and the liberal approach of 
the natural law tradition incorporate natural law principles into their social theory, in 
contrast to the contractarian theories of the sovereign or the absolutist theological 
justification.
For Hegel what is at stake in his examination of natural law in relation to the positive 
system of law is that it is an ethical relation, negative in its form. Modem ethical life 
is segregated into relative and absolute ethical life, and this relation in the NLE is 
reconstructed through the critique o f right and the positive science of law. The 
particularity of the modern ethical life is that the relation of natural law has a double 
expression, on the one hand, in jurisprudence, and on the other hand, in what Hegel
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calls the "system of reality" as subject matter of political economy. In this double 
realisation of natural law lies the particular form of modern ethics. The science of 
right is not merely a critique of morality or practical morality or what Hegel ironically 
calls the critique of "natural right or wrong" (NLE p. 113). Instead, it is a critique of 
the relation between natural and positive law, which involves history arbitrariness and 
violence. In other words, natural law is not exhausted in the sphere of the science of 
morals and thus subjectivity becomes subject of law through the legal personality of 
the citizen and the property owner. Further, this led to the separation between state 
and economy. The separation of the state and economy is made possible by positive 
law, and thus this distinction is represented in formal terms.
Herein lies the foundation of modern right as objective positive law as developed and 
criticised in Hegel's later political and philosophical writings. Hegel acknowledges the 
particular foundation of the modern science of rights as differentiated from the natural 
law tradition in the way he addresses the foundation of the speculative science of 
rights in the relation between jurisprudence and the "system of reality".
He employs two standpoints to articulate this relation: First, from the external side by 
linking universality with particularity and specification (NLE p. 129) and second, by 
dealing with positive science from its material side, i.e., with the particular as such 
(NLE p. 125). The sphere of law is constituted in the divided ethical life, and since 
this split is reconstructed not in terms of identity but of relative identity, this relation is 
an ethical one.231
231 In the SDS, relative ethical life is defined as the form of Sittlichkeit.
"Diese Form der Sittlichkeit, schafft also das Recht und ist R e c h t s c h a f f e n h e i t .  ... Ihre 
Totalität ist die empirische Existenz des Einzelnen, deren Erhaltung sie an sich und andern sich 
angelegen sein laßt" (GSDSp. 60).
The English translation olTcrcd by Harris goes as follows:
"Thus this form of ethical life fashions legal right and is honesty. . .The totality of relative ethical life 
is the empirical existence of the single individual, and the maintenance of that existence is felt to 
devolve upon himself and others" (SDS p. 149).
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6. Political economy and the speculative science of right.
Political economy has as its subject the "system of reality" or what Hegel calls in his 
later writings "the system of needs".
"These realities in their pure inner formlessness and simplicity (i.e., these feelings) are 
in the practical sphere feelings which reconstruct themselves out of difference and, 
passing from the cancellation (Aufhebung) of undifferentiated self-awareness, are 
restored through an annihilation of perceptions (Anshauung). These are the physical 
needs and enjoyments which, put again on their own account in a totality, obey in 
their infinite intertwining one single necessity and the system o f universal mutual 
dependence in relation to physical needs and work and the amassing [o f wealth] for  
these needs" (NLE p. 94).
Therefore, the subject of political economy is not merely the chaotic state of nature, 
as pure empiricism argued. Political economy does not merely start from the chaotic 
situation among individual atoms. It inquires into the relations of mutual 
interdependence which are not merely cognitive, or part of individuals' nature, but 
also a universal system of interdependence. To put it in a nutshell, what distinguishes 
the method of political economy from the natural law tradition is that instead of 
offering an analysis of the communities of God or an analysis of the state of nature 
which leads to the social contract, it highlights the relations of dependence in civil 
society based on the social relations of labour and division of labour.232 In that sense, 
although political economy embodies the contractarian view of natural law and 
contract theories in explaining the relations of exchange and contract, it also 
developed this logic to its extremes by showing its practical contradictions when used 
without an analysis of labour, needs and the relations of interdependence on the basis 
of some common value. This idea of social interdependence takes a systematic form 
in what Hegel calls the "system of reality", or "system of needs" as system of universal 
dependence
232 Dickey (1987) pp. 215-6.
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"And this system, as a science, is the system o f the so-called political economy. 
Since this system of reality rests entirely on negativity and infinity, it follows for its 
relation to the positive totality that it must be treated wholly negatively by the latter, 
and must remain subject to the domination of this relation. Whatever is by nature 
negative must remain negative and may not become fixed. In order to prevent this 
system from becoming a self-constituting and independent power, it is not enough to 
set up the propositions that every one has the right to live, that in a people the 
commonweal has to see to it that every citizen shall have a sufficiency, and that there 
be perfect security and ease o f gain. This last proposition, understood as an 
absolute principle, would on the contrary exclude a negative treatment of the system 
of possession, and would allow the system full sway to entrench itself absolutely" 
(NLE p. 94 emphasis added).
The system of the relations of interdependence becomes an independent power, the 
negative system of possession. Negative in the sense that it lies in the principles of 
exclusion. The absolute principle, let us say, that every citizen has an equal right to 
live and equal opportunity to make profits and secure his/her property is the principle 
posited in order to avoid the system becoming negative. This principle is contradicted 
by empirical inequalities, and thus as a scientific principle first points to the difference 
between a universal demand for equality and the negative system of possession and 
property. This acknowledgement of the difference is determined by measuring the 
degree of inequality (NLE pp. 94-5). The opposition between the principle of 
equality and inequality on the level of empirical observation is the opposition of the 
relative identity between the pure reality (inequality) and ideality (equality) of two 
opposed determinacies. For Hegel this indicates a formal identity which seems to be 
common to modem science. This opposition is resolved in the measuring (in this case 
of inequality) and thus in the increase of distinctions and subdivisions, which is best 
shown in modem legislation as the formal aspect of a growing development or as the 
development of modern science (NLE p. 97).
This development in absolute ethical life is a negative development, and thus relative, 
which has to be seen as a relation between relative ethical life and absolute ethical life
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(NLE p. 98). The latter relation is a practical relation between subjectivity and 
objectivity. By subjectivity is understood the individuality o f feeling or physical 
necessity and by objectivity, work and possession. Law is the formal representation 
of this relation.
The spheres of law and political economy are constituted and are an expression of this 
relation as a relation of relative identity. The negative aspect of this division is the 
foundation of the science or the system of law as separate from political economy. 
The separation of the state and economy, rather than being formally posited by 
positive law and abstract right (NLE p. 116), had for Hegel to be viewed from an 
ethical point of view, i.e. as a relation in the context of relative ethical life.
This is made more clear in the reconstruction of the different forms of this relation in 
the SDS and the Jena Re a Ip h ilosophi e, but also later in the PR which I shall examine 
in the following chapters. In the last section of this chapter I will examine the idea of 
ethical life not merely as the relation of absolute and relative ethical life, but as a form 
of organisation and as a living relation.
7. Modern S ittlich k e it and Iivin2 ethical, life
Hegel's critique of the empirical and formal science of natural law, but also of positive 
modem science, led to the articulation of the different forms o f ethical organisation as 
perceived by the modern science of the natural law. His philosophical understanding 
of the science of ethics was historically contrasted to, but also philosophically 
influenced by, the classic philosophies of Plato and Aristotle and their view of the idea 
of the ethos 233
233 Aristotle was a common source of influence for the Scots as well. Hutcheson explicitly refers to 
him. and Smith was also very familiar with Plato's dialogues and the classics which were the subject 
of his Lectures on Rhetoric.
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Hegel quotes Aristotle and Plato on the question of ethical life as a form of social 
organisation. What is the highest social task for social organisation is the idea of 
"politeuiv", i.e. "living in and with and for one's people, leading a general life wholly 
devoted to the public interest-or else the task of philosophising" (NLE p. 100). 
However, the highest social task is only enjoyed by the free citizens, in antithesis to 
people living in unfreedom and slaves. The classic divisions presented in Plato's 
Republic are viewed by Hegel from a modern perspective The class of non-citizens 
for Hegel represents the class of need and work, property law and justice, possession 
and property, i.e. the modem bourgeoisie. The third class lacks understanding of the 
difference of freedom and unfreedom. Freedom is the characteristic of the second 
class The third class is neither free nor unfree but is bound to the slavery of 
unmediated work and need
These first ideas of society on the basis of its social distinction into classes are later 
modified and further elaborated in the SDS and Jena Writings, as I shall examine in 
the next chapter For the NLE classes are formed according to the absolute necessity 
o f  the ethical life (NLE p. 99). Thus it is part of Hegel's first attempt to develop a 
theory of Sittlichkeit on its social basis. Hegel reflects on modem social divisions on 
that positive basis, as the reflective relation between relative and absolute ethical life. 
In return, the absolute division of social classes can be the subject of this relation.
In the modem world the second class becomes of particular importance and its role is 
influential in shaping new forms o f labour and organisation of ethical life. In the 
modem world the organisation of labour and the division of labour was also followed 
by the distinction between private and public bourgeois and citizens. This conflict is 
what characterises the modern subject In antiquity the distinction is on the level of 
the household and public life of the agora in the polis between slave labour and the 
life of the free citizen. This distinction is fundamental for the Greek polis and the 
unity achieved (NLE p 102). In the modern world, due to the division of labour, the
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individual belongs to a class according to the labour that he/she performs and then 
also is a citizen in the state.
Despite the similarities between the role of classes in the Republic and in the modem 
form o f society, modern ethical organisation privileged the economic characteristics of 
classes which were generated in a socially divided society. Reflecting on this 
difference, Hegel of the Philosophy o f  Right draws the conceptual distinction between 
Klasse and Stände which precisely points out the different role between negatively, 
i.e. on the basis of property relations, defined classes and the ethical political role of 
the Stände
The negative distinction on the basis of individual property owners is comparable to 
what Hobbes calls the "state of nature", assessed as far too negative to be a source of 
social and ethical distinctions. Albeit that the particularity of modem ethical life is 
due to its particular form of negativity.
"This totality of the widespread image is the justification of the single as an existent. It 
is therefore the formal standpoint which gives the form of particularity to an 
individuality and cancels the life in which particularity is real; it is the empirical 
standpoint, on the other hand, which demands a higher stage where the reality of a 
specific stage is laid down. That higher stage, even in its developed reality, is 
empirically just as much present [as the lower one]; the higher development o f the life 
of the plant is present in the polyp, higher development in the insect, etc." (NLE p. 
127).
In the NLE  the totality of the ethical life is approached on the basis o f a dichotomy, as 
actualised by formalism and empiricism Both standpoints are complementary to the 
extent that they highlight different views of ethical life, or what Hegel calls the totality 
of absolute ethical life. They highlight the different aspects of the absolute of ethical
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life and reflect at the same time its modem and relative character The question is still 
open how the absolute ethical life in its relation of relative identity to relative ethical 
life reflects the living aspect of ethical life.
To distinguish what is living, we must recall a distinction which can elude a formal 
approach and which must prevent us from taking what is inherently negative for the 
living law, and the rule of the inherently negative laws for the life o f the ethical 
organisation (NLE p. 130). The absolute ethical order is the living whole, within 
which there are indeed differences, but differences of a different kind. In antiquity 
differences are united, like the parts of the living body, by common life (SDS p. 102). 
The modem form of difference lies in the way it reconstructs the essentially living 
relation of parts and the whole.
Ethical life is to be achieved in the unity of the identity/non-identity o f the universal 
and the particular, rather than merely in the relative relation of opposition of the 
particular and the universal (NLE p. 126). Thus it is not philosophy which takes the 
particular for something positive, just because it is a particular. On the contrary, 
philosophy does so only if the particular has won independence as a single part 
outside the absolute cohesion of the whole.
"At the same time it is necessary for individuality to advance through metamorphoses, 
and for all that belongs to the dominant stage to weaken and die, so that all stages of 
necessity appear as such stages in this individuality. But the misfortune of the period 
of transition (i.e., that this strengthening o f the new formation has not yet cleansed 
itself absolutely of the past) is where the positive resides ... The shape, in its new-born 
strength, at this first exists for itself alone, before it becomes conscious o f its relation 
to an other" (NLE pp. 131-2).
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The philosophy o f ethics teaches us to comprehend the transition which appears as 
necessity, and to know the connection o f its content and the contents of specific 
character as absolutely bound up with the spirit and as its living body. Positive has in 
the event turned out to be the negative considered in itself Life fends off involvement 
with the negative, it confronts the negative as objective and fate,234 and by consciously 
conceding to the negative a power and a realm, at the sacrifice of a part of itself, it 
maintains its own life purified of the negative (NLE p. 133).
Hegel uses Montesquieu's work to criticise formalism as represented in his search for 
the individuality o f the modern nation. In Hegel's words:
"while he did not rise to the height of the most living Idea, he yet did not merely 
deduce individual institutions and laws from the so-called reason, nor merely 
abstracted them from experience to raise them thereafter to some universal. On the 
contrary he comprehended both the higher relationships o f constitutional law and 
the lower specifications o f  civil relationships down to the wills, marriage laws, etc., 
entirely from the character o f the whole and its individuality." (NLE p. 128 emphasis 
added).
Thus Montesquieu showed that reason, and common sense experience, are not to be 
taken a priori, which would be as absolutely universal, but as relations which have an 
individuality. It is of particular interest how Hegel deals with the question of 
individuality in a period of transition in the case of the construction of the German 
nation state from feudalism
In a period of transition that the modern nation did not yet exist as a modem nation 
on the basis of modern law the state of affairs was falling back to the feudal system.
234 R ose (1 9 8 1 ) p. 155.
187
The latter could not bear the relation of law but only of personality and of power 
relations between them (NLE p 128). This would mean the disintegration of the 
German nation, where its laws organising the whole had some importance for the 
feudal past which existed in the present in a contradictory form, i.e as representing 
the past. The concrete historical relation between feudalism and the nation state was 
instead the living relation between the two.235
What is a living relation on a conceptual level is the way that particular forms of 
ethical life reconstruct the relation between organic and inorganic ethical elements. 
For Hegel this complex relation led him to the inquiry into the relation between 
natural law and positive law (NLE p. 130).
"The shape, in its new born strength at first exists for itself alone, before it becomes 
conscious o f its relation to the other. Just so the growing individuality has both the 
delight of the leap of entering a new form and also an enduring pleasure in its new 
form, until it gradually opens up to the negative, and in its decline too it is sudden and 
brittle" (NLE p. 132, emphasis added).
The absolute ethical life examined positively and negatively offers a form of universal 
knowledge. This "must present itself as a system of legislation In such a way that 
the system completely expresses reality or the living customs present in the nation" 
(NLE p. 116). These laws in the case of a disintegrated nation represent this 
disintegration.
235 Bobbio (1975) examines the historical school and the codification of law in the German legal 
discussions (pp. 85-87). See also Gierke int., Marcuse (1941) in conclusion. Croce (1969) p. 201.
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A "dualism" seems to run through this argument, which results in the articulation of 
an ethical relation as the living unity of the ethical whole The dualism or relation o f 
opposition at the end of the NLE  is "superseded" into the new unity represented in 
two standpoints which resolve into the unity of the absolute ethical life as a living 
changeable relation. In other words, to use the metaphor of the relation of the 
organic/inorganic or the living, the different forms of life are distinguished in the way 
that they represent and acknowledge this relation as an absolute one.
In the NLE Hegel works out the speculative science of natural law that acknowledges 
and overcome the one-sidedness and negativity of both empirical and formal natural 
law In doing so Hegel employs the idea of ethos and the elaboration of modem 
ethical life as the relation between absolute and relative ethical life as the living and 
historical relation. This is illustrated by the examination of the relation between 
natural law and morality, natural law and positive law, right and political economy. 
This discussion is to be examined as the ethical relation which reflects a period of 
transition from feudalism to the modem nation state (taken as Volk) and the 
foundations of the rule of law and the modern nation. The inquiry in the foundation 
of modem natural law science made a shift from the empirical and formal ways of 
dealing with natural law and incorporated a politico-economic account in the science 
of right and positive law.
In the next chapter I shall deal with the way that this shift towards political economy 
and ethical life lead into a discussion of ethical life which incorporated the analysis of
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labour/division of labour and consciousness as a practical and ethical relation of 
property, contract, law and right.236
236 G ru y sb c rg h s  (1 9 8 9 ) p  117, L c ijc n  (1 9 8 9 ) p. 122.
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Chapter seven
1. Labour, mechanical labour and consciousness
This chapter examines the arguments developed in the SDS and the Realphilosophie, 
i.e FPS, PS on modern ethical life as a "system", on the basis of the politico- 
economic and legal categories, and Hegel's idea of the "system of needs". Although a 
number of ideas seem to be repeated in SDS, FPS and PS, there are some 
modifications in their presentation but also in their content I shall mainly focus on the 
early analysis of labour, division of labour, property, contract, exchange, system of 
needs and classes as the conceptual but also universal form of approaching modem 
ethical life
These texts published in English in the seventies and eighties, are important for the re- 
appropriation of early Hegel in critical social theory. The debate about these texts 
acknowledges their importance for both Hegel's phenomenological but also politico- 
philosophical writings. The former as spirit viewed from a subjective standpoint and 
the later with what is called in the later writings objective spirit.237 Both standpoints 
are to be comprehended as different views on spirit and thus spirit comprises both. In 
that sense the importance of these texts lies precisely in that Hegel had not yet drawn 
the distinction between the different aspects of what he calls the philosophy o f spirit. 
Harris (1979) recommends that the SDS is read together with the FPS 1803/4 and the 
PS 1805/6. In the latter texts the ethical consciousness of free people is viewed from 
a speculative point of view and thus the understanding of this text is a significant step 
for Hegel's theory of consciousness. In other words, the "systematic" approach on 
ethical life offered in the SDS is to be examined in the context of the philosophy of 
spirit. Hegel moved from the "Schellingesque" influence into developing a philosophy
237 Avineri (1972) p. 87.
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of spirit. According to Harris that offers insights on the way that the PR was latter 
structured.238 For both Cullen (1979) and Harris (1979) these texts offer "the general 
outline" for Hegel's mature political theory, and they can be read as the first draft of 
the PR 239
Rose holds that in these early writings is offered the "first phenomenology" and 
compares it to the Phenomenology o f  Spirit2*0 In contrast to the readings that put 
emphasis in the content o f these writings she underlines the phenomenological 
importance of these texts which lies not merely in the examination of their content but 
also in the form of their presentation. This aspect o f Hegel's argument is crucial for 
both the political and phenomenological writings but also the way that the subject 
matter is conceptually expounded.
According to Göhler (1974) the SDS and the Realphilosophie was the first systematic 
attempt towards the evaluation of social and political (staatlicher) phenomena and in 
particular of the relation between the state and civil society (Bürgerliche Geselschaft), 
which appears in its own right in the later political writings.241 With regard to the 
relation between the SDS and the Realphilosophie there are some systematic changes 
between the SDS and the Realphilosophie, which result in the different evaluation of 
social phenomena. For the Realphilosophie, the experience of consciousness and the 
struggle for recognition is a substantial part of the analysis of modem social relations. 
Instead, the SDS offers an analysis starting from the simple level (Potenz) of the 
natural individual and the natural form of labour. This simple, individualistic starting 
point is grounded in the natural law tradition and is twofold; first, it refers to modem
238 Harris (1979) p. 191-192.
239 Cullen (1979) p. 19, ch 4, p. 58. Harris (1979) p. 99.
240 The comparison she draws is as follows: 1) absolute ethical life is presented according to its 
relation as individual experience (Phenomenology ch IV). 2) absolute ethical life is presented as 
relative ethical life which is called " the negative or freedom of crime" in the SDS. Individuals 
recognise each other as means to particular ends (Phenomenology ch V). 3) Absolute ethical life is 
presented from the prevalent standpoint of the whole in its ethical, cultural and moral forms (ch VI), 
p 159.
241 GOhler (1974) p. 477.
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liberal natural law, and second, to the link with antiquity, in that antiquity lacks the 
modem divisions o f property and contract relations and the structures of recognition 
related to them In both SDS and FPS abstract labour, division of labour, and 
contract are examined in the specific sphere of social determination in the sense of 
naming and supplementing the abstract economic and legal universal structures. In 
both systems there are some similarities with regard to their content, although on the 
whole they are different in the way they tackle their content.242 243
For Riedel (1984) the influence of Aristotle appears more strikingly in the earliest 
sketch of a political system in the SD S243 The division of work in Aristotle does not 
imply private property relations. The product of divided work is instead communal 
property. In the SDS Hegel reproduces the classical distinction o f economics and 
politics on the basis of modern political economy, which had broken through the 
classical dividing lines. The rise of political economy and the rise of civil society of 
property owners challenged the classic distinction of oikos and politiki kinorua.244 In 
antiquity communal property rules out the questions which arise later from private 
property relations. In the Realphilosophie the "system of reality" refers to the 
distinctions of property relations. The connection between the economic categories 
of modem natural law theory, enlightens the relation between political economy and 
formal law.
In both SDS and the Realphilosopie labour has a constitutive function. The 
development of social unity and universality is primarily logical and systematic, and 
has as its content labour relations.245 Nevertheless, the account of labour is put in a 
different light and context in these texts. In the SDS the struggle for recognition is 
absent, but the social function of recognition is included and is shaped by economic
242 Ibid., p. 504.
243 Riedel (1984) p. 112.
244 Ibid., p. 170.
245 Ibid., p 489
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and legal trading (Verkehrsformen) in each case through the pre-social sphere without 
fundamental difference. The two levels of the natural Sittlichkeit in the SDS are 
described as the real spirit in the Realphilosophie.
The abstract analysis of social phenomena in the SDS, as falling into the economic and 
private law sphere, is replaced in the Realphilosophie by the analysis of contract and 
the abstract social relations On the whole, the economic discussion of the 
Realphilosophie is contrasted with the SDS, but is not essentially modified in its 
content. Riedel following the classic politico-economic view followed by the 
Volkswirtschaft observes that there is no decisive development from antiquity to the 
modem economy with regard to their organisation. However the endorsement of the 
modem liberal doctrine in the SDS is what seems to be contrasted with antiquity. In 
the Realphilosophie this is better worked out and its logical necessity is further 
developed.246 This abstract and logical actualisation of spirit is the conceptualisation 
of social relations as logical relations. This for Hegel sets the problem of alienation, 
externalisation and reification, i.e. of the universal logically presented relationships.
For Habermas this reification takes place also in the sphere of communication which is 
distinct from the sphere of production, and thus the logical reified relations are valid 
and operative only behind the "backs of the subjects". This examination of reified 
logical relations corresponds to the relations taking place in the sphere of production, 
which is separated from the sphere of communication.247 Thus Habermas 
distinguishes between two forms of reification; first, on the level of the struggle for 
recognition in the context of the relation between individuals, where possession is 
gained by means of labour.248 Recognition as mutual recognition is mediated by the 
individual's possessions. Second, reification in the labour process. The subject
246 Ibid., p. 546.
247 Habermas (1974) p 148
248 Ibid., p. 149. For a discussion on reification in the critical social theory see Lukács (1971) on 
reified consciousness and the capitalist reification pp. 99-102, Adorno (1973), Marcus (1982).
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through its labour makes itself into a thing 249 The tool is a middle category as is 
language.250 Habermas seeks the unity of the formative process of spirit in an 
interconnection of the three fundamental dialectical "patterns"; symbolic 
representation, labour, and interaction.251
In the Enzyclopedia, as in the Jena writings, Hegel constructs the transition from the 
philosophy of nature to the philosophy of spirit.252 Spirit is not merely the absolute 
presupposition of nature. This account is considered as a thesis of identity, according 
to which the interpretation of the dialectics of the representation and labour is 
perceived "idealistically". The model of extemalisation is therefore based on that 
separation or division (Entzweiung) and alienation. Riedel (1984) highlighted that in 
the SDS and in the Vorlesungen zur Realphilosophie 1803/4, 1805/6 work appears as 
the central moment of the constitution of spirit. In the NLE spirit cannot be identified 
with "ethical nature1 nor can the latter be identified with the people in which it reflects 
itself, taking nature back into itself in the form of intellectual intuition.253 In the SDS 
and in particular in the Jena Writings work becomes the problem o f practical 
philosophy. Work itself is the basic form of spirit and as such is no longer degraded 
to a subordinate position in practical philosophy. Labour, the struggle o f the subject 
with the object and the objectification of the struggle into the product of work, 
becomes for Hegel an essential moment in the historical mediation of consciousness. 
Hegel inverts the basis of classical practical philosophy. He cancels the aporia in his 
account of the relationship between labour and action.254
Politico-economic relations establish a system of solidarity and reciprocal dependence 
which requires other means for its dominance than the division and demarcation of
249 Ibid., pp. 153-4.
250 Ibid , p 155.
251 Ibid., p. 162.
252 Ibid., p 162.
253 Riedel (1984) p. 17.
254 Ibid., p. 19. See Caygill (1989) on practical judgment in Kant’s thought pp. 251-267.
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classes.255 Consciousness and objectification is essential for the labouring individual. 
But in society labour and need are always universal; the abstraction lies in the for- 
itselfness' of the individuation of the individual, which completes itself within 
society.256 The content of the individual labourer exceeds his need; he works for the 
needs of many as does everyone.
In the Jena Writings externalisation into thinghood in labour and enjoyment means 
that the thing itself enters into the process of social mediation and in it the moment of 
being recognised, the "general will", steps forward. Labour and exchange are forms 
of mediation which constitute "society" as a relation of will and right exchange, 
mediates his labour with the labour of all. In the same way that labour mediates the 
individual with himself and with nature as "thinghood", exchange mediates his labour 
with the labour of all.
In the PS spirit was the absolute of the people's spirit. In the FPS it is compared with 
people's work as absolute mechanical activity. Pure activity of ethical action 
transform people's spirit, in that it is not the individual that acts, but rather the 
universal absolute spirit in him. That is reflected in Hegel's analysis of mechanical 
labour. Objective spirit is the universal work which produces itself through the 
universal form of the division of labour. Will must fulfil itself at work. Free will is 
self-determined spirit which gives its determination external reality.257
Avineri (1972) distinguishes between a "philosophical anthropology"258 to be found in 
Hegel's argument, and social critique. By the former he means the struggle for 
recognition which does not derive merely from physical needs but also has an 
anthropological significance. Yet there still remains an accidental element in
255 Ibid., p. 119
256 Ibid., p. 120.
257 Ibid., p. 27.
258 What is known as philosophical anthropology has its roots in Kojeve's reading of Hegel.
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possession, even when turned into property, since the objects of property are related 
to this or that individual in a wholly arbitrary way. Through labour the accidentality 
of becoming into possession is superseded (aufgehoben).
Labour is the synthesis of objective and subjective 259 The problematic aspect of 
labour is bound up with its social nature, in other words of labour which is contrary to 
an atomistic and individualistic view.260 Abstract labour and the division of labour 
lead into a social critique which is the critique of industrial society based on the 
analysis of the real conditions of mechanical industrial labour.261 Thus he develops the 
immanent link between the division of labour mechanisation and the alienating nature 
of labour.262 For Avineri that also means the transformation of the form of the idea of 
social cohesion on the basis o f the social character of labour rather than on the basis 
of natural law found in antiquity and in the modem ethical life.
Avineri (1973) argued that through the instrumentality of labour Hegel constructs the 
paradigm of a society differentiated according to labouring classes, and it is on this 
stratification, based on the division of labour, that he sets his concept of the political. 
This conception of society links Hegel to the Marxian analysis of society. Labour is 
necessarily connected with the alienation fundamental and immanent to the structure 
of society. For Marx the distinction between the particular capitalist form of 
production is related to the alienation and misery that arises from it. Marx offered a 
practical view of abolition of the capitalist form of production which on the 
conceptual level was reflected as the distinction between the social and the particular 
form of the division of labour263 There lies the difference between Hegel and Marx on 
the question o f  alienation.
259 Avineri (1972) p 89.
260 Ibid., p. 91.
261 Ibid., pp. 89, 93.
262 Ibid., p. 104.
263 Ibid., p. 200.
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Labour for Hegel is the positive outcome of man's confrontation with the natural 
objective world. The process of labour is the objectification of man's subjective 
powers, and it is through the instrumentality of work on an object that man, a subject, 
becomes an objective actuality. Externalisation as alienation (Entausserung) in 
appropriation and in exchange. Yet in exchange, consciousness still accepts the 
external world as given, whereas in labour it is creating this world while 
simultaneously relating to other human beings. According to Avineri Hegel's early 
analysis of labour made him the earliest radical critic of the modem industrial system. 
Hegel responded to the "horrors" of industrial society by offering a philosophical and 
historical view of the political and social element o f the modem institutions.264
264 Ibid., pp. 201-207.
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A
1. The System o f  Ethical Life.
In the SDS Hegel presents in a more systematic form his views on ethical life and his 
political system.265 The SDS was written at almost the same period as the NLE, and 
remained unpublished until after Hegel's death. In 1893 it was found in Hegel's 
Nachlass.266 In the SDS the influence of political economy is very important for the 
elaboration of the politico-economic categories, and on this basis, of the perception of 
the modem ethical life. Hegel was influenced by Schelling and that is reflected in the 
way he presents his argument on three levels (Potenzen).
Despite the "Schellingesque" influence with regard to the mode of presentation of the 
subject-object relation, Hegel held different views to Schelling.267 For Schelling, the 
relation of the subject-object is perceived as an identity relation. For Hegel, this 
subject-object relation led into questions of difference of ethical life. In addition, his 
studies of political economy led Hegel to elaborate his position by using politico- 
economic categories for the analysis and critique of modem society. Schelling's 
approach sees creative artistic activity as the real form of actualisation 
(Venvirklichung) of the identity of subject and object. Among the same lines Schiller, 
in his Letters on the Aesthetic Education o f Man, also offers an Aesthetic critique of 
modernity.
265 Rose (1981) highlights that philosophically it conics after the NLE p. 60. SDS was composed in 
1802/3 and its first complete publication occurred in 1913 by Lasson (cited by Avineri (1972) p. 89). 
It was translated into English in 1979, although discussed by Shlomo Avineri in 1972 as an essential 
part of Hegel's political philosophy. Sec also Marcuce (1973) pp. 73-90. and Lukács (1976) pp. 407-
31.
266 Rose (1981) p. 59.
267 Ibid., p. 60.
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"... art itself is the medium for the education of the human race to true political 
freedom. This self-formative process is related not to the life of the individual but to 
the collective life ... of the people as a whole."268
Schiller turned against alienated labour and bureaucracy, against an intellectualised 
and overspecified science removed from every day problems in a way different to 
Hegel.269 These questions are to be represented in artistic production, and through 
aesthetic representation he sought to revolutionise life. Aesthetic appearance 
develops a reconciling force only as appearance, only so long as he conscientiously 
abstains, in theory, from affirming the existence of this appearance, and renounces all 
attempts, in practice, to bestow existence by means o f it.270 Hegel, instead 
concentrated on the actual relations in the modem world.271 For Hegel the 
conceptualisation of the relation between subject and object is located on the level of 
appearance (Erscheinung). The SDS starts with the explanation (.Erklärung) of
labour and from there moves on to other ethical relations. The former is achieved by 
starting from labour in totality as having three levels {Potenzen).
Dubsky argues that need is what breaks the identity between subject and object and 
divides them in the first place.272 That lack of identity is to be found first on the level 
of feeling {Gefühl) as conscious feeling. That leads to the mediating concepts of 
labour, consumption, production and possession {Besitz)21* The lack of identity that
_68 Habermas (1974) p. 46.
269 Ibid., p. 46.
270 Habermas argues that the idea of the independent logics of the value spheres of science, morality 
is already concealed in Schiller, an idea that would later be worked out energetically by Emil Lask 
and Weber p. 49.
271 Ioannidou (May 1991).
272 Dubsky (1961) pp. 15-16.
2,3 Dubsky (1961) p. 19.
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presupposes need is the real mediation in the relation between men, subject and 
object.274 In the SDS Hegel takes up the classic concept of labour as mediating 
"poesis" which stands in a qualitative difference with regard to the labour of the 
classes {Stände), and in relation to Sittlichkeit.
More specifically, in the SDS the emphasis is put on natural labour {naturwüchsigen 
Arbeit), which has a constitutive function for the second level of subsumption under 
the concept. This pre-social view of labour implies that the relation between the 
labouring subject and the object of labour is to be viewed on the level of the 
appropriation of natural resources. At the same time Hegel developed the classic 
sense of labour as "poesis" in the sense of real unity and social universality, towards 
the complex idea of "Bildung" and brought out explicitly the value {Wertung) of 
labour in modern society.275
On this issue Göhler points out that Riedel's account of labour does not search the 
structure of the pre-social "naturwuchsingen Arbeit" in the SDS as essentially bringing 
forward the first social universality. Instead Riedel highlights the importance of the 
NLE ("Naturrechtaufsatz"), where the intention is different. According to Göhler, 
Riedel and Kimmerle posit the difference that in the SDS the social character of the 
individual remains at the level of natural interrelations. Göhler underlines the 
universal elements in the SDS which appear as the naturalism of the social and thus 
universal social forms are posited as natural.276
274 Göhler (1974) p. 485.
275 Ibid., p. 491.
276 Ibid., pp. 514-515.
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2. The "ideal” aspects of the "real" in the political economy of the5/)5.
The SDS offers a systematic view of the modem abstract divisions of ethical life, as 
were addressed in the NLE under the law of property and abstract labour as opposed 
to  the organic living ideal of a common property and the natural division of labour. 
The mechanisation and universalisation o f modem life is presented through the 
mechanisation of labour, and thus the abstract logical aspect of modem life is 
represented as embracing different aspects o f social life.
In comparison to the NLE, where ethical life is dealt with as the living whole277 and 
the people represent that whole as an organic totality, in the SDS the idea of the 
whole of ethical life is presented on the basis of the following moments, identity or 
indifference, difference, absolute living indifference (SDS p. 145). Ethical life is 
examined through the subsumption of the intuition and the concept and the opposite 
(SDS par. 415). The idea of the absolute ethical order is represented as the unity of 
the two which, as Hegel says, "must be thought". This idea of Hegel that thought is 
needed in the analysis of social phenomena meant the philosophical examination of the 
modem science of politics and of the theory of the state.278 In the SDS what is meant 
by the necessity of thought was the relation of the concept and intuition as a mediated 
relation, but as a negative relation.
In the NLE Hegel addressed the question o f political economy under the heading of 
the "system of reality" or the "system of needs". In the SDS he offers a more detailed 
account of it by dealing further with politico-economic categories. The "real" 
relations are examined on the basis of their "real" and "ideal" aspects. The first refers 
to the actual relations of taking possession, labour, exchange (first Potenz), and the 
second to possession becoming property, abstract labour and contract (second 
Potenz). The "system of needs" is examined as the first system of government (third 
Potenz), which is to be modified later in the PR under the title of civil society. The 
Schellingesque influence applies to the analysis of labour and consciousness on three
277 Compare with SDS p. 171, par. 493.
278 See Hegel's discussion of Haller's argument in the PR (par. 221).
202
differentiated levels and their differentiation rests precisely on the subsumptions 
between concept and intuition. On the first level the concept is subsumed under the 
intuition, on the second the intuition under the concept and the third is the level of the 
unity of the concept and intuition, the level of indifference.279
Hegel articulates practical consciousness by pointing out the role of labour and 
possession first on the simple level, called in the literature the pre-social level.280 This 
level is elaborated further by a concrete analysis of the "real" and "ideal" aspects of 
the modem form of relations, moving towards a systematisation of the different forms 
o f consciousness. The most important aspect of the discussion of the real relations on 
the second level is the analysis of the "real" and "ideal" in the way that they are 
represented in the different levels of Hegel's examination of the ethical life.
On the first level (Potenz), labour and possession are discussed in terms of subject- 
object relations and desire, i.e. labour is the labour of the subject on the object 
motivated by its desire for the object. Possession is analysed in three moments and 
refers to the relation of the subject to the object as the first, practical feeling passes 
into the pure moment of taking possession. The legal aspect is abstracted and the 
subject-object relation is examined on the level of the subsumption of the concept 
under intuition. Taking possession is the ideal moment in this subsumption of the 
product by the subject (SDS par. 420, p. 105).
Labour is itself the subsuming of the object; the subject is indifferent as is the 
subsumer. Where the subject is the subsumer, the concept is dominant. Labour is the 
real aspect or movement, and thus the mediating term, and the entity of the subsuming 
subject into the reality of the object (SDS par. 420 p. 106). This is the second 
moment in the relation of the subject and object and that of taking possession of the 
object.
279 In terms of the content, the first section (part I of the SDS) is about "primitive natural needs ... 
most elementary forms of labour and economic relations" (p. 11). At this simple level the concept is 
subsumed under the intuition. Hegel offers a number of further subsumptions in elaborating the 
examination of labour and possession. In the second section we find the most elementary forms of 
labour and economic relations, organization of labour and property, family. The third part is mainly 
concerned with the character, functions, structure, and interaction of three social classes... within an 
established political community (p. 12). Harris (1979). Rose (1981) p. 61.
280 See Riedel's account.
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The third moment o f possession is the synthesis of the earlier two; present in the 
object as real according to the second moment, in other words as the movement and 
entity (SDS par. 421). The object subsumes labour under itself and only in relation to 
that is it real. Labour can have little to do with the life of the living organism (plant) 
but it only concerns its external form, its inorganic nature, "which itself is only related 
to something living" (SDS p. 108).281
Possession, as articulated by the three moments on the level of the subsumption of 
intuition under the concept, and property are examined as an established relation 
between subject and object, but also as the relation to the surplus produced by the 
mediation of labour. This is rather the shifting point of transition of the surplus 
produced into a real relation by the legal rights which persists in this relation. At the 
same time, legal right as the positive element is the ideal tie of possession becoming 
property. The right o f property is a right to right. Private property as right is the 
abstraction of property, according to which property right is the right to possess 
property (SDS par. 435, p. 118). Right in the form of consciousness is law.
Exchanges between property owners involve the recognition of one's right to one 
thing but also it involves the actualisation of one's right to private property. Herein 
lies one's right to transfer his/her property right to somebody else, by means of 
exchange and contract on the basis of empirically calculated prices. The real aspect of 
this relation involves an ideal element in its negative form, i.e. through the exclusive 
relations of private property. The right of property involves the right to use one's 
property and to exchange it for something else. This right is posited by law and 
misrepresents the double aspect that the right involves. That is the difference, the 
"ideality" of bourgeois relations of exchange as they become fixed through the legal 
relations of private property, exchange and contract.
281 Hegel borrows the terminology of natural philosophy to describe the different forms of labour. 
Mechanical labour is examined in relation to a living plant. It is only related to something living 
and lets it alone. It docs not destroy it chemically. Second, he examines labour and animals (SDS 
par. 423). Third, the absolute identity of these two levels is that the concept of the first is one with 
the identity of the second or is the absolute concept, it is intelligence (SDS par. 424). The first two 
levels are relative identities. Absolute identity is something subjective, outside them.
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The examination of the subject-object relation does have a naturalistic beginning in 
the sense that it assumes the immediacy of desire as the first level of abstraction, and 
then it builds on the mediating role of labour and the legal categories and structures of 
consciousness Thus the examination of the last two levels is negative in its structure, 
which is contrasted to the positive idea of the ethical life as a whole. It is negative in 
the sense that it "is" positive only by assuming a double aspect. The positive ethical 
moment instead is the reflective moment of the double sided aspect which posits what 
it is not as what it is. This idea is what I call the "surplus" of the negative analysis of 
the real relations
Labour and the discussion of the division of labour addresses the social element in the 
real and ideal aspects of the negativity of property exchange and contract, for it 
acknowledges the very process of its production but on the level of the relations of 
production. In socio-theoretical terms this meant the "socialisation" o f the 
individualism of private property relations through the acknowledgement of the 
character of the relations of production as commonly produced relations. This 
mediating level of analysis results into the analysis of ethical life on the level of the 
constitution as ethically organised on the basis of the social estates.
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3. Tool and mechanical labour
The analysis of labour in the SDS is substantiated through the analysis of the three 
levels (Potenzen) and I shall examine it separately due to its particular mediating role. 
The universality of labour is expressed in the medium of the tool. The tool is the 
rational "ideal" middle, the product of labour as something which it is possible to use 
universally (SDS p 113). The tool is the middle term, for it represents the 
actualisation of the rationality of labour, and its product ceases to be directed at 
something singular but acquires a rational universal form. In the tool the subjectivity 
of labour is raised to something universal since its use is not merely consumption. Its 
universality lies in that anyone can make a similar tool and work with it. To this 
extent the tool is the persistent norm of labour.
"On account of this rationality, the tool stands as the middle term, higher than labour, 
higher than the object ... and higher than enjoyment or the end aimed at. This is why 
all peoples living on the natural level have honoured the tool ... (SDS par. 428). The 
tool is under the determination of the concept and therefore belongs to differentiated 
or mechanical labour..." (SDS par. 429 p. 113).
The mechanisation o f labour takes place when the single living labour becomes 
mechanical, i.e. variety is excluded from it and so it becomes itself something more 
universal, more foreign to the living whole. This universalisation and externalisation 
of labour turns into a "deadening characteristic", i.e. mechanical, which at the same 
time indicates labour's universal but also mechanical element. This description of 
mechanical labour refers to the division of labour and the labour used in manufacture.
For Hegel the interest in this process of mechanisation of labour lies in its particular 
universal and thus social characteristics. In other words, the characteristic of this
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labour is not only that it produces machinery, but also that it acquires a particular 
social form of organisation and division of labour. It presupposes at the same time 
that peoples' needs are provided by the labour of others, since the mechanisation of 
labour implied that somebody's work being specialised in one thing can not satisfy the 
multiplicity of individuals' needs (SDS p. 117).
Mechanical labour is only quantitative without variety and, since its subsumption in 
intelligence is self-cancelling, is something absolutely external (SDS par 433-4, p. 
117). Its contradiction is implied on the level of reaching intelligence, i.e. as reaching 
a level o f actualisation in being universal activity. At the same time it is self-cancelling 
by developing a particular mechanical and deadening characteristic which is actualised 
on a universal level.282 283 Mechanical labour also implies a particular form of labour as 
lacking subjectivity and therefore becomes universal. This is what makes the analysis 
of labour in SDS important. The dialectic of this relation is worked out further in the 
PS as the relation between will and intelligence as a form of actualisation of 
individuality on a universal level. 282
The ambiguous aesthetics of mechanical labour is discussed as follows:
"labor is without an aim, without need, and without a bearing on practical feeling, 
without subjectivity; neither having done one's duty, in the latter an inner one, the 
consciousness it has a bearing on possession and acquisition, but with itself its aim 
and its product cease too (SDS par. 467. p. 149).
282 See Realphilosophie II on intelligence in the section that deals with actual spirit.
283 "It is the same with labour as it was with the ethical aspect of the virtues ... Just as the virtues are 
without outer and inner hypocrisy(SDS par. 467, p. 148). ...
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This mechanisation of labour leads to the increase of productivity and the production 
of a surplus produced on the basis of common socially joined labour. The tool, and 
later the machine, appeared as representing the alienating form of objectified labour 
into something universal and acquires its own rationality. Nevertheless, Hegel 
addresses these developments by using the term externalisation as reaching the level 
of contradictory intelligence, i.e. actualisation and alienation at the same time The 
dynamic of the modem forms of manufacturing labour and the division of labour and 
its social implications are represented on a general universal level as the actuality of 
will in a universally produced product.
4. Classes (Stände) in the SDS.
The analysis of social classes is more elaborate in the SDS, with regard to their 
particular modem nature which distinguishes it from his account in the NLE, very 
much influenced by antiquity.284 The social classes as a form of ethical organisation 
are contrasted with the perception of society as a relation among single individuals as 
presented in modem natural law theory. The individual, by belonging to a class, 
acquires universality and thus becomes a person. The slave does not belong to a class 
because he is not a person and thus universal. What is characteristic about the slave is 
the relation o f dependence to his master (SDS p 152). In that sense the modem role 
of social classes is neither the same as the classic nor as the feudal one.
The subdivision of classes implicitly offers an analysis of three forms of social labour 
presupposed for this distinction. Their interrelational character is the basis of the 
actualisation of spirit. Thus classes are divided as follows: first, the absolute class, i.e. 
the military nobility. Its labour is training for war and is not directly related to the 
satisfaction o f its needs, though its needs cannot be satisfied without some form of
284 Göhler. Riedel, Ilting debate.
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labour. Consequently this labour has to be done by other classes and things must be 
transmitted to it which have been prepared and manufactured for it. All that is left to 
it is direct consumption in enjoying the product produced by others' labour. The 
essence of the relation to the other classes is mutual utility. On that basis they provide 
it with its necessities and it makes the goods and gains of the others its own, it must in 
turn, be useful to the others. The utilities offered by the first class, such as looking 
after public affairs, are that it substantiates the absolute and real ethical shape. The 
labour that it offers to other classes is security of their property and possessions but it 
excludes the other classes from courage and government (SDS p. 153). To put this in 
a "positive" form the other classes can pursue their private interests, without being 
concerned with public duties but also universal interest can be pursued without 
interference by particular interests.
The second class is that of honesty, the bourgeoisie. It relies on work for satisfying 
particular needs, possessions, gains and property. This class acquires reality only in 
the people and its content "is settled by the contingency of real things, and by caprice 
involved in them" (SDS p. 154). The labour of this class is universal since it involves 
commercial and exchange activities. For the sake of the satisfaction of physical needs 
a system of universal dependence is set up. The universal and legal element becomes 
the "real" natural control of things, against the particularity which is perceived in a 
negative relation to universal legal structures.
The value and price of labour and its product is determined by the universal "system 
of all needs", and the capricious element in value, grounded in the particular needs of 
others and on whether the surplus produced is necessary for them (SDS p. 154). The 
universality of labour acquires a comparative aspect and each part of labour is 
convertible due to money. The commercial class adjusts the particular needs to 
particular produced surplus. Nevertheless, the commercial class activates universal 
exchanges on the basis of profit making. When the transfer of property takes place,
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an "ideal" element which is fixed in positive law285 is presupposed. The transfer of 
property through exchange involves contract and established property relations. The 
produced surplus commonly produced by individuals changes owners on the basis of 
individuals' wills guaranteed by contracts. What matters on that level is not the 
possession of the thing or the appearance of exchange but whether the thing is 
somebody's property or not. On that level just exchanges and contracts are 
constituted in relation to the property of things as a relation between persons' wills. 
In relation to the other classes this class contributes by its productive activity to the 
needs of the first class and of the needy (SDS p. 155).
The third class is that "of crude ethical life", i.e., the peasantry. This class falls also 
into the system of universal interdependence since it also has physical needs. Its work 
is neither intellectual nor is it directly concerned with the preparation of something to 
meet a need. It is something living and more of a means to master the organic 
"potency of the living thing and so determine it, and through the thing produces itself 
by itself'.286 With regard to its relation to other classes the third class is related by 
trust to the absolute class which represents it politically, it is useful to the whole by 
being capable of courage and labour (SDS p. 156).
The "real" "ideal" aspects of the second class and the relations of interdependence 
between classes on the basis of mutual utility becomes central. The second aspect 
that is brought out in this account of classes is that slaves are not members of a class 
since they are not persons. The analysis of the second class is informed by the 
elaboration of what Hegel calls "ideal" and "real" relations in the context of exchange. 
The role of the second class is shown to be particularly important for its commercial
285 More on the reality-universality of the relation of possession becoming property, exchange and 
contract see Ibid., pp. 116-124. Compare with the second part of the analysis of spirit in the PS II p. 
119. Herein is offered the most elaborate analysis of the transformation of possession into the 
universal right of property, and of labour into universal labour and the critique of its negative form 
in the early writings (PS II pp. 111-2-3).
286 That form of labour for the physiocrats was the productive, for it produces value by labour on the 
land.
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activities. The third class, which was in the NLE related to work based on needs, is 
dealt with in the same way in the SDS. In addition, Hegel's analysis of abstract labour 
as the labour of the second class offers an implicit account of the new forms of labour 
related to the introduction o f machinery and manufacture. Although Hegel does 
acknowledge that modem developments affect class organisation by the creation of 
new forms of poverty, he does not offer an account of the new classes related to the 
particular modem developments of productive activities until the Realphilosophie and 
the PR
5. The "system of needs" and the "surplus of the whole".
In the SDS the "system of needs" is discussed as the first system o f government. The 
section devoted to government was not finished by Hegel, and the headings were 
added later by Lasson. According to the intuition-concept subsumptions, government 
is the third level at which the concept and intuition are united in the relation of 
indifference. The "system o f  needs" is the system of universal and physical 
interdependence among people (SDS p. 167) The totality of individual's needs are 
independent of the individual and appear as an alien power outside the individual's 
control. At the same time, on the basis of the new forms of labour, the surplus 
produced increases, as does its value 287 The determination of this value is something 
independent of the particular producers. The system of needs is conceived formally 
above as a system of universal physical dependence on one another. One's labour, or 
whatever capacity it has for satisfying one's needs, does not secure one's satisfaction. 
Whatever the surplus that somebody possesses depends on an alien power over which 
he has no control (SDS par. 488, p. 167).
287 A  d if fe re n t v iew  is  o ffe red  in  th e  R e a lp h ilo so p h ie  B , C.
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Contrasting the relations of interdependence in this way, Hegel raises the question of 
the evaluation of the surplus produced socially, i.e. on the basis of the relations of 
interdependence. If individuals lose control of the whole process by being part of it 
through their particular task, but also being dependent on it for the satisfaction of 
their needs, then who is to regulate the alien power produced by individuals' activity 
and mechanical labour? The value o f that surplus, i.e., what expresses the bearing of 
the surplus on his need, is independent from the particular producer, although he 
participates in its production and is dependent on it.
"This value itself depends on the whole of the needs and the whole of the surplus, and 
this whole is a scarcely knowable, invisible, and incalculable power, because this 
power is with respect to its quantity, a sum of infinitely many single contributions and, 
with respect to quality, it is compounded out of infinitely many qualities"(SDS par. 
488 pp. 167-168).288
However, the whole does not lie beyond the possibility of cognition. In exchange its 
the value, the universal, must be reckoned up quite atomistically and thus 
quantitatively. In that sense is the presupposition for exchanges between merchants, 
where some form of value is presupposed and used or else exchange is not possible.
In the "system of needs" these rules appear to be unconscious and blind. The entirety 
of needs and the modes of their satisfaction are to be known cognitively, but they also 
have an individualistic basis. Here lies the difference of the universal which must be 
able "to master this unconscious and blind fate" and thus this universal becomes the 
government (SDS p. 168). This form of universality is necessary to balance the 
universalisation arising from the mechanisation of labour and "the system of needs", 
which tend to inequality, and the destruction of public and private life (SDS p. 171). 
As Smith did in his Lectures, Hegel points to the need for the regulating role of the
288 Hams points out the echo of Smith in this analysis, i.e. the echo of the invisible hand.
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government and police in the market by intervening in the determination of values as 
specific prices and second, to avoid the destructive consequences for the people who 
become completely dependent on the new system of economy and its blind laws (SDS 
p. 169).
Taxation is introduced on the basis of the principle of justice as an external remedy to 
the inequality produced by the accumulation o f wealth and poverty at the same time 
(SDS p. 172). In the SDS the universal role o f the government is that it regulates and 
provides some balance to the excess of property and wealth. Yet this universal 
mediating role of the government is not clearly distinguished as a different form of 
universality from the universality of labour or the universality of property owners.
The influence on Hegel by political economy is formative and reflects in the way he 
deals with the "system of needs" which results in the production of a surplus product. 
The analysis of labour in its modern form as mechanised labour is examined in its 
doubled rationality; first, as positing a new form of rationality in the production of 
tools for universal use, increase of wealth and relation of interdependence and second, 
the very nature of mechanical reproduction itself results in the need for regulation. 
The articulation of this relation is very much similar to that of political economy.
In part B I shall examine the further elaboration of this argument in the FPS, where 
this mechanical aspect released by the modern organisation of labour and the system 
of needs involves also the question of consciousness.
213
B
1. The "surplus of the whole" and spirit
In the second part of the SD S I examined Hegel's analysis of labour and of the "system 
of needs" which results in the surplus produced by the mechanised and universal form 
of labour. In the SDS the discussion is rather negative. This first approach is further 
elaborated in the Jena writing (1803-4), where Hegel develops his speculative 
philosophy. In the FPS (1803-4) I shall focus on Hegel's account of what he calls the 
"real existence of the people", labour as living and mechanical, possession becoming 
property, consciousness in its objective social forms and as actualised through the 
work of the whole.
The above issues are examined on the basis of the double form of consciousness: first, 
as formal and second, as practical consciousness. The former refers to memory, 
speech and language.289 The idea of speech as the ideal speech situation is considered 
not as productive activity, in the sense of the activity of labour that produces a useful 
product, but only as externalisation of what is already produced. Speech is 
considered as formal activity for it represents a universal form of consciousness (FPS 
pp. 244-5). The first half of the essay examines formal consciousness and the second 
half practical consciousness, i.e. "real existence", "the negative", the people. Hegel 
articulates these phenomenal oppositions: formal/practical, simple/complex, 
singular/universal on the basis of the idea of the public spirit being split into the levels 
of consciousness as formal activity, universal consciousness, practical consciousness, 
and work as the real existence of the people (FPS p. 230).
289 To a certain extent Harris is right to point out that the analysis of consciousness is rather set in 
"contractarian terms", although Hegel's intention was to criticise it (Harris (1979) p. 199).
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In comparison to the NLE in the FPS Hegel focuses on the idea of the people not as 
the Volk but on the basis of economic relations. Public spirit is an expression of the 
spirit of the people in the form of consciousness, memory and language and is 
"produced" socially and actualised through labour organised on a common basis.
"... the spirit o f the people must eternally come to be the WORK (fVerk), that is to 
say, it only is as an eternal coming-to-be spirit. It is achieved as work when activity is 
posited in it, which is forthwith against it, and the activity against it is directly 
cancelling of itself. This becoming other than itself consists in its connecting itself as 
passive with itself as active, as active people it is generally conscious of itself, and 
passes over into the product or to the self-identical; and since this common work o f all 
is their work as conscious being in principle, they come to be themselves outside o f  
themselves in it, but this outward [beingJ is their deed..." (FPS pp. 242-3 emphasis 
added).
"The ethical work of the people is the being-alive of the universal spirit; as spirit in its 
ideal union, as work it is their middle, the cycle of [men] cutting themselves off from 
work as a dead [thing], and positing themselves as singular agents, but positing it as 
universal work, and so immediately just cancelling themselves in it again, and being 
themselves only a superseded activity, a cancelled singularity" (FPS p. 243 emphasis 
added).
Work is not taken merely in its concrete form, but as universal and common activity 
as the mediating term in transforming and actualising spirit, but also as the 
polarisation between singularity and universality. This work is the common activity 
transformative of the whole as "the work of all" as a "conscious being". Thus 
singularity exists through the common universal work (fVerk), cancelling itself as 
singularity and at the same time what has been cancelled as singularity becomes 
universal singular existence.
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2. "Real" existence and "mechanical" mediations of abstract labour.
Singularity is defined as the "singular being as such" (FPS p. 246). The labour of the 
singular individual is concerned with the need of the single individual. Although the 
singular individual is motivated by its need, its action is universal and produces more 
than satisfaction of individual's needs. How does this paradox come about? For 
Hegel of the FPS labour as such is a form of recognition, and it assumes a form of 
universality.
Labour as purposeful activity is a learned skill, it is not an instinct, in that sense it is 
not merely a subjective activity and demands recognising.290 It is a form of rationality 
that makes itself universal in the surplus produced by the labour of the people. 
Labouring becomes something other than the subjective activity of the single agent: it 
is a universal routine and it becomes the skill of the single artisan through this process 
of learning; and through its process of othering itself it returns to itself as a new unity 
(FPS p. 246).
The development of skill leads to the discovery of tools and the innovation of 
machines, as the result of mediation between universal and practical consciousness, 
practical labour and the use of tools. In turn the tool is the material and formal 
nullification of living labour
"The tool is the existing rational middle, the existing universality, of the practical 
process; it appears on the side of the active against the passive; it is itself passive on 
the side of the laborer, and active against what is worked on. ... whereas both the 
subject and the object o f desire subsist only as individuals, and pass away" (FPS par. 
300, p 230).
290 Labour as an educative and formative process is dealt with in the PR par. 196-198 under the title 
"Die Art der Arbeit".
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The use of the tool, as well as labour applied in machines, shows how singularity and 
the living aspect of labour evaporates. This form of labour diminishes the labour 
required for the whole, but not for the particular labourer. Instead, the mechanisation 
of labour and the machine man only postpones the necessity of individuals labouring 
"and makes it more distant" from its living nature.
"His living labour is not directed on nature as alive, but this negative vitality 
evaporates from it, and the labouring that remains to man becomes itself more 
machine like; man diminishes labour only for the whole, not for the single [labourer]; 
for him it is increased rather; for the more machinelike labour becomes, the less it is 
worth, and the more one must work in that mode" (FPS p. 247).
The increase of the product for the whole, instead of being possessed commonly is 
owned as private property and exchanged 291 Hegel draws a distinction between 
worth and value of the socially produced product. The question of determining value 
universally is a more complex question and it is not resolved by Hegel, either in the 
SDS or in the FPS.292 Hegel analyses the blind process released by industrial 
production and the generalisation of exchanges between individuals.
"Need and labour, elevated into this universality, then form on their own account a 
monstrous system of community and mutual interdependence in a great people; a life 
of the dead body, that moves itself within itself, one which ebbs and flows in its 
motion blindly, like the elements, and which requires continual strict dominance and 
taming like a wild beast" (FPS p. 249).
This analysis of the forms o f social interdependence developed by labour becoming 
abstract and universal labour are criticised in a clearly negative mood. Negative in the 
sense that the monstrous system of community is opposed to any conception of 
individuality. The division of labour as the principle of modem manufacturing
2.1 Hegel in the articulation of the contradiction of private property had in mind the commonly 
owned product on the level of the family or in the community dealt with by Plato.
2.2 Compare with the SDS, where the invisible and unconscious aspect of the surplus of the whole 
must be mastered by the universal, which thus becomes government (pp. 167-8). In other words, it is 
not the blind process of the market that regulates values.
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production was a form of universalisation of singularity and universalised exchange as 
the means of satisfaction of individuals' needs (FPS p. 247). The labour of the 
singular labourer is at the same time universal and the "ideal" factor of public life,
"he satisfies his needs by it certainly, but not with the determinate thing that he 
worked on; in order that that may satisfy his needs, it must rather become something 
other than it is; man no longer works up what he uses himself, or he uses no longer 
what he has worked up himself; that becomes only the possibility of his satisfaction 
instead of the actual satisfaction of his needs; his labor becomes a formally abstract 
universal, a singular [factor]; he limits himself to labor for one of his needs, and 
exchanges it for whatever is necessary for his other needs" (FPS p. 247).
Hegel explicitly refers to Smith's example of pin manufacture to indicate the 
particularity of the division of labour in manufacturing production. The simplification 
of labour and need and its formal universal simplicity increases individuals' 
dependence on it (FPS p. 248). This form of interdependence appears as an abstract 
principle of the division of labour and results in the singularity of the commonly 
produced thing representing all needs, i.e. money.
"This manifold laboring at needs as things must likewise realize their concept, their 
abstraction, their universal concept must become a thing like them, but one which, 
qua universal, represents all needs; money is this materially existing concept, the form 
of unity, or of the possibility of all things needed" (FPS p. 249).
This early draft does not go further with the critique of money. But it underlines the 
particular character of the modern form of interdependence as the abstract socially 
produced community. This meant the birth of the social which is at first sight viewed 
as the impersonal product of mechanical labour, and thus the living element exists 
through its mechanical reproduction. Society is the product of the generalised 
division of labour and the introduction of the machine into production. The process 
of labour mediates the most basic satisfaction of individual needs, and at the same 
time appears as an external and impersonal "ideal" which is at the same time real The
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identity of ideality and reality in the analysis of abstract mechanised labour is in this 
text given in its most vivid form. The analysis of Smith's political economy and the 
division of labour is viewed under a very much sociological light. This emphasis on 
the social and communal foundation of modem society is contrasted to the negative 
relations of private property and universality of contract.
3. Possession becoming private nronertv.
Labour and the modem division of labour had an important role to play as a form of 
interdependence but also as presupposition for the production of common goods. 
The latter for political economy is the increase of wealth on the level of the nation 
Political economy assumed private property relations and thus division of labour and 
exchange was developed on the basis of the limited access to resources. For Hegel 
this form of looking at social relations is contradictory. That is the subject of the 
analysis of possession becoming private property. The analyses o f the process of 
possession becoming private property of the singular individual is viewed on the basis 
of the relations o f recognition.
"Like labor, possession becomes within the whole of a people a universal factor in its 
privacy; it remains the possession of this private [person], but only in so far as it is 
posited as his by the universal consciousness, or in so far as in the universal 
consciousness everyone else likewise possesses what is his, that is to say, possession 
becomes property" (FPS p. 249).
The instantiation of the right of property takes place as the moment of exclusion of 
others from one's own possession. The particularity of this exclusion is that it is 
introduced on a communal basis as "a communal exclusion", and the private 
possession of the right to property by one person is the private possession of all other 
persons
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Thus the contradiction of private property of the communally produced product is to 
be explained in two steps: first, as presupposing that all have the same rights to the 
commonly produced product, the right to the right of private property is universal. In 
that sense, property right is implicitly contrary to itself, by presupposing a communal 
possession to guarantee the right of private property. In the same way the security of 
one's property is the security of everybody's. In one's own property all hold their 
property, in that sense the individual's situation is valid because all enjoy the same 
right. In this way a universal right is posited and thus possession becomes private 
property.
The "loose moment" between one's right as implying also the other's right, since these 
rights are not identical to one's right, is articulated as being the subject of reflection 
and formal consciousness. This is a loose connection, although it is a formal 
presentation of the universalisation of property relations. The contradiction of private 
property is to be found on two levels: first, in that the commonly produced product is 
appropriated by individual property owners and second the very idea of private 
property is based on relations of recognition and thus its very idea is a "common 
product". Then the common produced consciousness is to be reflected practically and 
historically as the "commonly" produced product under manufacturing labour. On 
that level, the contradiction of private property, although posited on a universal level 
of consciousness and equality, presupposes social inequalities which are excluded 
from a formal reflective foundation of private property on the basis of the commonly 
produced product
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1. The Philosophy o f  Spirit293.
The PS is a critical text for it introduces the distinction between concrete and abstract 
labour, the distinction of being (Sein) and external existence (Daseiri) as a form of 
extemalisation (Entdusserung), alienation and objectification. In addition, it offers a 
more elaborate account of the social classes in comparison to the NLE and the SD S294 
In the P S  there is a shift from questions related to the different forms of ethical life, as 
they were posited in the SDS, towards the discussion on the basis of the PS and 
relations of recognition as social and negative relations295 but also positively viewed 
on the level of the constitution. Thus spirit is actual in its concept as being neither 
negative nor positive:
"Spirit is actual neither as intelligence nor as will, but as will which is intelligence. ... 
As thus transcended, the will must produce itself in the element of universal 
recognition, in this spiritual actuality. Possession thereby transforms itself into 
[property] right, just as [individual] labor was transformed, previously,296 into 
universal labor" (PS p. 119).
The PS is divided into three parts: spirit according to its concept, actual spirit, and the 
constitution. The first part offers a discussion of intelligence and will and an analysis
293 The PS  (1805-6) was published a year before the Phenomenology o f  Spirit, which Hegel kept 
revising till 1831. The PS is considered important for the "split” into the later major works such as 
the Phenomenology but also of the PR. Gbhlcr deals with this work as the most phenomenological, 
in contrast to Rose who finds Hegel's first phenomenology in the SDS.
:94 Social classes are subdivided into lower and universal classes according to the subdivisions of 
actual or objective spirit and thus analyses the political (positive) and economic (negative) aspects of 
social relations.
295 GOhler (1974) points out the natural pre-social view in the SDS and phenomenological 
distinctions in the PS pp. 602.
296 PSpp„ 111-3.
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of its different moments.297 In this text the analysis of labour is crucial for the 
determination of will as being more than: first, the immediate abstract "arbitrary" will, 
second, on the level of language third, as will in itself the indeterminate first moment 
of the will.298 The labour of the subject is the mediating actual moment of the will 
which thus becomes universal abstract labour (PS pp. 111-3).299
The second part of the PS examines actual spirit, in the way it is actualised in relations 
of recognition and the process by which possession becomes property. Consciousness 
as immediate consciousness transforms itself into a thing. Labour is considered as the 
formative process. In contrast to the FPS, this process is dealt with in PS  as a process 
of objectification or of consciousness transformed into a thing. Contract is a form of 
acquiring property, and thus a form of universalisation and alienation, as is value and 
money. The non binding aspects of contract or its failures result in crime and 
punishment, i.e. as the violation of contracts. The third part deals with the 
constitution, and under that heading Hegel examines the alienation (Entausserung) of 
will as externalisation. In the examination of the constitution is also offered an 
account of the lower and universal social classes.
297 On the moments of the will see Liebrucs (1975) pp. 28-32. For Göhler will and its internal 
characteristic in the Realphilosophie is read as the key for universality (Allgemeinheit), particularity 
(Besonderheit), individuality (Einzelheit). For an analysis of the different moments of the will in the 
PR see par. 5-7 and the chapter on civil society below.
298 Compare with the question of the will and abstract right in the PR.
299 Riedel (1984) pp. 19-23.
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2. Will and right in the "state of nature”.
In his account of intelligence and will Hegel contrasts two models of taking 
possession; first, taking possession by naming or by willing something. This form of 
will in-itself is only formal and "arbitrary" (PS p. 95). Language as the name-giving 
power is a first form o f  taking possession. This form of taking possession is based on 
the power of the imagination which provides an empty form. Logos and reason are 
the essence of things rather than merely imagination. The second moment of the 
immediate abstract will is that of the I as the working subject which determines the 
object by willing it. Labour is the transforming activity (aufgehobene Arbeit) of the I. 
It represents the formation of the thing (sich zum Dinge machen). The division of the 
I beset by drives is this very same self-objectification (sich zum Gegenstände 
machen) 300 Desire must always begin anew, never succeeding in ridding itself of its 
labour. The drive, however is the unity of the I as objectified (a/s zum Dinge 
gemachte) (PS p. 103).
Labour itself as such is not only activity, but it is the activity of the willing subject. It 
is reflected in itself, and brings forth a new one-sided form of the content as 
particular element. But here the drive brings itself forth through labour, and thus falls 
into external existence (PS p. 103).
The general common character of labour is that the individual's desire is satisfied in 
shared labour organised on the basis of the division of labour. Modern labour does 
not occur to satisfy merely the desires of the individual, but as a general means for 
satisfying people's needs. The individual who works on a given object does not 
necessarily consume it. That means that the surplus produced by the individual's work 
becomes part of a "common store" and all are supported by it. This surplus, as it 
applies in the case o f the tool, constitutes the general possibility of enjoyment and also
300 See Ibid., below.
223
the general actuality of it (PS p. 108). It is an immediate spiritual or material 
possession (PS p. 109). This general and common character of labour is most vividly 
shown in the example of family property. Through the latter form of common 
property Hegel distinguishes between higher activity for a common end and merely 
instrumental activity301 In addition, this form of labour is a conscious movement in 
the sense that it embraces a social process of formation and education (PS p. 109).302
In contrast, in property relations the individual's labour acquires a negative and 
exclusive significance. Another party is thereby excluded from something which he is. 
Thus the existence is no longer "general", i.e. things are now defined as "belonging" 
to individuals. This examination of individuality and immediate universality as will 
and intelligence is paralleled to what is referred to as the state o f  nature, the free, 
indifferent being of individuals towards one another.303
The concept of natural right applies to the following questions; first as to what rights 
and obligations the individuals have towards one another, and second, which is the 
element of necessity in their behaviour as independent self-consciousness. Their only 
interrelation, however, lies in overcoming [aufzuheben] their present interrelation, 
i.e., to leave the state of nature. In this interrelation they have no positive rights, no 
obligations towards one another, but acquire them only in leaving the state of nature.
The problem is how it is possible to think about right and obligation for the individual 
in the state of nature, which will lead to something different. The concept of the 
individual in the state of nature is taken as the basis and out of this concept its full 
notion is to be developed. The subject as the bearer of rights, natural right in the first
1,11 This distinction is important for the critique of mechanical labour and universal aspects of labour 
aiming at the general good as realised through the labour of dilfcrent social classes.
302 This aspect is to be found in the role of corporations, which is more explicitly explained in the PR 
(chapter eight).
303 In comparison to Hegel's account of the state of nature in the NLE, Hegel modifies his idea which 
led to an analysis of relations of recognition of what he calls the actual spirit.
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place and then as the rights of the person (PS p. 111). Right implies the relation of 
other right holders, in their conduct, to one another. It is the universal element of 
their free being - the determination, the limitation of their empty freedom. This 
freedom becomes substantial through relations of recognition. The object, in general, 
is itself this creation of right, i.e. a relation of recognition. In the relation of 
recognition the self ceases to be an individual; it exists by right in recognition, i.e., no 
longer immersed in its immediate existence. In the particular case the recognised right 
is the particular and historical right to private property as the end of slavery in the 
state of nature.
If I now compare this analytical exposition in comparison to liberal accounts of 
natural right, property right and the simple theory of the labour theory of property, 
Hegel offers a critique of the liberal argument 304 For Locke the right to one's body 
and what its activity produces is taken as given and natural.305 Hegel's analysis of the 
naturalistic elements of Locke's theory is as follows. By taking something as owned 
as "mine" one appropriates more than his actual activity since this activity is applied 
to something and then it excludes others from it. Let us say, putting a sign on a piece 
of land indicates that one wishes to take possession of that piece of land. More 
complex is the situation when one puts his /her labour, let us say, into making a metal 
cup. The new form given to the cup by my labour cannot be separated from the cup. 
In that case, although my labour is changing the form of the cup it is not clear that I 
own that cup. The same can be said for the ownership and cultivation of land. These 
examples indicate the difficulty to endorse the "externalities" that one's activity 
produces applied to something external to one's body (PS p. 113).
304 Cullen (1979) mentions that the "first reference to economic activity is due to Hegel's reading of 
Locke while he was at Tübingen. The Lockean concept of property as the embodiment of the 
personality of the labourer was to reappear -practically unmodified- in vitally important sections of 
the/T? (par. 51)".
305 Rauch introduction Ibid., Stillman (1976) p. 105.
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For Hegel the liberal labour theory of property is not altogether rejected. He does 
reject its individualistic basis, which overlooks the importance of the relations of 
recognition in the "state of nature" as a relation of interdependence among property 
holders and the particular social form of property and labour (PS p. 116). The 
relations of recognition as the struggles between individuals are for Hegel a life and 
death struggle. The labour process is the form of recognition for the labourer and a 
relation of transformation (PS p. 118). It leads to an account of concrete labour 
becoming abstract, but also of the relation between persons, as Hegel argues in the 
Phenomenology.306
The phenomenology of the life and death struggle, Hegel's version of the "state of 
nature", results in the universality of the will through the will of the person. Labour is 
the key to the relations of recognition; the will of the individual is the universal will - 
and the universal is the individual as the will becoming intelligence. Labour is not 
taken naturally as the appropriation of nature but as the foundation of right to a right, 
i.e. as individual right (PS p. 118). The process o f transformation from labour as 
concrete labour to universal abstract labour for Hegel is parallel to the transformation 
of possession into property rights.
The labour theory of value, viewed on the basis of the relations of recognition, is also 
endorsed in the critique of abstract right in the PR which I shall examine in detail in 
chapter eight.
,06 In the Phenomenology o f  Spirit Hegel says: "through work, however, the bondsman becomes 
conscious of what he truly is” (p. 118) and then "The individual who has risked his life may well be 
recognised as a person, but he has not attained the truth of his recognition as an independent self- 
consciousness" (p. 114). Labour and the struggle for recognition is what differentiates pure 
cognition, to be found in Kant, and recognition developed by Hegel. Kant's critique of the "state of 
nature" as the war of all against all in his "Anti-Hobbes" does not employ the phenomenological 
analysis of the different forms of recognition and consciousness, as Hegel did in the Phenomenology 
o f  Spirit and first dealt with in his early writings. For Kant the argument is constructed on the level 
of the universality of reason characteristic of every rational being. Thus the universal right of the 
person is perceived on the level of the reason. The same goes for contract theories.
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3. Need, labour and abstract labour.
By the examination o f the actual spirit Hegel examines the different forms of 
recognition, i.e., the examination of the spirit according to its concept as the 
immediacy of the subject-object relation. The two subjects know themselves as 
being-for-themselves and they are separated in this way by what they have in 
common. The struggle for recognition is not yet a relation of recognition (PS p. 117- 
8). The articulation of the latter has as follows: it presupposes the knowing will being 
recognised; juxtaposed to itself in the form of universality Immediate recognition 
(Anerkannlsein) being recognised is immediate actuality. This moment o f recognition 
refers to need as the motivation of activity, which is not yet mechanical activity, but a 
labour process, as the conscious transformative activity of labour.
Need in the PS, although not addressed as part of the "system of needs", is viewed as 
the multitude of needs corresponding to the complex forms of production of things 
serving to satisfy these needs.307
"The needs are many. The incorporation of their multiplicity in the I, i.e., labour, is an 
abstraction of universal models (Bilder), yet [it is] a self-propelling process of 
formation (Bilden). The I, which is for -itself, is abstract I; but it does labor, hence its 
labor is abstract as well. The need in general is analyzed into its many aspects - what 
is abstract in its movement is the being-for-itself, activity, and labor" (PS pp. 120-1).
Labour is performed to satisfy abstract needs and thus both needs and labour become 
abstract. Their universal inner possibility is posited as outer possibility as form. This 
process of making things involves the consciousness that makes itself into a thing. 
This objectification of consciousness is vividly represented in production for exchange 
and the satisfaction of universal needs, but also tools, and machines. Producing as
307 See N L E , S D S  an d  PR.
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purposeful activity to meet universal needs is examined as a critical process with 
regard to the concept of labour becoming abstract mechanical industrial labour
The concrete aspect of this abstraction with regard to the abstract aspects of 
individuals' concrete labour for the satisfaction of their needs is expressed as follows:
"Each individual, because he is an individual here, thus labors for a need. [Yet] the 
content of his labor goes beyond his need; he labors for the needs of many, and so 
does everyone. Each satisfies the needs of many, and the satisfaction of one's own 
many particular needs is the labor of many others. Since his labor is abstract, in this 
way, he behaves as an abstract I - according to the mode of thinghood - not as an all- 
encompassing Spirit, rich in content, ruling a broad range and being master of it; but 
rather, having no concrete labor, his power consists in analyzing, in abstracting, 
dissecting the concrete world into its many abstract aspects" (PS p. 121).
Hegel is not only introducing the distinction between concrete and abstract labour, but 
also refers to the most abstract forms of labour as intellectual labour and different 
forms of knowledge. Abstract labour and division of labour seem to be unlimited. 
The way that this separation seems to cover all aspects of social life and forms of 
labour resolves into a number of drawbacks as Hegel pointed out in his critique of the 
new forms of abstract labour. Hegel's early critique of labour and its impact on the 
individual labourer follows along the same lines as Ferguson and Smith. Labour as 
abstract and mechanical labour becomes duller, and spiritless. The spiritual element, 
as the fulfilled self-conscious life, as will becoming intelligence and thus universal, 
becomes an empty doing and a distorted formal universality. The power of the self as 
a rich all- embracing comprehension is lost. Labour lacking individuality becomes 
mechanical, and the labourer's activity thereby becomes more formalised, 
consummated, and one-sided (PS pp. 139, 121). The dialectic o f labour as a spiritless 
activity, but also formalised and one-sided, results in multiplicity, fashion, mutability, 
freedom in the use of forms. Hegel's view of fashion is positive, in contrast to Smith's 
ideas, in that it shows that it is not permanent and thus change is far more rational
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than staying with one fashion and wanting to assert something as fixed (PS p. 139). 
The dialectic of modem labour, although spiritless, formalised and one-sided, also has 
some liberating effects on the use of forms, as that is expressed in the multiplicity and 
fashion resulting from it.
In the PS the subject-object approach becomes complex, viewed on the basis of the 
modem form of the dialectics o f labour. In this early critique, the influence of the 
politico-economic analysis of labour, abstract labour and need is insightful for Hegel. 
The liberating element of labour is not to be found merely in the product on the basis 
of the motive of desire, as in the subject-object relation in the SDS and the FPS or in 
the legal categories of the person as the result of the struggle for recognition, but in a 
liberating and conflicting social process produced on the basis of the abstract labour.
4. Needs and exchange.
Exchange relations presuppose abstract labour that produces goods to satisfy 
universal needs as homogeneous needs and not merely the individual's need. These 
goods are exchanged on the basis of their comparable values. For exchange the needs 
are the same. Value itself, as a thing, is money. This same universality is a mediation 
of exchanges as a conscious movement. Property is thus an immediate abstraction 
mediated through relations of recognition on the basis of property and thus becomes 
an external existence (Dasein). Property is presupposed for exchanges of things 
according to the subject's will. For abstract property relations the origin of property 
is labour as the activity of the individual's will (PS p. 123).
In the SDS  the analysis of exchange relations involves the analysis of the "real" and 
"ideal" aspects of exchange. In the PS these relations are examined under the light of 
the relations of recognition. Thus possession acquires its concrete aspect in
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exchange, i.e. in the movement of universal value in exchanges. Work and exchange 
are forms of recognition of will becoming existence (Daseiri) through one's work and 
exchange. Labour and recognition are also forms of externalisation, or what Hegel 
calls Entausserung (alienation). With regard to labour as the individual's activity, it is 
the source and the origin of property as my activity itself (PS p. 123). In labouring 
the subject makes itself into a thing, a form which is being. At the same time the 
subject externalises this existence (Daseiri), making it something alien (Fremde) to the 
self, and preserves the self therein.
Relations of exchange and contract are forms of extemalisation, but also of 
alienation. It is acquiring by the recognition of one's will and thus becoming 
recognised existence (Dasein). This recognition implies an accomplishment, but also 
alienation, where one's will becomes recognised as the will o f  the abstract person.
"My word must count -not on the moral grounds that I ought to be at one with 
myself, and not change my inner sentiment or conviction (for I can change these)- but 
[that] my will exists only as recognized" (PS p. 126).
In the contract one's word has the significance of the thing. There is nothing that is 
binding, i.e., the determinate aspect in personal service (PS p. 128). I respect my 
particular selfhood by respecting this universal not only as power but as the power of 
law (PS p. 144). That is how people are made moral and educated by the recognition 
of law, not merely as power but as the power of law. The force of the contract is 
purely negative, whose negativity is to be found in the concept of the person (PS p. 
127). I am compelled as a person because I place my will in a particular existence but 
I could do this only as a person. This abstract and negative aspect of contract 
concerns property and external existence. It does not embrace personhood (honour, 
life) since the contract is this mediation which sees itself in the thing, in existence as 
the lawful existence but also as a form of alienation (PS p. 128). Contract relations
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are abstract and formal and become valid by being based on law which becomes 
coercive law (PS p 123). Law is the actual validation of property, the element of the 
actual existence through the will of all Like family, law is the substance and the 
necessity of the individual, even more it is the guardianship over the individual, when 
the family "died out", i.e. in so far as he appears as individual.508 Law as the universal 
right, property in general, protects each one in his immediate possession, inheritance 
and exchange. But this is merely a formal right, which remains free but in a negative 
form.
5. The social classes.
The negativity of the relations among individuals, reflected as mediated relation and 
thus as relation of recognition, is contrasted to the positivity of the universal relations 
between social classes. In the PS Hegel offers a more elaborate account of classes 
compared to the NLE and the SDS. Classes are divided according to the nature of the 
self-ordering spirit, and thus reflect the idea of the ethical whole. In each class the 
spirit has a distinct task: to know its own existence and activity in that class; and a 
particular concept knows its essentiality, i.e. in the relations of trust. Class is analysed 
on the basis of labour, trust and outlook (Gessinnung). The classes are all part, i.e. 
connected organically in spirit.
In the PS Hegel introduces an additional distinction between lower and higher classes. 
First, the peasant class is examined; the class of immediate trust and concrete or crude 
labour. "Absolute trust is the basis and element of the state however, the trust returns 
to one class, to the elementary point of departure ...". The peasant class represents 
this unindividualised trust, having its individuality in the unconscious individual (PS p.
308 With regard to contract and law Hegel is critical of Kant's idea of marriage as the tie binding two 
persons. He argues that the tie binding them is not the formal contractual tie. Nevertheless, these 
relations are subject to positive law governing the relation between the two partners.
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163). Peasant labour lacks the abstraction of industrial labour, in the sense of 
producing for the satisfaction of universal need, but it rather produces for the 
satisfaction of individual's needs. This concrete labour provides the means for 
satisfaction of the peasant's needs The connection between his end, i.e. the 
satisfaction of his needs and its actualisation, is the unconscious aspect o f nature and 
his land and relations of trust to the other classes.
The peasant's concrete labour is the elementary labour that is the crude basis of the 
whole. This substantiality passes over to the abstraction of labour and knowledge of 
the universal: the class of business and of law. The labour of the bourgeois (Burger) 
class is the abstract labour of the individual handicrafts in the sense that they produce 
for market exchange
"It has taken labor out of nature's hands and has elevated the process of giving shape 
(das Formiren) above the unconscious level. The Self has [thus] gained independence 
from the earth (ist über die Erde herausgetreten). The form, the self of the work 
produced is the human Self; the natural self has died; [now the self is] to be 
considered only in its capacity for use and work" (PS p. 165).
The Bürger thinks of himself as the proprietor, and that is part o f his rightful 
existence. He knows himself as recognised individuality and he stamps this on 
everything which carries his self-image (die Einbildung von sich selbst). What counts 
for the Bürger is not class as such but the reality of possession as such.
The third subdivision of the lower classes is that of the mercantile class whose labour 
is pure exchange, neither the natural nor the artificial production and forming of 
goods.
"Exchange is movement, spiritual, the medium that is freed of uses and needs, as it is 
freed of work and immediacy (e g. the stock exchange). This pure movement and 
activity is the object here. The object itself is divided into two elements: the particular 
[trade goods] and the abstract [money], [This is] a great invention - the thing that is
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needed has become something merely represented, not something to be enjoyed itself' 
(PS p. 166).
Money destroys the self-image of the bourgeois and the person is as real as the money 
he has. Money signifies all needs and it is the abstraction from all individuality, 
character and skills of the individual.
The counter-aspect of this is the alienation of the individual and the misery of the 
labouring class. Hegel, in this account o f classes, with the introduction of the role of 
money, examines also the new class related to the development of manufacture, i.e. 
the class that sells its labour for money. The labour of this class lacks universality and 
is divided and abstract, akin to machine work. It lacks the universal object to which 
the universal class is devoted, i.e. the pursuit of the general good (PS p. 169). The 
higher class is the universal class whose labour is work for the state (PS p. 169). In 
other words, its labour is the administration and development of public wealth, the 
exercise of law and executive powers. This distinction between lower and higher 
classes with regard to their relation to the general good is not to be found in the 
earlier examinations of classes. Somehow the economic aspect of the new class and 
the introduction of the analysis of money relations led Hegel to the distinction 
between bourgeois relations based on money and the universal administrative role of 
the universal class.
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6. The question of "bad infinity" and the constitution.
What has been examined so far can be represented to some extent by what Hegel calls 
"bad infinity". In other words, universal taken as abstract or immediate is analysed 
negatively, posited as external and alienated. This critique o f modem universalism, 
abstract right and the mechanisation of labour resolves into the cancellation 
(Aujhebung) of the positive constitution and the state In the PS Hegel has not yet 
elaborated the analysis of the modern state A substantial part of its content is the 
critique o f the immediate universality of right and property, which is dealt with there 
as mediated
The state guarantees the existence (Dasein) and power of right .309 The individual has 
his supposed right only in and through a universal mediation. Property right is what 
counts as universal substance, i.e. as recognised external existence However, what 
counts presuppose the universal mediation of the immediate, which has thereby 
become "immediate" (PS p. 141).
"Just as it is immediate subsistence, the [social] substance here is also the universal 
law - and the maintenance of this abstraction vis-a-vis the individual, his known and 
wanted necessity for him, and the attempted balance of this empty necessity with his 
existence" (PS pp. 141-2).
The negative critique of the immediacy of abstract universality through the critique of 
will, right and property, but also of abstract mechanised labour, exchange contract 
and money can be considered as the backbone of Hegel's critique of liberal contract 
formalism, but also a critical encounter with the questions o f political economy and 
the new forms of labour This critique in the PS is articulated on the level of the 
relation o f recognition, mediation of immediacy, and the process of labour, in addition
309 It is noticeable the way that this idea was developed further in the PR.
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to a positive analysis o f the development of the different forms of social 
interdependence
The state is an expression o f the universal general will and its powers defined similarly 
to liberal political thought. It is the substance and subsistence of immediate property 
and of the power of all individuals. It protects contracts, and secures negatively 
expressed social bonds, but also reproduces relations of inequality and poverty (PS p. 
140).
"It is universal wealth and universal necessity - which comes to be known as such, 
knowingly recognized as such [and] comes to be sacrificed to this evil; and it thereby 
allows all individuals in general and their [particular] existence to become a part [of 
it], so that it can use them. It, [i.e., the system o f  universal wealth and necessity] 
condemns a multitude of people to a raw life, to stultification in labor and to poverty - 
in order to let others amass wealth and [then] to take it from them. The inequality of 
wealth is accepted if heavy taxes are levied" (PS p. 145).
Taxation of property appears as the limitation of private property and the evils arising 
from it.310 The freedom of commerce may as well lead to arbitrariness and 
contingency which is expressed in the multiplicity o f law (PS p. 143-4) The individual 
is contingent in his actual property ... he is essential as possessing property in general, 
i.e. abstract right. The state is the existence of the power of right. Pure right is an 
abstraction that cannot remain in itself absolutely (PS p. 148).
On the other hand the positive power of the state as "external" to property owners 
"averts the fear of distress and robbery". The non-payment of taxes exposes wealth to 
the danger of losing it through violence (PS p. 145). The danger of the positive state
310 To the extent that the individual as the pure person separates himself from the universal he is 
accounted as the evil (PS p. 147). Evil is that which is nothing in itself, pure self-knowledge; this 
human darkness in itself (through this itself the absolute will) is not something alien to the law (PS 
p 149).
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power is that it might result in tyranny and alienation (Entausserung) of the 
individuals' actual will (PS p 156).
This issue, i.e. the relation between abstract individuals and the positive state power, 
results in the discussion of the general will and Hegel's critique of Rousseau.311 The 
unity of individuality and the universal is now presented in a twofold way, as the 
extreme pole of the universal which is itself individuality. The individual is divided312 
into the individuality of the bourgeois and citizen as the living unity of the ethical life 
(Sittlichkeit"), i.e. the totality of moral and ethical life (PS p. 158).
Yet this formal distinction is subject to contingency, leading to the "bad infinity" 
where the universal is applied directly to the universal, in order that the particular may 
subsist (PS p. 143). This identification is judged as "bad infinity". That is what differs 
in Hegel's argument about the positive universal and the state from the politico- 
economic account o f the state to be found in political economy .313
7. The transition from a negative account of labour and division of labour to 
social analysis.
In this chapter I examined Hegel’s first systematic attempts at the conceptualisation o f 
objective spirit under the influence of discussions in German idealism, contract theory 
and political economy. Hegel's study of political economy broadened the difference 
between him, Schelling, Fichte and Kant but also liberal contract arguments. The 
problem of labour was not merely a relation between the subject and object whose 
end is the identity of subject and object. For Hegel the subject-object aesthetic
111" The spiritual tie is public opinion; this is the legislative body the real national assemblage. This 
requires the general cultivation" (PS p. 159).
312 The first subdivision refers to the will of all and the second to the positive unity of the general 
will.
115 Compare with PR below.
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relation is to be examined in the sphere of the objective spirit as the complex relation 
of recognition that the identity o f the subject and object is a form of misrecognition in 
bourgeois society. The role o f labour and the division of labour is constitutive for 
modem consciousness social relations of recognition and misrecognition.
In the Realphilosophie the first subject-object unity is not the structure of labour itself 
(selbst), but results from the primary logical development towards a new unity. It 
involves the extemalisation and also actualisation and realisation through conscious 
activity.
The examination of political economy and labour is critically negative in the Jena 
Writings since it deals with the abstract form o f labour, contract and property 
relations and their objective form. Mechanical labour is objectified in the tools of 
labour and labour becomes mechanical. It loses for Hegel its natural organic form and 
multiplicity. It becomes mechanical instead of a process of labour as an application of 
the individual's will and intelligence and thus a formative experience. Mechanical 
labour can be absolutely external in the sense that it is not a conscious process for the 
individual labourer since his work is repetitive and monotonous.
Labour is subdivided into simple tasks and thus the individual's labour is only an 
activity in a series of activities which result in the product. The latter is an alien 
product and reflects the characteristics of the process and type of labour presupposed 
for its production. The abstract determinacies of the product are the characteristic of 
the division of labour from the objective side. The product is purely quantitative and 
stands in unmediated relation to the totality of needs of the individual. The individual 
produces not only to satisfy his needs but for others for universal use. Labour, 
instead of becoming an immediate form of recognition through the product of one's 
work is also the source of misrecognition or of a mediated form of recognition. By
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the analysis of the objective and universal character of labour Hegel shows that the 
mediation of the subject and object takes an objective social form.
Contract and property relations presupposing this form of organisation of labour are a 
form of objectification of the recognition or misrecognition involved. In the 
Realphilosophie the structure of recognition through legal categories of property, 
contract and exchange leads to the positive constitution of the state. The latter 
appears as the form of moderation and regulation of the process released by the 
mechanisation of labour. Its positivity is a form of overcoming the negativity o f the 
state of nature and the system of needs towards the ethical unity of the social classes 
in their relation of interdependence.
In both SDS and Realphilosophie their distinction is ambivalent and the economic 
sphere is examined negatively on the basis of its inner dynamic. The positive 
constitution of the state is there to regulate the dynamic and increased negativity of 
modem ethical life.314 This negativity is articulated on the individualistic basis of 
actualised right, which produces positive ethical relations as modem relations.
314 Gôhlcr (1974) p. 604.
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Chapter eight
1. The antinomies of the formalist thought in: right, contract, morality.
This chapter examines what Hegel calls the philosophy of right; as abstract right, 
property/possession, contract, morality in the way that it embodies and is 
distinguished by the liberal contract argument, the philosophy of pure will or the 
antinomies of the critical philosophy. Thereby, Hegel points out the ethical qualities 
of property, the political aspect of contract, and the way that modem right informs the 
idea of morality as subjectivity, inwardness. Therefore he offers a modem concept of 
subjectivity which knows itself in and for itself as negative will (PR par. 5-6).
Abstract right viewed from a moral philosophical view breaks through the abstract 
formalism of modem legal thought and reproduces it on a level which is distinguished 
from the immediacy of the naturalist approach of natural law theory and Smith's 
political economy. The immediacy of the abstraction of right as natural right is what 
Hegel calls "right in itself' and this is where he starts his analysis of right in the PR. 
Right becomes for-itself through property and contract and informs morality and the 
modem consciousness of subjectivity as negative consciousness.
This consciousness led Hegel into the phenomenology of consciousness in 
Phenomenology and the speculative philosophy as the logic o f the will in the PR (PR 
par. 140, 7).
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2. The Elements of the P h ilo so p h y  o f  Right.
"The point of view of free will, with which right and science of right begin, is already 
beyond the false [unwahren] point of view whereby the human being exists as the 
natural being and as the concept which has being only in itself, and is therefore 
capable of enslavement. This earlier and false appearance [Erscheinung] is associated 
with the spirit which has not yet gone beyond the point of view of consciousness; the 
dialectic of the concept and o f the as yet only immediate consciousness of freedom 
gives rise at this stage to the struggle for recognition and the relationship of lordship 
and servitude" (PR par. 57).
In the Elements o f  the Philosophy o f Right or Natural Law and Political Science in 
Outline and as early as in the Natural Law and Political Science in Outline Hegel 
offers an account o f the political science of modern right and free will. Abstract right 
and free will is the absolute starting point (PR par. 57).315 The extemalisation of 
abstract right and will is presented in three forms or "moments" and modes of modem 
freedom which are also forms o f externalisation (PR par. 7). These modes of freedom 
are the content of the philosophical exposition of the particular characteristics of the 
modem right.316 The transition of the one form to the other offers a critique of 
abstract right, of moral consciousness, of moral antinomies and, last, the critique of 
civil society and o f the particular forms of historicism related with it. This way of 
developing conceptually and thus philosophically the different forms of modem right 
is also a transition of subjectivity as an abstract negative moment to the 
phenomenology o f subjectivity or the objectivity of will, as particular and universal 
will in the modern ethical life. There lies Hegel's theory of modem society and its 
critical principle o f freedom which informs the exposition and reconstruction of the 
modem ethical life.
315 On the question of the abstract beginning and the method followed in the PR, but also on the 
transitions to the different levels of the conceptual exposition, Hegel refers to the Science o f Logic. 
In the Science o f Logic offers the logic of the speculative method employed in the PR. See preface of 
PR p. 10, and introduction PR pp. 41, 63, on dialectics p. 60.
316 This for Smithian political economy was presupposed as natural and thus Hegel started his 
analysis of modem commercial society on a different level.
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Criticising the negativity of Kant's and Fichte's systems, Hegel aims at a philosophical 
conceptualisation that has to "apprehend the negativity which is immanent within the 
universal" (PR par. 6, p. 40) and the apparent opposition between the object and the 
as the willing subject. Hegel embodies the critical aspects of Kant's argument. 
The will wills something particular and thus sets a limitation and is negative. This is 
the starting point of Hegel's speculative exposition. The will for Hegel "is the unity of 
both momenis-particularity reflected into itself and thereby restored to universality" 
(PR par. 7). This unity splits into individuality (einzelheit), particularity and 
universality. The first moment:
"It is individuality [Einzelheit], the self-determination of the ’/  in that it posits itself as 
the negative of itself, that is, as determinate and limited, and at the same time remains 
with itself, that is the identity with itself and universality; and in this determination it 
joins together with itself alone" (PR par. 7).
This negativity is the negativity of the understanding which "refuses to enter into" the 
speculative unity or what the understanding describes as the incomprehensible. This, 
for Hegel, is the concrete concept of freedom where the
" T is with itself in its limitation, in this other; (which was posited as the alien object) 
as it determines itself, it nevertheless still remains with itself and does not cease to 
hold fast to the universal" (PR par. 7 parenthesis added).
This relation, but also the abstract conceptual beginning, is extensively discussed in 
the Science o f Logic. Speculative logic is distinct from the old logic but also from the 
critical transcendental philosophy of Kant and its further uses by Fichte. The different 
moments of the will are cancelled in a new higher unity.
"The moving principle of the concept, which not only dissolves the particularisations 
of the universal but also produces them is what is called dialectics" (PR par. 31).
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This development is an immanent progression rather than an external activity of 
subjective thought. The form of subjective thinking is based on a speculative mode of 
thinking In that sense, the way o f philosophical thinking has installed in it the 
characteristic o f what Hegel calls the present times.317 This idea of modem 
philosophical thinking posits the question of free will and rights (PR par. 7, 8).
Modem critical thinking falls into contradictions. The antinomy of formal thinking 
fixes upon and asserts the two moments of an idea in separation to each other, i.e. 
slavery as related to arbitrary will and free will as realising the concept of freedom 
though positive law. The claim that slavery is contrary to right is an abstract 
proposition that is immediate and free in itself. But also on that level slavery is 
contrasted with the proposition that the human being is free by nature which is the 
assumption of modem and Christian thought. This antinomy is resolved in the 
struggle for recognition.
"The free spirit consists precisely in not having its being as mere concept or in itself 
(see & 21), but in overcoming [aufheberi] this formal phase of its being and hence 
also its immediate natural existence, and in giving itself an existence which is purely 
its own and free" (PR par. 57).
In short for modern thought slavery does not have a naturalistic foundation, i.e. the 
proposition "human beings are born slaves" does not meet the requirements laid by 
reason (Vernunft) because of its content.318 This cannot become a universal maxim in 
the Kantian sense although it may be argued that it meets the requirements of formal 
logic. Therefore the existence of slavery is valid as wrong and its validity is to be 
found in its immoral, illegal foundation when right becomes positive right. This
511 See Preface of the PR.
518 Reason "resists" the content and thus is possible to become universal and quarantee some form of 
universal and critical freedom. This logic exposes the "dangers" of an uncritical reading of Hegel's 
critique of Kant and enlighten the role of philosophical reason which both thinkers share.
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antinomy explains the evaluation of slavery as a necessary wrong since it is valid 
although not right, i.e. it is not supported by the modern moral ideas of the good and 
also of the modem civil code.
This double aspect of formal thinking, i.e. what the Scots would call the distinction 
between "is" and "ought", is also to be discussed further in the sub-section on morality 
as the distinction between wrong and right and in the examination of civil society as 
the question of appearance. Historically the question of the dissolution of slavery was 
related either with the rise of bourgeois enlightenment thought and revolutionary 
developments which led to a natural law-oriented legal system or, as political 
economy has shown, with the dissolution of a method of production which was not 
profitable any more and was in contest to the enlightenment idea of human nature and 
rights. The shift that Hegel makes, following Kant's critical tradition, is to point out 
the problem of slavery not merely on a naturalistic basis but on legal, moral and 
ethical grounds.
3. The transition from possession to property
The antinomy of formal thinking and the conceptual or naturalistic foundation of 
slavery and free will is the basis for the discussion of possession in its different forms 
and of property. The latter is right to the extent that it realises an abstract form of 
freedom. This is expressed clearly in the transitional paragraph to the examination of 
contract. However, the detailed examination of the transition of possession to 
property is of particular interest in the way that they are defined positively and 
embody the idea of free will.
Thus possession is first possession of one's life and body. Possession presupposes the 
will to "possess my life and my body, like other things only in so far as my will is in
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them", thus "violence to the body does violence to me". That means that "my body is 
not my external property" but it is the embodiment of freedom, presupposition of the 
will for life, something which is "impossible" in nature and for animals. The right to 
one’s life and well being as opposed to the "right to suicide" is evaluated positively 
and more than being a natural right is also a subject to be discussed on the level of 
moral freedom rather than of nature However the actualisation of one's moral 
freedom and well-being may involve that his/her right is violated when the means of 
its reproduction are absent. In the same way that self-respect may presupposes the 
respect for other forms of life, which must be socially protected from violation. 
Furthermore, it brings us to a social level:
"One cannot speak of the injustice o f  nature in the unequal distribution of possessions 
and resources, for nature is not free and therefore is neither just nor unjust. That all 
human beings should have their livelihood [A uskommeri) to meet their needs is, on the 
one hand, a moral wish; and when it is expressed in this indeterminate manner, it is 
indeed well intentioned, but like everything that is merely well intentioned, it has no 
objective being On the other hand a livelihood is something other than possession 
and belongs to another sphere, that is of civil society" (PR par. 49, p. 80).
The possessed power which reproduces itself and the possession of a thing are two 
distinct concepts in the analysis of the concept of possession. In that sense the former 
is not "merely a possession but a resource" (PR par 69, p. 99). The second 
conception of possession is rather closer to the Lockean idea of possession based on 
one's labour examined in chapter one. This distinction also applies to a naturalistic 
consideration of possession distinguished from a formal abstract beginning in the 
examination of right which leads to the analysis of the social relations of
• • T i grecognition.
119 Both these foundations of right are essential appearances related to the modem form of civil 
society which I shall deal with in chapter IV. Avincri underlined the "sociological" aspect involved 
in the analysis of abstract right as properly right and leads to the analysis of civil society (Avineri 
(1972) p. 37).
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A more systematic approach to the different forms of taking possession which lead to 
the right to property goes as follows: first, by occupation
"a thing (Sache) belongs to a person who happens to be the first to take possession of 
it [occupation] is an immediately self-evident and superfluous determination, because 
a second party cannot take possession of what is already the property of someone 
else".
Nevertheless, the first in time is not "the rightful owner because he is the first, but 
because he is a free will, for it is only the fact that another comes after him which 
makes him the first" (PR par. 50). The second form of possession is that by the 
appropriation of the form of the thing. This leads to an actual possession of the thing 
which is different from its property as such.
The separation between external property of things and possession in one's life and 
body is the characteristic of the free man and thus the embodiment of the idea. The 
single will as the will of a person becomes objective through possession and property 
and thus the latter the presupposition of the freedom of the individual's will. Property 
is realized and actualised only through the full use of the thing, which in that sense has 
an owner. This owner, apart from the legitimate use of the thing, also owns its value. 
The value of a thing is its abstract specific quality as universal characteristic which 
arises in abstraction from the specific quality of the thing. Thus its true substantiality 
is determined and becomes an object (Gegenstand) of consciousness (PR par 63, p. 
92).
Alienation of property is the true mode of taking possession and its first moment (PR 
par. 65). The way that the alienation of property takes place is what distinguishes the 
slave from the hired labourer. There lies the difference between the producer and the 
owner of the use and value of a thing. In that sense, the author of the book or the 
inventor of a technical device
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"remains the owner of the universal ways and means of reproducing such products 
and things [Sachen], for he has not immediately alienated these universal ways and 
means as such but may reserve them for himself as his distinctive mode o f expression" 
(PR par 69).
There lies the difference between ownership of the thing and the power which confers 
such things. This power is what makes things not merely a possession but a resource 
(Vermögen) (PR par. 69). This power acquires an ethical quality that
"is to protect those who work in them (sciences and arts) against theft and to provide 
them with security for their property, just as the earliest and most important means of 
furthering commerce and industry was to protect them against highway robbery" (PR 
par. 69).
This "ethical quality" of property as resource is raised also in paragraph 170 in the 
context of the communal property of the family. Hegel distinguishes between the 
abstract property of the individual which contains the arbitrary moment of the 
particular need of the single individual transformed into having a communal purpose, 
in other words, an ethical quality (PR par. 170).
Moreover, the concept of property has a double meaning: first, private property as the 
right of the individual as a legal personality, which would be closer to a legal or 
liberal approach, and common property, which implies membership in an ethical 
purpose and quality. The concept of private property is found in the "partnership" 
through which "the retention of my share is explicitly a matter o f  my arbitrary 
preference". This distinction does not imply that private property is unrestricted. The 
"specific characteristic of private property may have to be subordinated to a higher 
sphere of right". In other words, to be embodied in the higher spheres of ethical life 
where a broader idea of social freedom is realised. ,2°
320 Ilting (1971) p. 93.
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Hegel's criticism of Plato is that his "ideal state violates the right of personality by 
forbidding the holding of private property". The justification of that is to avoid the 
realisation of private advantage, caprice and arbitrariness etc., thus putting in danger 
the common interest and the peace o f the state (PR p. 189). Therefore Plato argued 
that the common advantage is guaranteed only by forbidding individuality and 
particular interests expressed through private property. Instead the institutional 
protection of particularity became for modem society the very condition of commerce 
and of the development of science, arts and technical innovations. Thus individuality 
and realisation of abstract freedom expressed in the right of the person to be a 
property owner is the distinctive characteristic of modern ethical life and the condition 
of some form of freedom.321
For Hegel possession becoming property implies the transition "into the external 
world where it falls under the category o f property in the legal sense". This transition 
is also alienation, as externalisation. The thing is defined as opposing the person, 
which means the opposite of what is substantive. The person has the absolute right to 
appropriate all external things (PR par. 44). The will for something external to the 
individual person implies a form of externalisation and alienation. Externalisation is 
the result of determinations which derive from the legal definition of property. On the 
one hand, it is the "result of my natural need", and on the other hand, as actual will, 
i.e. by being object to itself and through what it possesses. In this sense, property 
becomes an embodiment of freedom and a substantial end in itself. The essential 
presupposition for property is rational since it is the condition for the realisation of 
subjective freedom, yet in an abstract form (PR p. 42).
321 This ethical realisation of freedom through the institution of private property is contrasted to the 
liberal conception of property for which the political protection of property and fair exchanges is the 
presupposition of commerce and of commercial society. Hegel's argument embodies the liberal 
approach but also underlines the ethical quality of property.
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This positive account o f freedom as ethically realised has been the source of different 
interpretations and misunderstandings of Hegel's argument. I shall look at Waldron's 
and Stillman's arguments, which underline the importance of property as the 
realisation and formal actualisation of the person's free will and thus of some form of 
freedom. Waldron calls an "obscurity" the statement that "my body is the 
embodiment of my freedom",322 i.e. the natural law argument that one has rights to 
one's body and I should add the right to its reproduction and well-being. Waldron's 
account, a rights-based account, argues in favour of property, and its positive content 
as the precondition of individuals' actualisation of freedom.323 Stillman takes into 
account the historical context and the way that it influences Hegel's argument324 
Thus private property transcends the development of individuality and it is related to a 
rich social and political order 325
The point that Waldron and Stillman make can be formulated as follows: first, private 
property being positive by principle is accepted as an essential element for the 
realisation of the individual's freedom. Second, as Stillman points out, private 
property is bound up with a concrete form of society and a particular social and 
political order.326 This relation is called a "conundrum”. First, because the relation 
between abstract right and Sittlichkeit is not settled. Second, because Hegel locates 
the problem in the particular relation of property rights and the major socio-political 
institutions of ethical life.
Stillman, although he points out the complexity in Hegel's argument, says that Hegel, 
like "many political philosophers" and contract theorists starts his
Ilting deals with the "social obligation of property" which arise from the very rational foundation of 
the free will as well as from the very fact that will wills something external. This form as an 
extemalisation of the free will implies the ethically mediated character of property. In addition, the 
rational exposition of the concept of the free will is understood only in its relation; firstly, in its 
reality, and, secondly, in its actuality.
322 Waldron (1988) p. 362.
323 Ibid., p. 343.
324 Stillman (1989) pp. 1055, 1056, 1058.
325 Ibid., p. 1072.
326 Ibid., p. 1032, emphasis is added.
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"presentation or justification o f property with a single person in a presocial condition 
From that origin Hegel closely links property to freedom and personality, and 
presents personality as an odyssey of Bildung" 327
This simple beginning which characterises Hegel's argument is very much different 
from the one to be found in the liberal accounts of society.328 For Hegel it is to be 
resolved, as Stillman correctly points out, in the context of the ethical life. Stillman 
completely misses the point when he isolates Hegel's argument on that simple origin 
from its relation to ethical life and to the positive justification of bourgeois 
institutions. This approach may result in reading Hegel's argument as another 
"justification" of property and thus of a particular form of modem ethical life, 
abstracting from the dynamic historical aspect in Hegel's argument.
In the next section I shall examine "the politics" of Hegel's argument and its 
justificatory aspect by comparing his ideas on property and the social contract.
4. Property contract and the social or "political" contract.
"This mediation whereby I no longer own property merely by means of a thing and my 
subjective will, but also by means of another will, and hence within the context of a 
common will, constitutes the sphere of contract Reason makes it just as necessary
327 Ibid , pp. 1039-1040.
328 According to Haddock, Hegel "rejected contract theories but also retained some of the language 
and assumptions of social contract theory". Further, I should argue that Hegel did not merely 
"retain" contract theory on the linguistic level or the level of their assumptions. Property contract 
theory and social or political contract theory was a substantial part of Hegel's reconstruction of the 
idea of modern society and modern freedom. However, Hegel rejected contractarian throughout on 
the level that history made it redundant, i.e. by the development of commercial society and political 
economy, and thus the transition of rational negative constitution of the society based on the 
individual's will toward a practical and more politico-economic one. In the contemporary debates 
Hegel's critical view of contract theory is endorsed by the communitarians versus the liberals by 
MacIntyre and Sandel (cited by Haddock (1994) pp. 158, 162). See also Steven Smith (1989).
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that human beings should enter into contractual relationships -giving, exchanging, 
trading etc.- as that they should possess property" (PR par. 71).329
Contract is the formal externalisation o f one's will and thus important for possession 
becoming property. The classification o f contracts as appears in a legal analysis is as 
follows: first, contract of gift, second, contract of exchange, third, completion of a 
contract by giving a pledge (PR par. 77, 80). Hegel argues that this classificatory 
attitude rooted in Roman law is based on external and superficial aspects of contract 
which occasionally contravene the concept of right. These formal distinctions tend to 
confuse the "nature of contract" (PR par. 77).
Two forms of contract have been the subject for discussion by liberal thought and the 
critiques that follow it. The first form o f contract focuses on the examination of the 
forms of recognition of one's will as the right to something, i.e. as the right to private 
property. Thus it leads to the exclusion of others. The second form concerns the 
nature of the state and the foundation of government and of the monopoly of political 
power. The first can be put under the category of contract of exchange, and the 
second as the social or political contract. Liberal contract theory from Locke to 
Smith has dealt with these contracts as the same thing.330
As I have shown in Smith's critical view o f exchange and contract in book one of the 
WN, contract is taken as mainly the labour contract based on the simple labour theory 
of property. In the LJ, while examining the natural law tradition, contract is the 
presupposition of the extension of the market and the division of labour. Contract is 
to secure property rights and thus make possible exchanges.
329 In the German text “should" is only implied by the expression "es ist durch die Vernunft". In that 
sense the normative philosophical content of possessing property is to be found in philosophical 
reason and through that only possessing property is rational.
330 Benhabib (1984) p. 170.
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Kant's liberalism went as far to say that the most simple forms o f social relations and 
family relations can be considered under the category of contract. In this sense, 
marriage is also a contract. For Hegel neither marriage nor the state can be 
constituted on the basis of contractual agreement. The former argument is dealt with 
on the context of morality and the latter on the level of the critique of contract as 
constitutive for the modern state In Hegel's words:
"The nature of the state has just as little to do with the relationship of contract, 
whether it is assumed that the state is a contract of all with all, or a contract of all 
with the sovereign and the government" (PR par. 75).
and continuous:
"But the state is by no means a contract (see & 75) and its substantial essence does 
not consist unconditionally in the protection and safeguarding of the lives and 
property of the individuals as such. The state is rather that higher instance which may 
even itself lay claim to the lives and property of individuals and require their sacrifice" 
(PR par 100).
Therefore, Hegel distinguishes between the contract among property owners and the 
social or political contract. With regard to the first he underlines the importance of 
the relations of recognition and positive realisation of common free wills in the owned 
thing but also negatively as form of exclusion of others' wills to express their free will 
in this particular thing.
Hegel's argument is not only distinguished from the liberal contract argument but also 
from Smith's historical critique of contract in the LJ and TMS which is based either on 
"the four stage theory" or on the principles of authority and utility. In the WN Smith 
employs "pragmatically" the Rousseauian idea of the general interest and the 
representation of conflicting interests in commercial society. Hegel follows Smith in
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his conclusion that the general interest most times is identified with the particular 
interest. That is reflected in the distinction he had drawn between civil society and the 
state which follows Rousseau's distinction of general and particular will.
According to Hegel, although Rousseau's distinction is not altogether wrong, it tends 
to be realised as a formal distinction, since what actually happens is the identification 
of particular and universal interest and thus their distinction can be reflected. 
Although he assesses this distinction as positive, he points out that this creates a 
confusion when the distinction of particular and universal will reflects the relation 
between the state and civil society. To put it in a different way, the political 
expression of different social interests, which for Hegel is the condition o f the state, is 
"cancelled" on the level of civil society. There lies Hegel's distinction o f civil society 
and the state and his critique of a merely formal distinction but also the liberal 
conception of the state and the state as the political substance, i.e. as the existence of 
political institutions.331
"If the state is confused with civil society and its determination is equated with the 
security and protection of property and personal freedom, the interests o f  individuals 
[der Einzelner] as such becomes the ultimate end for which they are united; it also 
follows from this that membership of the state is an optional matter. - But the 
relationship of the state to the individual [individuum] is of quite a different kind. 
Since the state is the objective spirit, it is only through being a member of the state
331 Hegel ditTers from Rousseau by postulating a transcendental general will which, as the 'objective 
will' o f a rationally structured community, is more than the sum of individual wills. He agrees that 
such will must express or manifest itself in the actual thinking and willing individual citizens, 
consciously identifying their subjective will with the objective will and its needs. This union of 
subjective and objective will constitutes "concrete freedom" which is higher than the abstract 
subjective and objective freedoms taken by themselves. It is through the political institutions of the 
ethical community that the reconciliation of the subjective and the objective aspect of the will is 
effected (Pelczynski (1984) p. 75).
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that the individual [individuum] himself has objectivity, truth, and ethical life" (PR 
par. 258).
What is at stake in this distinction is not merely the relation between the particular will 
of the property owners and its "Aujhebung" in the objective spirit of the state of 
citizens. But the relation between individuality as the expression of individual's [der 
Einzelner] interests and of the end of the unity of the will of all. The state and its 
relation to the individual [individuum] as a political subjectivity highlights an ethical 
quality of individuality which is not merely identified with "the security and protection 
of property and personal freedom" of the individual's interest as such.
Hegel's argument puts forward the "ethical quality" of this distinction, rather than 
merely the formal distinction put forward by Rousseau.332 Nevertheless, Rousseau's 
way of dealing with the question of the state, i.e. on the basis of will as being the 
principle of the state, in other words examined the question of the state 
philosophically rather than historically. However, he made the same mistake as Fichte 
in considering the will as the determinate will of the individual and then
"regarded the universal will not as the will's rationality in and for itself, but only as the 
common element arising out of this individual will as the conscious will. The union of 
individuals [der Einzelnen] within the state thus becomes a contract,..." (PR par. 
258).
Rousseau and Kant, drawing from the latter, made as their highest foundation of right 
and free will, the will and spirit of the particular individual, as the will of the single
332 Hegel's presupposition can be considered from a "practical" standpoint, i.e. as a separation of the 
concept of the state from civil society, as a "separate entity, besides and outside civil society" 
(Pelczynski (1984) p. 1). Marx (1970) p.80.
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person [des Einzelneri] in his distinctive arbitrariness. Thus they lack the immanent 
rationality of individual right and free will and freedom is only an external and formal 
universal. Instead, Hegel suggests that will as rational will has being in and for itself 
or as spirit (PR par. 29). Herein lies the difference between a contractarian view and 
Hegel's, in that consciousness is not merely the consciousness of the individual which 
encloses also arbitrariness but it is the actuality of the spirit as actuality .333
Historically though this approach to individuality and contract became the foundation 
of individuals' autonomy and on the level of contract theory sought a justification of 
power in individuals' rationality (PR par. 75). This was a turn against the divine 
justification of political power and social harmonies or disharmonies. As a result the 
abstractions of contract were dealt as follows:
"Consequently, when these abstractions were invested with power, they afforded the 
tremendous spectacle, for the first time in human history, of the overthrow of all 
existing and given conditions within an actual major state and the revision of its 
constitution from first principles and purely in terms of thought, the intention behind 
this was to give it what was supposed to be a purely rational basis" (PR par. 258, p. 
277).
and then
"The state is not the work of art; it exists in the world and hence in the sphere of 
arbitrariness, contingency, and error, and bad behaviour may disfigure it in many 
respects" (PR par. 258 p. 279).
The analysis of the "rationality" of the state presupposes for Hegel the analysis of the 
antinomies of reason and thus the critical reading characteristic of enlightenment 
thought. The problem that Hegel addressed was that "the pure rational basis" led into 
the lack o f thought lacking the idea of the state as the ethical whole actualising the
333 Marcuse highlights actuality as the conscious existence as the Dasein (Marcuse (1936) p. 55).
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idea of freedom and the idea of the rational will as being both in and for itself. 
Therefore the state was perceived on the level of appearance, and formal universality, 
i.e. as if it were the civil society which endorses arbitrariness and social inequalities 
and through its contradictions leads to the actuality of the universal will.354 That is 
what is also called the "myth of enlightenment".335
In the examination of the property contract Hegel mentions the distinction between 
common {gemeinsam) will and the particular (besonderer) will corresponding to the 
distinction between property and possession in the theory of property.336 The 
distinction between universal and particular will is the way the individual's will is 
realised as the will of the "einzelner" or o f  "individuum" and the different qualities 
related to this distinction of individuality. The distinction of the different forms of will 
and the way that they are realised in the context of ethical life is a political question. 
Hegel is more explicit on that in his critique of terror in the Phenomenology o f  Spirit. 
In the PR, Hegel puts forward a political concept of ethical life in the way individual 
freedoms are not merely cancelled but also conditioned and realised in social and 
political institutions.337 Political economy and his theory of civil society are to deal 
with this question.338
334 On appearance see Science o f Logic, book two, section two; the dissolution of appearance, 
essential relation. See the History o f Philosophy on the way that the modem world is distinguished 
tfom classic and roman.
The actualisation of freedom overcomes civil society as such since it fails to be its true actualisation 
(Marcuse (1936) p. 50).
335 Adorno, Horkheimer (1972).
336 Hegel uses common (gemeinsam) will and the particular (besonderei) as distinct from the 
universal (Altgemaine) will.
33 Ripstein (1994) finds the importance of Hegel's argument to consist in the fact that it 
acknowledges the contingency of the will, whilst avoiding arbitrariness (p. 445) which "plays itself 
out in the form of the Reign of Terror" in the case o f the French revolution (pp. 451-2). Ripstein, as 
most commentators who follow this line of argument, seems to miss the moment of enlightenment 
which Hegel calls the "tremendous spectacle" which overthrows existing and given conditions within 
an actual and major state and then ground the state on thought not based on cognition but on the 
rationality actualised historically in the modern state. That is the power of modem thought which 
turns into illusion, and in practical matters into terror, when thought becomes pure abstraction as the 
foundation of a thoughtless science of politics. The characteristic of this thought is that it deals with 
what Hegel calls negatively the "tremendous spectacle" and thus lacks its idea in and for itself in its 
historical actuality.
338 Whereas Hegel, when he refers to the political theories of the revolution (Rousseau), points out 
critically their abstractness and their fundamentally one-sidedness with respect to historical reality,
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The nature of contract lies precisely in that both "common and particular will should 
be expressed, for a contract is a relationship between one will and another" (PR A 
par. 78). The property contract presupposes the contracting parties as self-sufficient 
persons and the contract is the product of their arbitrary will.
"The identical will which comes into existence [Dasein] through the contract is only a 
will posited by the contracting parties, hence only a common (gemeinsamer) will, not 
a will which is universal (allgemeinex) in and for itself' (PR par. 75).
The third characteristic of the property contract is that "the object (Gegenstand) o f 
the contract is an individual external (Sache), for only things of this kind are subjects 
to the purely arbitrary will of the contracting parties" (PR par. 75). In that sense 
neither marriage nor the state are contracts. The latter because it is assumed that 
there is contract of all with all or a contract of all with the sovereign and the 
government. The confusion created is expressed in the fact that political rights and 
duties are regarded as the immediate private property of particular individuals in 
opposition to the right of the sovereign of the state (representing the political power), 
as if the rights of the state and the sovereign can be regarded as objects of contract. 
The latter for Hegel are of "higher nature" and "totally different". The property 
contract originates in the arbitrary will of individuals and does not apply to the state in 
which the individual is by nature (!) a citizen (PR A par. 75 exclamation mark added). 
In enlightenment tones, with an Aristotelian influence, Hegel points out that: "it is the 
rational destiny of human beings to live within a state, and even if no state is yet 
present, reason requires that one be established". The state in modem times is an end 
in and for itself (PR A par. 75). In the same way: "reason makes it as necessary that 
human beings should enter into contractual relationships - giving, exchanging, trading, 
etc. - as they should possess property." The reasons for that might be utility or
he acts otherwise in his fastening upon political economy. The political theories of the revolution, 
which are deductive positing of new political forms from principles, have at the same time the 
immediate determination of making possible revolutionary emancipation for the existing historical 
institutions and legal forms, Riedel (1984) p. 69.
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benevolence, but implicitly they are led by reason, which is expressed in the realisation 
of free personality as an objective relation even if that presupposes property 
relations.339 The universal will on the level of the property contract appears only in 
the form and shape of a community (gemeinsamkeit), the community of the common 
will (PR A par. 71).
The Kantian argument in this case argues that reason is the characteristic of the 
modem and enlightened person, as Hobbes argues for the calculating and thus rational 
characteristic of every human being.340 On that basis it is possible to have a contract 
of all with all and with the sovereign, who after this agreement represents something 
"higher" than the will of all. The power of the sovereign has thus a rationalistic basis. 
Hegel highlights the arbitrary aspect of individuals' will and interest which cannot be 
the basis o f a social contract. Nevertheless, his emphasis on natural disposition 
(Willkur) does not lead Hegel back to the enlightenment formalism of reason but to 
the way that reason is realised in ethical life and the state.341 Thus Kant's foundation 
of practical moral autonomy on reason (Vemuft) in the "second critique", but also the 
synthetic a priori autonomy of the agent of reason who acts in the interest of reason, 
is to be looked at in the context of ethical life and acknowledge its partiality.
With regard to the latter I shall examine Hegel's critique of morality and of the 
antinomies of formal thinking which lead to deception, wrong and the negative 
realisation o f will through crime/punishment, i.e. the negative realisation of freedom 
as the foundation of modern subjectivity.342
339 I shall contrast this account of the rationality of property relations among persons with the early 
account of property in the FPS and PS see ibid, chapter eight B,C.
340 Angclidis argued that the characteristic of Hobbes argument is that he introduced a typology of 
action which is distinct from a typology of rules and values. This separation of action and values led 
to the functional foundation of values and the critique of the traditional values on a modem scientific 
basis (Angelidis (19S7) p. 4). Adorno and the critical school also by unfolding the antinomical 
nature of reason offered a critique of the instrumentality of modern reason. Ripstein's empiricist 
view of contract (Hobbes, Locke, Hume) as grounded on the agreement on mutual advantage and 
thus instrumental calculation of interests (Ripstcin (1994) p.444).
341 Hegel says at the end of par. 75 siehe unten: Sittlichkeit unci Stoat"
342 Hegel's analysis of the antinomies of formal thinking and the necessity of wrong which although 
wrong is valid (PR par. 57).
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5. Wrong deception crime and punishment.
Wrong presupposes the separation between right in itself as the appearance of right 
and the actuality, existence (Dasein) of right (PR par. 82). In the case of wrong there 
is a semblance from the point of view of right in itself (PR par. 83). Deception is 
wrong, but from the point of view of one person in relation to another person, i.e. I 
create this semblance to deceive someone else. Crime involves both wrong and 
deception, i.e. wrong both in itself and for me (PR par. 83). Deception in this case is 
the reduction of universal will to the particular will which is a mere semblance. This 
reduction in the case o f contract appears as the purely external community o f wills. In 
deception the particular person is given the illusion that he receives his right (PR par. 
87).
The infringement of right is coercion (PR par 95). Coercion at that stage is mainly 
dealt with as external coercion by the state or law, which enforces the power of right 
through the system o f  justice and punishment. At that stage there is a special relation 
between right and morality mediated by law and its enforcement.
A decision in accordance with the law may be judged as immoral although legal. That 
is because law contains some form of content which is only assumed. Punishment as 
the revenge against the offence made to the law in the context of the modem 
institution of justice has also some pre-modern elements in the way that common law 
is related to the individual's actions. Hegel offers a critical view of the theory of 
punishment as not merely legal, since it involves the element of "revenge" from the 
point of view of protecting common values.
In the NLE the economy of the market seemed to apply also to the legal code. The 
latter appeared as the "price list" and thus evaluation of an action rested on paying the 
prices of one's crime. In the PR Hegel develops an idea of common value as the basis
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for punishment which may equally lead to an arbitrary association o f evil with an illicit 
action To avoid "relativism" or the casuistic approach (Klein) Hegel suggests a 
theory of punishment that takes into account a moral point o f view; first, of the 
particular consciousness and second, the arbitrary elements involved and "retributive 
considerations" (PR par. 99, 101 and tr. notes on par. 99).
Nevertheless, "right and justice must have their seat in freedom and the will, and not 
in the lack o f freedom at which the threat is directed" (PR A par 99). In that sense, 
psychological coercion which refers to the quantitative and qualitative differences 
within crime, and not to the nature of crime in itself, cannot be the proper foundation 
of a legal code (PR paraphrase par. 99). Thus the question resolves into that of the 
foundation of law and the different schools of legal thought and jurisprudence, and I 
shall examine it on the level of morality and ethical life rather than on the stage of 
abstract right.
6. Right and morality.
Abstract right appears as the first moment o f the will as pure activity (PR par. 7). The 
will is free in and for itself as it is in its abstract concept, it is in the determinate 
condition the immediacy, i.e. free will exists as a level in the concept's pure 
development (PR par. 34). T  is still being within itself without any opposition. In 
morality, on the other hand, there is already an opposition; for in this sphere, it is 
present as an individual will, whereas the good is the universal, even though it is 
within one's individual will (PR par. 34).
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The difference between right and morality, although at first sight it seems to be a 
relation o f opposition (negative/ positive), is differentiated in the way that different 
wills are related and thus it has an ethical foundation. Formal right contains only 
external prohibitions and an action closely in keeping with right has a negative 
determination in respect of the will of the others.
"In morality ... the determination of my will with reference to the will of the others is 
positive - that is, the will which has being of itself is inwardly present in what the 
subjective will realises. This entails the production or alteration of something 
existent, which in turn has reference to the will of others. The concept of morality is 
the will's inner attitude [Verhalteri\ towards itself. ... On the contrary, its 
objectivization also contains the determination whereby the individual will within it is 
superseded; and in consequence, since the determination of one-sidedness disappears, 
two wills with a positive reference to one another are now posited. In the context of 
right any intentions which the will of others may have with reference to my will, which 
gives itself existence [Dasein] in property, are irrelevant. In the moral sphere, 
however, the welfare of others is also involved, and it is only at this point that this 
positive reference can come into play" (PR par. 112 A).
Legal action which is determined by rules, is not imputable to me; it thus contains 
only some moments o f moral action proper, and these are only externally present. 
What makes action moral in the proper sense is therefore distinct from its legality (PR 
par. 113). Right is related to the abstract universality of the law. Morality is related 
to the free will and subjectivity. Nevertheless,
"The sphere of right and that of morality cannot exist independently [fur sich]; they 
must have the ethical as their support and foundation. For right lacks the moment of 
subjectivity, which in turn belongs solely to morality, so that neither of two moments 
has any independent actuality. ... Right exists only as a branch of a whole, or as a 
climbing plant attached to a tree which has firm roots in and for itself' (PR par. 141 p. 
186).
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For the distinction between morality and legality the relation between Hegel and Kant 
is critical. The difference between Hegel and Kant on subjectivity is that the being of 
subjectivity is limited by Kant to inwardness in all the religious, moral, and personal 
relations determining it.343 According to Hegel, Kant cannot avoid the opposition 
between inner morality and the outer facing it. Therefore, according to Hegel, 
morality is without an actualisation, it remains an ought to be.
Right as the right of the person should also involve subjectivity as representing the 
freedom of all individuals' rights.344 This type of "preservation" o f subjectivity in the 
positive system of Kant leads beyond the differentiation of ethics and the theory of 
right which follows from it. The separation between morality and legality, between 
"ethical” and "juridical" legislation, in the specification that morality is related 
exclusively to correspondence with the law. Insofar as the idea o f duty from the law 
is at the same time "the incentive of the action", Kant is led to the view that 
everything in human action which does not rest upon inner legislation belongs, as 
external action, only in the sphere of right. Ethics is exclusively a doctrine of virtue 
that does not come under external laws. Freedom which applies to both realms 
(virtue and law) is divided into outer and inner freedom.
For both Kant and Hegel family, civil society and the state remain objects of the 
doctrine of right. However, at the same time they are placed under an ethical 
determination as structures in which freedom includes the freedom of subjectivity. 
That is the transition from morality to the institutions of the family, civil society and
143 Ritter (1983) p. 157. 
344 Ibid., p. 158.
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state which is a transition to the ethical life.345 Morality is thereby freed from its 
restriction to the duties of inner freedom and is related to these institutions as its inner 
reality and actuality.
7. Morality and the formalism of abstract thinking.
Moral freedom, autonomy and subjectivity is at stake in the discussion of morality. 
Hegel is mainly dealing with the formalist, critical approach offered by Kant. He also 
argues against casuistry as represented by the casuistic theologians, the Jesuits (PR 
par. 140 p. 138). Jesuits had worked upon the different forms of consciousness and 
multiplied them on the basis of probabilism. Their point of view is parallel to that of 
absolute sophistry. Their argument is articulated on the basis of representation 
[Vorstellung] and thus can show the positive aspects in evil and transform the latter 
into good.
"It [probabilism] adopts the principle that an action is permissible and can be done in 
good conscience if the consciousness can discover any good reason for it - even if this 
is merely the authority of a single theologian, and even if other theologians are known 
to diverge very considerably from the former's judgment" (PR par. 140 pp. 172-3 see 
third "type" of subjectivity).
A step further towards the objectivity of subjective conviction and consciousness was 
the product of Fichte's philosophy which led to the objectivity of universal selfhood 
(PR par. 140 p. 184). But this subjective point arises only when faith has lost its 
seriousness. Nevertheless, Fichte's idea of subjectivity mainly arises from the critical
M5 Ethical life is introduced by Hegel in contradiction to the morality of the subjective will and its 
good in the abstract as the absolutely valid laws and institutions (PR par. 144), ethical powers (PR 
par 14S), custom, habitual practices as the general mode of conduct of individuals (PR par. 151), 
social and orderly life (PR par. 170), class (PR par. 207) corporation (PR par. 253), and in summary 
as institutions (PR par. 265).
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philosophy of Kant.346 The critique of Kant's moral will, good and conscience is on 
the basis of the analysis in its antinomies between universal maxims/autonomous free 
will, objectivity/subjectivity, which lead into contradictions and the impossibility of 
judgement.347
Hegel's critique of morality and consciousness is developed mainly in the 
Phenomenology where he deals with subjective spirit, and is critical for his philosophy 
as a whole (PR par. 135). In the PR the critique of the formal aspects of morality (PR 
par. 129 133, 135-9 140), which I shall deal with, is based on an analysis of moral 
duty (PR par. 135), subjectivity (PR par. 136, 138, 140), good and evil (par. 139). 
"Duty for duty's sake" is for Hegel a pure and empty formalism.348 From the point of 
view of moral autonomy based on knowledge (Erkenntnis) a theory of duty is not 
possible. As Kant may argue, one should bring "material from outside", "content" and 
thus duty splits into particular duties. But then a contradiction is bound to appear. In 
that sense the determination of duty for duty's sake is the absence o f contradiction as 
formal correspondence with itself. If it is so, the maxim to act according to one's duty 
offers no criterion to decide on the content of this maxim. That was made clear as 
early as in the NLE with the example of the deposit.349 As far as no content is 
presupposed in this case, let us say of property, no contradiction arises. Instead of 
acting according to the universal maxim to respect property and thus the duty to act 
according to this maxim one may respect property because of other reasons rather
346 Both these standpoints make Hegel's critique of morality comparable to TMS and LJ where Smith 
offers a critique of casuistry and modern systems of moral philosophy.
,47 Compare with the theory of moral consciousness and the early critique of morality and deposit in 
the Natural Law Essay.
,48 Ioannidou (1991).
349 See ibid., ch. I.
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than to act according to the rule for the sake of it In that case, there is the possibility 
of agreement o f duty with the moral maxim and thus resulting in the formal identity or 
being in contradiction with it. But even if acting according to one's duty and 
respecting property then "the duty for duty's sake" is mediated by the presupposed 
content of property. Thus the existence of a content makes it impossible for principle 
to be principle o f action without contradiction (PR par. 135 p. 163). This formal way 
of thinking sets the opposition of subjectivity and objectivity as universal and does not 
offer a criterion for action.
Nevertheless, there lies the distinction between the modem world and antiquity. The 
modem world attains knowledge by the consciousness of this opposition which is 
grasped in thought and thus is a source of obligation. In antiquity this 
"internalisation" or "evaporation of subjectivity" was "impossible" (PR par. 136 A). 
Thus the question of action and praxis is on a different basis external and given, i.e. 
fate. For Hegel this opposition in modern thought is bridged by what he calls ethical 
disposition and religious consciousness which lies outside that sphere (PR par. 137 p. 
165).
"Both principles that we have so far considered, the abstract good and the conscience, 
lack their opposite: the abstract good evaporated into a complete powerlessness 
which I can endow with any content whatsoever, and subjectivity of spirit becomes no 
less impoverished in that it lacks any objective significance. ... The unity of the 
subjective with the objective good which has being in and for itself is ethical life, and 
the reconciliation which taken place in it is in accord with the concept" (PR par 141).
By the term "evaporation of subjectivity" Hegel means the evaporation of all aspects 
of right, duty and existence (Dasein) into itself as abstract self- determination and
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pure certainty of itself alone. Subjectivity is determined solely from within itself in as 
much as it is the power of judgement of the good in relation to a given content. But 
that is already a modern conception of subjectivity.
Self-consciousness reaches absolute reflection in the stoics and Socrates's thought. 
The tendency to look inwardly in the self and determine from within what is right and 
good appears in epochs when what is recognised as right and good in actuality and 
custom is unable to satisfy the better will (PR par. 138). Thus this "evaporation" is 
the evaporation of every content into itself and then develops it out of itself. This 
inner life for Hegel is characteristic of "spiritless times" and historically was related to 
the collapse of Athenian democracy The evaporation of the external world was 
turned into a search for right and good, inwardly.
This state of pure inwardness leads
"either in the universal in and fo r  itself or to the arbitrariness o f  its own 
particularity, giving the latter precedence over the universal and realising it through 
its actions - i.e. it is capable of being evil" (PR par. 139).
Evil in that case is the reduction of universality into the arbitrariness of particularity. 
Conscience as formal subjectivity can turn into evil, for both morality or evil have 
their root in self-certainty which has being for itself and knows and resolves it for 
itself. Particularity is also divided into the "will's natural phase" and its inwardness. 
In the relativity of the will's natural phase lies the immediate objectivity, opposed to 
the universal as the essential and thus the individual subject is posited as having the 
responsibility o f  its own evil (PR par. 139). But then, if the abstraction o f self­
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certainty is always a part of evil and only the human being is good, then it is good 
only in so far as it can be also evil. Good and evil are inseparable and their 
inseparability derives from the fact that the concept becomes its own object and, being 
so, embodies the determination of difference. Good or evil will are distinct from one 
another through the way they are related to the universality of the will and its concept. 
Natural will can be neither good nor evil except in relation to the will as freedom and 
as the knowledge of freedom, the natural contains the determination of the unfree, and 
is therefore evil. Positive understanding merely sticks to the positive or wholly good 
which is supposedly good in its origin. From the point of view of the concept, 
positivity is apprehended as activity of self-differentiation (PR par 139). On the level 
of will, decision is the cancellation of this duality.
Paradoxically this examination of subjectivity, good and evil led Hegel into a 
"typology" of subjectivity and of the different forms of consciousness which lead to an 
action as ways of bridging the dualism on the level o f subjective consciousness. That 
is given in six principal shapes:
a) Acting in bad consciousness either because of knowing that the action is not in 
accordance with the universal maxim, or because o f lack of knowledge.
b) To act in an evil manner and with an evil consciousness, which may lead to 
hypocrisy, in which in addition evil is presented as good for others. This is the trick 
of deception.
c) An action is permissible and can be done in good consciousness if consciousness 
can discover some good reasons for it, even if it is the authority of one agent. In the 
case of probabilism, subjective reasons are employed to support an action. In that
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sense there is a positive moment, in the sense that reasons for the action are needed, 
but probabilism is still a form of hypocrisy in the sense that the difference between 
good and evil is judged on the basis of their probability.
d) In the case of action out of agents' good intentions Hegel uses the argument versus 
the formal universal maxims, and good intentions shows that the dialectic between 
moral good intentions and universal maxims is to be articulated on the level of 
subjective opinion and knowledge of what is good or evil, and thus decide their 
validity.
e) Subjective opinion distinguishes between the subject's conviction and the authority 
of the external law. Law cannot produce a subjective conviction. The possibility of 
error is always open, taking into account the ethical aspects which are identified as the 
degradation of philosophy and academic life. The way that Hegel formulates the 
problem of contingency and necessity, deed and action, as the foundation of the right 
of moral will and responsibility is as follows:
" ... the action as the end translated into the external world is at the same time 
exposed to the external forces which attach to it things quite different from what it is 
for itself, and impel it on into remote and alien consequences. The will thus has the 
right to accept responsibility only for the first set of consequences, since they alone 
were part of its purpose" (PR par. 118).
0  The supreme form by which subjectivity is to be comprehended and expressed is the 
form of irony. Irony is initially borrowed by Plato, employed in the personal dialogue 
by Socrates to defend the idea of truth and justice against sophistry. Thus irony is 
applied to the uneducated consciousness of the sophists and not the idea itself. Irony 
concerns the manner of speaking in relation to people and by means of dialectics 
submerges subjectivity under the substantiality of the idea. In romantic irony
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subjectivity knows itself as supreme. The tragic irony, subject of the classic tragedy, 
has an ethical interest.350 The objectivity of the knowledge acquired by the preceding 
historical forms is ethical. It can either lead to enjoyment of this knowledge and the 
self-conscious subjectivity or to the beautiful soul as the nobler type of subjectivity in 
a community of bonds between self-satisfied subjectivity and the aesthetics of good 
intentions "in basking in the glory of this self-knowledge and self-expression and of 
cherishing and cultivating such pursuits" (PR par. 140 p. 182).
This account of subjectivity as empty and absolute form of subjectivity led Hegel into 
the phenomenology of consciousness, unlike Kant and representational thought. The 
phenomenological aspect is rather distinct from the one exposed in the PR, where the 
discussion of consciousness, morality and subjectivity led to the examination of ethical 
life and the analysis of the naturalism of the family, the appearance and actuality of the 
will in civil society and the political universal moment of the modem state.
350 NLE p. 79.
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Chapter nine
1. Civil society versus the state?
Most of the discussion of the PR is concentrated on Hegel's theory of the state, which 
was associated with the actuality of what is.}i' Early Marx, in his Contribution to the 
Critique o f  the Philosophy o f  Right, argues that Hegel's mistake is that he represents 
what is as the nature of the state 351 52 Therefore, Hegel's work is reactionary to the 
extent that the social order of the Prussian state it reflects is reactionary, as Marcuse 
put it. Nevertheless, Hegel’s theory more than being a reflection on the Prussian state 
by being a conceptual exposition is able to "absorb and consciously retain the 
contradictions of this society to follow them to a bitter end" 353 Taking into account 
the centrality of the socio-political analysis in Hegel's philosophy, Marcuse (1973) 
highlighted how Hegel prepared the path for both social theory as social critique, and 
of positive sociology.
Avineri (1972) shifted interest towards Hegel's social analysis offered in his political 
and philosophical writings. He attempted to fill the gap in research in this topic by 
throwing light on Hegel's social theory as part of his analysis of modem ethical life 
and of the family, rather than focusing on the state. His view of Hegel's civil society 
distinguishes between an anthropological reading, which puts emphasis on the 
struggle for recognition and needs, and a social critique, which raises the question of 
labour as the way of relating objectivity and subjectivity in the real conditions of 
factory labour in industrial society.
351 See Rose (1981) for a speculative reading of this proposition pp. 48-51.
352 Marx (1843) CW Vol. 3, p. 63. The translation given is Philosophy o f  Law.
353 Marcuse (1973) p. 178. For Habermas Hegel solves the problem of mediation of the state and 
civil society by the sublation of society in the constitutional monarchy. The absolute is conceived as 
the model of the relation to itself of the knowing subject (Habermas (1985) p. 39).
*
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The systematization of Hegel's argument in the PR in recent debates is mostly 
represented by liberal and "critical" legal theorists. According to Stillman (1987) 
Hegel rejects the language of economics and political economy and differentiates civil 
from political society of the state. He sees civil society as the sphere of human needs 
and labour, law, public authorities and corporations.354 The role of labour is 
perceived from the perspective of social culture.355
Among authors such as Gohler, Riedel, Ritter, Pelczynski, and Habermas the 
discussion is mainly located on the articulation of the distinction between the state and 
civil society, and on the crucial role of modem political economy. For Gohler (1974) 
the separation of the state and civil society is the result of Hegel's reflection on the 
French and industrial revolutions. The division of state and civil society is viewed as 
the reconstruction of modern political economy. Economic relations appeared as the 
private sphere separate from the public by the monopolisation of political force.356 By 
economy was not merely meant the economy of the house (oikos) as in the 
Aristotelian tradition. Society was considered as primarily economic with the 
emancipated burgers and their new political role in the modern state of citizens.357
The idea of the social as a free apolitical space is the result of the one-sided 
privatisation of one part of the public life of the traditional "societas civilis". 
However, this division of the state and civil society did not conceptually grasp 
economic and social developments. Hegel examined the traditional "societas civilis" 
and the economically determined social structure of private burgers and the 
centralised political force.
354 Stillman (1987) p. 77.
355 Ibid., p. 80.
356 Gbhler (1974) p. 472.
357 Ibid., p. 474.
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For Hegel the Bürgerliche Gesellschaft represented formal universality and had the 
same meaning as "the night-watchman state" of the liberal argument, in the sense of 
the external state of necessity and understanding which has as its content the system 
of needs, police, administration of justice, corporations.358 This view of civil society, 
i.e. implying the liberal conception of the state is differentiated from Hegel's idea of 
the political as the realisation of the universality o f the will and thus of political 
freedom. In both early systems, System o f Ethical life (Regirungsystem "also selbst 
im Staat") and Realphilosophie (the constitution), the state and civil society were not 
yet dealt with as objective institutions as they appear in the PR.
For Riedel (1962) the connection of the state and civil society is not merely formal 
since it corresponded to revolutionary historical changes.359 This historical change 
was expressed in the rise of "political" or "national economy". For the history of 
ideas Aristotle was the first to use the term "Koinonia politike" as the political union 
or association. This latter was translated as "societas civilis" and became, together 
with its synonyms civitas and res publica, a general term for the independent political 
entity of the state. The "political" and "civil" was used synonymusly by Aquinas, 
Bodin, Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, and Kant. Hegel's alteration was the boldest 
innovation of the traditional use which started with Bodin's concept of sovereignty 
and Rousseau's general will. In the NLE and in the Jena period Hegel rejected the 
modem natural law viewpoint in favour of an ethical concept o f the state as an ethical 
substance rather than a multitude of individuals.360 In the Phenomenology Hegel 
pointed the danger that Sittlichkeit may be alienated to the moral and intellectual 
tradition and therefore end into terror as the political experience of the Jacobin 
republic had shown. Herein is based the restoration of the romantic interpretations 
and the positivist reading of Hegel.
358 Ibid., pp. 477-8.
359 Riedel (1962) p. 3.
360 Subjectivity and particularity were perceived in Jena as the enemies of ethical and political life. 
Instead of being the sphere of individualism and freedom. The third standpoint is that of organised 
social interests represented on the level of social classes (Kortain (1984) p. 5).
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For Pelczynski (1984) the civil society of the mature Hegel represented a necessary 
"moment" in the dialectical development from the family to the state.361 The 
conceptual separation of the state and civil society is one of the most original features 
of Hegel's political and social philosophy. Habermas (1985) distinguishes the classic 
idea of the social, which since the eighteenth century has split apart into a social 
theory grounded in political economy and the theory of the state inspired by modem 
natural right. Hegel is the first to articulate a conceptual framework that is even 
terminologically adequate to modern society, in that he separates the political sphere 
of the state from civil society. He integrates, as it were, the opposition between 
modernity and antiquity found in the theory of art into the theory of society .362
The above discussions highlighted the importance of the conceptual comprehension of 
modem society through the split of the social sphere into economic and political. 
They point out the importance of this conceptual split, and then mainly concentrate on 
the role of the modem state viewed historically and reconstructed by Hegel. Thus the 
early marxian critique that it is a mistake to identify what is as the nature of the state 
has a political and conceptual importance which indicates the ethical nature of the 
political economy of the modern state and the critical stand-point of a conceptual 
reconstruction.
Habermas with regard to his analysis of social relations focused on communication, 
Pelczynski on the role of modern state and the nation as the modem political 
community, Riedel on the distinction between antiquity and modernity on the basis of 
the natural law tradition and o f the political economy based on the analysis of labour, 
Gohler on the comparison of the political economy of the early writings in contrast 
with the political economy of the PR and the logic of universalism.
Pelczynski (1984) p. 1. 
362 Habermas (1985) p. 37.
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In this chapter I shall focus on Hegel's social theory as demonstrated in his account of 
civil society and the politico-economic argument developed as the necessary 
"moment" in modem ethical life. The following analysis presupposes the critique of 
liberal accounts of abstract right, morality and contract examined in the chapters 
above. The questions of Rousseau's will, the Hobbesian state o f nature, the Kantian 
idea of reason and practical rationality being the basis of law and morality are 
discussed in the context of ethical life from the point of view of civil society.
In the early writings (NLE, SDS, FPS, PS), social theory had a practical orientation in 
the discussion of right, morality, ethical life, and some first blueprints on constitution. 
The politico-economic influence highlighted the economic nature of the modem 
relations and the search for the science of ethical life. The later Hegel reformulated 
this distinction but also elaborated the idea of civil society and modem ethical life on 
the basis of the ethico-political and politico-economic analysis to be found in the 
practical categories of labour and the division of labour, right and positive law.
2. An "analysis" of the political economy of civil society (B u reeriiche  
G esellschaftV
Civil society is approached as the sphere of mediation in modern ethical life. It is the 
stage of difference between the naturalism of the family, feeling and the universality of 
the state as the conceptual realisation of the rationality of the modem ethical life. It is 
the "moment of the liberation of plurality" but also of collisions and conflicts.
The analysis of particularity and universality is the second level of analysis of the 
relation of individuality and universality. This conflicting relation is analysed logically 
and systematically as the examination of the different moments of the will which 
becomes ethical. It contains three elements: abstract individuality as expressed in
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abstract right, the formal universality of law and the substantial universality of the 
state. The priority of the universal is not irrelevant to a critical and methodical 
examination of right as it becomes the characteristic of modern ethical life.363
As pointed out by Marx, the principle of civil society lies in an ambivalence364 due to 
its double-sided foundation (PR par. 182).365 Its principle is the concrete person, not 
merely the abstract legal person as it is for abstract right. The concrete person is the 
citizen as actualisation of the particular will of the bourgeois as universal will (PR par. 
190).366 The bourgeois is the person as the totality o f needs, mixture of natural 
necessity and arbitrariness. This person stands in relation to other similar particular 
persons and thus "each asserts itself and gains satisfaction through the others" and 
further through the mediation of a universal form, i.e. the second principle of civil 
society.
Particularity is liberated only in the relation with the other, which in this case is a 
relation of means to the end of the particular person. In the means-ends dialectic the 
particular person becomes conscious as a selfish end in and for itself through its 
relation to others, even if the others are only viewed as means from the viewpoint of 
the particular person. The relation with the other is recognised as a relation subjected 
to the means-ends dialectic. The rationality of this form of liberation appears at first 
sight as instrumental, i.e. as the relations among particular individuals.367 
The dialectic of means-ends is absent from the societies of classical antiquity, which 
also lacked the idea of the individual's right and subjectivity. That is very much a 
modem product. The concept of society in Plato and Aristotle puts emphasis on the
563 GOhler (1974) p. 479.
364 Ibid., p. 479.
365 The exposition of civil society reproduces the phenomenological transition from simpler forms to 
more complex. In the case of civil society Hegel presents the phenomenology of needs Brod (1992) 
p. 29.
366 The object of right is the person, of morality the subject, of civil society the citizen as bourgeois, 
of the state the citizen human being is examined in the context of the representational thought (PR 
par. 190).
367 On the teleology of the means-ends dialectic sec Lukács (1976) ch 6.
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social relations of interdependence among human beings. The “zooti polilicon" in 
Aristotle, or the perception of the Republic by Plato, emphases this interdependence 
as part of man's political nature. In other words, being interested in public affairs is a 
civic virtue and essential element of the nature of the citizen. For Plato, the simplest 
politeia can be founded by the coexistence of four or five people where each works 
for the whole.368 The division of labour as separation of professions is acknowledged 
and the just city is the one that achieves the best possible distribution of resources and 
labour according to individuals talents and education.
The enlightenment view of society, as represented by the natural law and contract 
tradition, seems to assume and transcend this idea o f  interdependence which 
underlines the co-existence in society. Relations of interdependence were the basis of 
the feudal idea of society or of the medieval natural law tradition of the community of 
God. However, the question of individuality and natural rights as the basis of modem 
individualism, pointed out the need for their guarantee on the very social basis of 
modem society which is relations of interdependence. The bourgeois civil code and 
the codification of law in continental Europe was to endorse and institutionalise these 
natural law demands. Hegel's idea of civil society and the PR  is to be viewed as part 
of this debate. It grasps conceptually, the idea o f  society as a form of 
interdependence based on needs, but also highlights the social demand for the 
liberation of particularity under the rule of law. Particularity without the support of 
law is merely arbitrariness.
In that sense the concept of society that Hegel introduces is based on a double 
principle which is possible to be grasped conceptually not only as threefold relation 
(abstract, formal, substantial) but also as the relation of universality and 
particularity369 and in addition as relation between particularities. These arguments
368 Plato Republic 369 B and C, 370 A.
369 For the danger that the universality-particularity relation be reduced to the old metaphysics see 
NLE, where Hegel offers a critique of metaphysics.
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seem to run together in the analysis of civil society. The selfish ends are conditioned 
by universality as the system of interdependence which implies the subsistence and 
welfare of the individual as a rightful existence This system is that of external 
necessity and understanding (PR par. 183).
The relational mediating characteristic, as relation between similar particularities, is 
very soundly indicated in what Hegel calls the moments of civil society. First, the 
abstract moment of the mediation of need and satisfaction of the individual through 
his work and through the work and satisfaction of the others. That "system" is what 
he calls the "system of needs", where particularity splits into systems, consequently 
there is a plurality o f systems. Nevertheless, for Hegel the logic of the system of need 
is not merely mechanical. The nature o f needs and their satisfaction, the mediating 
role of work and education and then the resolution o f the plurality of the systems of 
needs in the permanent recourses of the estates is also turned round in the sense that 
particular persons share universal resources on the basis of social inequality. This 
aspect of particularity is "the spectacle to the relative identity of particularity and 
universality" (PR par. 200). The protection of permanent resources is a root to the 
universal.
The second moment of civil society is the actuality o f universal freedom in its merely 
abstract form as right becomes law (Dasein) and its actualisation as the system of 
justice. Justice is merely negative justice, in other words the liberal concept of justice, 
to be found in Smith's LJ, as the protection of the particular right which is fixed as the 
right to private property. This institutionalisation of arbitrariness and particularity 
endorses arbitrariness in the social institutions of civil society and thus contingency. 
The internalisation of contingency, similar to the Hobbesian state of nature, in the 
systems of needs and administration of justice requires public provision offered by the 
political institutions of civil society, instead of an "invisible hand policy".
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Contingency, but also provision for the common interests among similar particular 
concrete persons, implies public policies. These provisions become the actualisation 
of the individual's own will, and particular nature is cancelled through the 
infringements of property, and thus legal personality, on the same basis. In that sense 
particularity is posited as formal and thus "cancelled" by being subject to the end that 
security of property owners and persons should be guaranteed. Nevertheless, it also 
raises the question that the livelihood and welfare of individuals should also be 
secured. Universal authority must prevent contingency on the level of particularity 
from becoming arbitrary evil (PR par. 232).
3. The "System of needs" and political economy
Subjective need is the starting point for the examination of the system of needs. The 
satisfaction, multiplication and differentiation of needs, implies at the same time the 
abstraction of needs (PR par. 190-5). The human being with natural needs of the 
system of needs assumes the subdivisions into the person of abstract right, as subject 
of morality, member of the family, bourgeois in civil society and citizen of the state. 
Individuals are compelled to produce for the satisfaction of abstract needs in order to 
satisfy their own particular needs. Interdependence among the bourgeois is based on 
selfish motives of need and satisfaction which is mediated by the need for producing 
for others, and then only indirectly satisfying their particular needs.370 Civil society is 
the sphere in which particularity reaches its universality as the universalization of the 
particular will. In this sphere the will being in-itself and for-itself reaches formal 
universality as abstract form. The formality of this universality is full of contradictions 
between subjective ends, moral opinions and universal relations of interdependence.
370 Cullen (1988) p. 23.
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Nevertheless, there is no liberation in the "state of nature" in which there are only 
natural needs and their unmediated satisfaction. The lack of mediation does not imply 
a higher degree of liberation or freedom for individuals.
"For a condition in which natural needs as such were immediately satisfied would 
merely be one in which spirituality was immersed in nature, and hence a condition of 
savagery and unfreedom; whereas freedom consists solely in the reflection of the 
spiritual into itself, its distinction from the natural, and its reflection upon the latter" 
(PR par 194).
For Hegel, the lack of identity between satisfaction and mediation is also the source of 
the modem concept of freedom, as freedom of reflection, i.e. critical. Within social 
needs, as a combination of natural needs and spiritual needs, the latter, as universal 
needs, predominate. Liberation is possible in the sense that need exists not merely as 
a necessity imposed by oneself alone, instead of simply being an external necessity. 
This inner contingency is contrasted with the arbitrariness of natural need. The 
dialectic of immediacy and mediation does not exclude one another. The relation of 
immediacy and mediation is a combination which highlights the condition of modem 
freedom and liberation.
This form of subdivision is perceived positively as the moment of social liberation.371 
Liberation is actual through the expression of opinion and work (PR par. 194). The 
liberation of the immediate need meant the move from the state of nature to the 
system o f needs for Hegel. There is a substantial shift in comparison to Hegel's early 
views; first, in the way that he introduces what he calls the state of nature and how 
needs arise and are satisfied. Second, the way he embraces the arbitrariness of 
particular needs in the system of needs. Third, by distinguishing between the
371 This process of abstraction implies for Habermas the reification of the logical relationships 
which was the subject of negative critique in the early writings. The sphere of communication, and 
thus the logical reified relations are valid and operative only behind the backs of the subjects. This 
examination of reified logical relations corresponds to the relations taking place in the sphere of 
production which is formally separated by Habermas from the sphere of communication (Habermas 
(1985) p. 148)
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unfreedom of savagery and socially mediated freedom. What his later account shares 
with the early writings is the mediating role of work and subjective opinion as forms 
of externalisation and actualisation of socially mediated freedom. This way of putting 
the question of liberation leads Hegel to the endorsement o f the politico-economic 
account of needs and their satisfaction, but also the socio-theoretical mediations 
implied.372
The analysis of the "system of needs" in the PR is addressed as the subject of political 
economy. The methods of political economy, as the way o f grasping its material 
(Sache) and reaching its principles, is addressed as follows in the addition written by 
Hegel and Gans:373
"But this proliferation of arbitrariness generates universal determinations from within 
itself, and this apparently scattered and thoughtless activity is subject to a necessity 
which arises in its own accord. To discover the necessity at work here is the object of 
political economy, a science which does credit to thought because it finds the laws 
underlying a mass of contingent occurrences. It is an interesting spectacle to observe 
here how all the interconnections have repercussions on others, how the particular 
spheres fall into groups, influence others, and are helped or hindered by these. This 
interaction, which is at first sight incredible since everything seems to depend on the 
arbitrary will of the individual, is particularly worthy of note; which presents only 
irregular movements to the eye, yet whose laws can nevertheless be recognised" (PR 
par. 189 A).
The discovery of the principles of the thing is not merely an arbitrary imposition or 
enforcement of laws onto the subject matter. The "extraction" of the rational
372 At this point it is important to mention the distinction between negative economic and legal 
freedom and ethical freedom. Negative freedom is the characteristic of "open societies". It is the 
freedom achieved in the context of social contract. Economic freedom is that of the liberal natural 
rights, of abstract formal right, of the right to private property, o f work and of the choice of 
livelihood. The latter question raises the question of ethical freedom in its politico-economic basis.
373 In contrast to the Rousscaucan revolutionary deductive contract theory, Hegel understood English 
political economy as an inductive (hermeneutical) theory of the already existing, historically 
constituted social reality, which seeks to extract from it the principles that determine it as its inner 
law. The "pathbreaking" significance of political economy as the new science is in the way that it 
draws its principles from multiplicity and develops them into simple principles (Ritter (1984) p. 69).
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principles of the thing is the "thinking" thing which is not the immediate thing but the 
thing in terms of its concept as it is thought from within itself.
Political economy works on the level of understanding which giasps the nature of the 
thing itself, i.e. defines the nature of the thing by discovering its principles. The laws 
of political economy arise from the generalisation of arbitrariness which becomes law. 
Hegel highlights the historical role of deductive reasoning in both sciences of law and 
political economy but also points out the mischief it can do if used uncritically.374 For 
classical political economy the realisation of the individual's will is mediated by labour, 
the organisation of the division of labour, and exchange. The virtue of political 
economy is that it offers the spectacle to observe "how all the interconnections have 
repercussions on others, how the particular spheres fall into groups, influence others, 
and are helped or hindered by these" (PR par 189 A H,G). These connections cannot 
be seen on the basis of the arbitrary will of the individual.375 The way that political 
economy approached civil and modern society was rational, in the sense that it 
inquired into the nature of the laws of politico-economic relations. Political economy 
offered a systematic and naturalistic view of the political economy of modem 
relations. The idea of the "hidden hand", for example, represents the negative 
acknowledgement of the nature of reason in modern political economy. The 
systematisation of politico-economic relations put on the conceptual level the conflicts 
of these developments. Hegel's endorsement of political economy acknowledges the 
dialectics involved in the systematic politico-economic approach on social 
phenomena. Therefore the system of needs as the expression of need in general is the 
presupposition of the satisfaction of singular need, i.e. producing for others and for
374 In the introduction of the PR deduction is asserted as a necessary duty of positive science, i.e. to 
deduce from the positive data and historical development and to follow up their consequences. But it 
cannot claim in this way, in the case of the science of law, that the need for the rational 
determination of right is satisfied (PR intr.).
375 Marx, in the comments on James Mill, argues that "the true law of political economy is change, 
from whose movement we, the scientific men, isolate certain factors arbitrarily in the form of laws" 
(Marx 1970 p. 211).
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the satisfaction of abstract need is the condition of the satisfaction of individuals’ need 
which at the end of the day is simple and singular 376
4. Labour: a phenomenological and political view.
The first influences of political economy led Hegel to a negative critique of the 
universal form of social relations expressed through property, contract, money 
exchange, but also of the universalism of mechanical labour. His account of this type 
of universalism led to what he called the "bad infinity" and thus a first, still negative, 
account of the political constitution in modem society.
Labour for civil society, as a productive power, is the basis of civil society and of the 
idea of the state as indicating the social character of man's activity and results in the 
ethical role of estates.377 Labour and the labour process involves conscious activity 
which results in some form of self-objectification. Viewed on a social level, labour 
and need are always universal. For Hegel this abstraction is illustrated as in and for 
itself in the process of the individuation of the individual which completes itself within 
society or what he calls objective spirit.378
The secondary discussions on Hegel that deal with the question of labour are rather 
anthropological in the sense that they overemphasise the argument that human beings 
satisfy their needs through human activity, i.e. labour as the appropriation of nature 
on the basis of natural rights. I shall distinguish two stand points in Hegel's own 
writings on that question. First, is the master-slave dialectic developed in the
376 This way of looking at Hegel and political economy saves us from questions like "was Hegel 
liberal or not". Popper's argument against Hegel that he was an enemy of liberal thought which was 
defused by Ilting (1975). See also Avincri versus Russell (Avineri (1972) p. 239). For a recent 
account on the question of closure and opcncss "in the cross of the present" see Fine (1993, 1995).
377 Ilting (1975) pp. 71-2
378 Riedel (1970) p. 120.
281
Phenomenology and, second, the examination of labour in relation to the division of 
labour. Both standpoints share the fact that labour is not merely a "natural" activity 
or an activity for the appropriation of "nature". Rather it is a mediating and mediated 
activity, an activity which is already a formative relation. This relation is formative for 
the working subject, but also for the object formed If this relation is viewed in 
abstraction as a subject-object relation its historical content is acknowledged only 
negatively. What is missed out is that the content is subject of change under the 
complex form of labour organised on the basis of the division of labour and 
mechanised labour. This misrecognition is presupposed for an analysis of labour as a 
social relation, but also for the use of individual resources, i.e. individual's power to 
produce (PR par 69).
The master-slave dialectic developed in the phenomenological writings has shown that 
labour is a conscious activity.’79 In other words, labour, apart from being a 
purposeful activity for the production of a particular product, involves also social 
relations as relations of recognition and reification. Thus the master-slave dialectic is 
resolved into the critique of the reified social relation. More important is that these 
reified social relations posit legal personality and the person as the foundation of right 
and characteristic of the modern form of social relations. This is to be shown in the 
PR by the examination of abstract right. Instead what the master-slave dialectic put 
forward is the relation of mutual interdependence which results in a product but also a 
recognition of the social relations involved.
The misunderstanding of the relation of interdependence and recognition involved led 
to a legal political view which underlines the importance of the relation between 
persons and seems to underestimate the importance of the phenomenological reading 
(as the experience of the forms of consciousness). The lack of a political reading led
5,9 GOhler (1974) appropriates Riedel's argument that the classic idea of labour or labour as art and 
the modem idea of labour carried by the self-conscious traders. In that sense he highlights the 
questions of value and reification of labour and the division of productive and unproductive labour.
to the anthropological view of labour and the slave-master dialectic or to an 
anthropology of labour relations and of the way that they are experienced as forms of 
consciousness In that sense, the modern form of labour relations as relations of 
interdependence and recognition is the key to a critical understanding of ethical nature 
of modem social and legal relations, and as a form of the objectification of individual 
consciousness and activity as a social purposeful activity.
The use of labour (in the labour theory of property) in the early sections of the PR 
presupposes the structures of recognition developed in the phenomenological 
writings. This exposition is presupposed in the critique of the individualistic theory of 
property and labour theory of property found first in the writings o f  Locke.380 It is to 
be used first as the critique of the legal concept of property and thus shows that the 
"property contract" in industrial society led to the "labour contract", where the subject 
of contract was not an external thing or the access to natural resources but a contract 
on the very nature of the individual to be a resource for production of value and thus 
as having the power of producing and using this power.
The view of property as right to one's body resources and labour led historically to the 
abolition of slavery and its replacement with wage-labour. In that sense, the 
individual became the subject of rights which were not contained in the property 
contract theory. This also meant that the existing theory of political contract which 
was based on an individual's calculating reason or on the fear of God had to 
incorporate the social developments perceived conceptually by political economy and 
the new role of labour power of producing and division of labour.
In the civil society section, work is defined as the process of formation, during which 
goods acquire their value and their appropriateness (Zweckmafiiqkeit) for 
consumption. What is consumed at the end of the day is human effort. Work in the 
context of the system of needs is the mediation whereby appropriated and
180 For a comparison of Hegel's and Locke's theory of property sec Brod (1992) p. 67.
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particularized means are acquired and prepared for similar particularized needs. The 
labour of human beings provides the means for the satisfaction of human needs (PR 
par. 196 [A]). Thus labour becomes a formation not only of the particular material 
where the effort and work is applied, but is the process of formation and education, 
both theoretical and practical, which makes individuals able to use permanent 
resources to satisfy their needs and have the choice of their livelihood. This form of 
education is based in the very nature of work, as pointed out by Smith as the use of 
individual resources socialised through the system of the division of labour.
The modem form of labour was viewed either from an anthropological educative 
point o f view or as merely mechanical activity. Both views are to be looked form the 
perspective of the division of labour as the social, and mediating moment in the 
organisation of labour in modern society.
5. Labour, abstract labour and division of labour.
Abstract labour as divided labour exists in a new form of "unity" as the plurality of 
simple abstract labour, or simple tasks as is represented in the "system of needs" by 
the abstract form of labour as the universal and objective aspect of work. For Hegel 
the objectification of labour as a process of abstraction confers a character on 
meaning and needs and in its abstracted form is represented through the division of 
labour (PR par. 198). The first form of perceiving labour as externality is by 
comprehending it as social labour. In other words, as a form of a social relation. This 
is a simple form of abstraction. The second form of abstraction which is characteristic 
of the modem form of labour is its relation to socially divided labour as it took place 
in manufacture and then on the basis of organised industry. The clock-work 
organised division of labour was idealised by its contemporaries (Smith, Mandeville, 
Hume). Its rationalising effects measured its key role for the social use and
organisation of labour. Thus its social role was to be concretely observed in the 
example of manufacture. This social phenomenon was investigated by the Scottish 
moral philosophical school, which gradually became more and more interested in 
comprehending civil society and politico-economic relations underlined by the 
generalisation of the division of labour and exchange.
The philosophical response to that process was sceptical. The division of labour 
substantiated the objectification and forced externalisation o f individuals' labour 
followed by the development of policing practices and what was called the later 
"police state". What was to be the provision for the well-being of the polis (classic 
use of the term) was to be developed into the policy of the regulation of the prices of 
commodities where the market failed and criminalisation.
Industrialisation was experienced first as alienation and second, as a form of 
destruction. Destruction of the unity of the ethical life and forms of social 
organisation, i.e. polis of the citizens.381 All the formative content of labour was 
merely a socially organised process where human activity was part of a mechanical 
process. The simplification of tasks and the introduction of machines allowed the 
joining together of simple tasks leading to the production of the product, which for 
the individual would have been impossible to produce as quickly and in the quantities 
produced by united simple tasks. In the early political writings Hegel address these 
developments negatively, but also by pointing out the "dynamic" which was released 
by the modern organisation of production. The universality and objectification of 
labour could lead into not only the mechanisation of labour but also to barbarism 382
,S1 See for the Aristotlean distinction between oikos and the polis.
382 Harris (1993) highlights that the blind reproduction of mechanised labour and the economic 
machine under capitalism could result in the actualisation of "economic rationality" and thus to 
barbarism pp. 191, 206. Thus he employs a normative conception of social justice as regulative idea 
p. 198. In the mature Hegel of the Science o f  Logic but also of the PR the project of "reconciliation" 
of teleology and mechanism is central. The purposiveness as teleology is to be found in the very 
nature of labour as purposive activity (Lamb 1988). The rationality of this purposiveness is subject 
not merely to "economic rationality" but to the "cunning of reason" which lies in Hegel's idea of the 
ethical organisation.
The division of labour proved to be more than a principle of the modem labour 
process, a social mediating form, and a "dubious" form of social coherence for civil 
society. It offered a particular form of "materialisation" of the conception of society. 
In other words, the division of labour was central for the generalisation of the 
extensive economic relations of exchange commodification of labour which had never 
appeared in history before, since only in modem times had free labour replaced 
slavery. The division of labour as a principle represented the formal mediation of 
multiplicity and the complex modem economic rationality. More than being a 
technique of producing goods, it was a form of economic and political relations 
Nevertheless, there lies the fetishism and "overpoliticisation" of a "mechanical" 
approach to social matters.
For the mature Hegel, the division of labour is the universal and objective aspect of 
work, consisting at first sight in the conceptually perceived social process of 
abstraction383 (PR par. 198 compare with 193). Through the division of labour, the 
work o f the individual becomes simpler and more abstract, skill becomes greater, 
dependence, and reciprocity more tense. The platonic idea of society as form of 
interdependence becomes more than ever "immediate" and the object of observation 
for political economy. This abstraction had in return an effect on the organisation of 
production and on individual labour. Abstraction of production made work 
increasingly mechanical. Division of labour, more than being an abstraction, 
conferred a specific character on means and needs and hence also on production. 
Labour moreover offered the means for the satisfaction of needs. The abstract form 
of labour as the mediation of individual's needs made money the universal converge. 
Due to its universality money was an essential part for the abstraction of need, 
mechanised production and money exchange.
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183 Abstraction for Hegel is represented "logically" on the basis of the trichotomy of abstract in itself, 
formal as being in and for itself and the universal as the relation of all the previous moments.
1
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The constitutive element of the division of labour is the separation o f  the labouring 
individual from the means of labour.384 For both Hegel and Smith this historical 
element of the modem division of labour seems to be assumed. This historical 
presupposition is introduced in their analysis of the division of labour and its 
drawbacks are discussed in relation: first, of property owners and propertyless, and 
second, as the alienating results of the division of labour for the propertyless 
dependent on the commodification of their labour. Nevertheless, at the same time the 
expansion o f the division of labour had some liberating effects. It presupposed the 
free self-interested individual freed from the guilds system, bondage, slavery, locality, 
and privileges. That made the division of labour a positive social force which 
highlighted the importance of exchanges on the basis of self-interest 385 These 
characteristics of the modem division of labour for Hegel questioned and posited the 
idea of abstract freedom and examined its ethical aspect in social, moral and political 
institutions.
6. Estates as the link to the universal
The form o f interdependence actualised by labour/division of labour as a relation 
between persons which leads to the dependence on others' work is also expressed on 
the social level by the estates. The estates represent the plurality of interests in 
society as social interdependence. In that sense, as Marx has pointed out, the estates 
are the root of the state by representing these interests politically in the national 
assembly.386 Hegel would argue that this representation is raised (aufgehoben) to the 
universal rational level which reflects the rationality of the ethical organisation.
384 Ritter (1984) p. 71. For the historical analysis of this process see the chapter on primitive 
accumulation in Capital Vol I, part eight.
385 Ritter (1984) p. 73.
386 Marx CPR p. 315. Compare Smith's idea of the political as exclusion of the workers' interests in 
the public deliberations (See ibid., ch I, section 2). This point is what Hegel calls the non­
representation of the interest of the working classes because of the lack of knowledge of the law and 
the fact that it is devoted to the security of the interests of private property-owners on the level of the
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The estates as well as the family are the basis of the state. In the PR Hegel examines 
the estates under the title of resources (Das Vermögen). In other words, the estates 
are the permanent resources which are represented by the agricultural estate of the 
landowners, the estate of trade and industry and last the universal estate. This way of 
viewing the estates reflects the distinction of the moments of the ethical life. But what 
is important is the difference of interests due not merely to the difference on the level 
of need but mainly on the level of the different forms of resources, property relations 
attached to them, and interests which represent a plurality of interests.
The permanent resources on the level of civil society are not merely the individual's 
resources as the mere power of producing. This idea of individual resource as the 
presupposition of private property examined in the section on abstract right, is here to 
be viewed on the social level On the level of the family the common resources are 
examined on the level of the personal relations of love and natural dependence. This 
natural relation is different from the abstract idea o f individual private property (PR 
par. 170) but also from the idea of the relations among members of particular estates. 
On the level of civil society, estates - as resources - are an impersonal social relation 
which appears as
"the necessity which is inherent in the interlinked dependence of each on all ... appears 
to each individual in the form of universal and permanent resources" (PR par. 199).
The necessity of common resources makes sense as the condition of the actualisation 
of the individual's choice with regard to its livelihood through the income he earns 
from his labour. At this point Hegel explicitly refers to Smith's revenue theory/87 
Nevertheless, for Hegel this relation makes sense as the condition and guarantee of
administration of justice (PR par. 228). That seems the drawback of the specialisation arising from 
the division of labour.
187 There lies the difference between the political economy of the division of labour which informed 
Hegel's analysis of civil society from merely the inner contradiction of private property in relation to 
the communal approach on the labour process contrasting to the privatisation of its final product but 
also the questions of social inequalities raised.
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freedom of choice concerning individuals realise the actualisation of the freedom of 
individuals in relation to common resources.
Nevertheless, the possibility of sharing resources is conditioned by particularities and 
arbitrary circumstances and necessarily results in inequalities of resources and skills of 
individuals. The postulate of equality put forward by an egalitarian approach as a 
principle, for Hegel, is characteristic of empty understanding. "Empty understanding" 
because it abstracts from the complexity of the remnants of the state o f nature as 
natural, and arbitrary particularity is not simply identical with universality. From the 
standpoint of the particularity, universality appears as obligation, (Solleri) as an 
ought, i.e. in distinction to what is. At that point where the moral philosopher or the 
contract theorist would put the question of moral and political obligation or the 
postulate of equality in front of the law, Hegel highlights the importance of the 
remnants of the state of nature and the way they are integrated in a rational whole as 
the particular characteristic of civil society in its simple form.
Inequalities are perceived as real, whereas universality is only imagined (einbildet) and 
thus is only in relative identity with the particularity realised in bourgeois society (PR 
par. 200). The relation of particular universal and universal is dealt with as follows: 
first, he acknowledges the vestiges of the state of nature and, second, the state of 
nature is examined as in opposition to moral or political obligations approach. This 
opposition is a rational opposition on the level of the empty understanding. The truth 
o f this relation is grasped conceptually, in its relation to the ethical organisation as set 
by Hegel, historically and philosophically. Thus estates are divided according to the 
concept, and in that sense reflect the idea of ethical organisation. Abstract equality is 
contrasted not merely to inequality but in relation to the ethical organisation of the 
different estates.388
188 Marx in hir Contribution o f  the Critique o f  the Philosophy o f  /tight made central the relative 
identity of civil society and the state and this ambivalence was the political representation of civil 
society in the institutions of the state and the legislature. Marx is particularly ironical when he
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What is at stake results in what is known as the "analytic of the political". Under the 
section of the power of the sovereign Hegel points out that what is misunderstood as 
the power and empty arbitrariness, results in the equation of sovereignty with 
despotism. The rule of law and the rightful existence of power lies in the ethical 
organisation of the whole as expressed in its end, i.e. the welfare of the whole (PR 
par. 278 A, G 279). That is very much like Smith's idea of the general good. For 
Hegel, further, that consists in the subjectivity of the will as self-conscious will being 
in and for itself and thus becoming through the immanent development of science the 
general will and the basis for the justification of power in the modem world (PR par. 
279). This development of the will is the basis for the state and the universality that 
ensures the connection between selfish particularity and the immanent necessity to 
have links with the universal having resource to the others (PR par. 201).
The universal is actualised in consciousness and knowledge of its negativity which is 
the content of positive universality. But since this expression is very abstract and the 
aim here is to analyse the dialectic of bourgeois society, I shall refer more specifically 
to what Hegel calls the allocation of individuals to the estates viewed historically as 
the basis of the distinction between antiquity and modernity. In the Greek states, 
caste system or Roman republic subjective particularity was excluded from the 
organisation of the whole.* 389 Thus the presence of subjective particularity was 
considered as corruption, degeneration etc. In bourgeois society subjective
analyses the way that political theory responded to this question. The earthly inequality of civil 
society became the equality in front of God or in front of the law in the rule of law. That became a 
resource for the religious readings of Hegel's theory of the state. According to Pelczynski (1971), 
Marx denies the view that the state was an all-inclusive political community with a distinct ethical 
character and denied its primacy in social and historical life. He reversed the Hegelian relations 
between the two and made civil society the ground of political life and the source of political change 
(Pelczynski (1971) p. 2).
389 Thus Hegel's modem ethical life incorporates the principle of subjectivity and morality. That is 
what distinguishes Hegelian ethical life from the ancient Greek ethos. It liberates morality from the 
separation from reality deriving from the end of traditional politics. This reality itself has emerged 
... with a political and social revolution and the grounding of law and state upon freedom, such that 
it has subjectivity as its subject and freedom as its substance (Ritter 1983, p. 168).
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particularity is supported by the objective order and becomes "its sole animating 
principle" and the resource of development of intellectual activity, merit, honour. In 
that sense civil society animated a universal but formal idea of freedom (PR par. 206), 
which endorsed particularity as the fixity of right to private property protected by its 
political institutions (PR par. 208).
In short, estates as part of the system of needs realise the plurality o f the system of 
needs and are a form of social organisation, an ethical organisation, in the same way 
that corporations and police as public provisions are part of civil society. That 
introduces, for Hegel, the contrast to an individualistic model of society similar to the 
Hobbesian view of the state of nature. This model is already the subject of 
examination by political economy and the historical development of labour and the 
division of labour which materialised the idea of society as a relation of 
interdependence The contrast between these models is expressed in the distinction 
between first, the determinate universality of this interdependence as external 
necessity and second, as rational universality which is the realisation o f  the universal 
will. Thus Hegel put forward a view of society which is not merely mechanistic but 
rests on the rational idea of the realisation of freedom on both the conceptual and the 
ethical level as an ethical relation
The rationality of the estates and their ethical aspect is that they are a form of 
organisation of the permanent resources as a whole. The subdivision into different 
estates is similar to the one to be found in the earlier writings. First, is the substantial 
estate which has its resources in the natural products of the soil which it cultivates. 
This estate is the original foundation of the state (PR par. 203). Second, comes the 
estate of trade and industry. Its labour is to give form to natural products (PR par. 
204). Third, is the universal estate which represents the universal interest. This estate 
is exempted from work for the direct satisfaction of its needs (PR par. 205). This 
subdivision of estates represents three different forms of labour and modes of
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satisfaction of needs and reflects a broader form of organisation and use of the 
plurality of the systems of needs: that which in the later literature on the division of 
labour was dealt with as the social division of labour.
7. Estates, corporations and the "rationality" of the state.
Estates, similarly to corporations, are the moment that actualises universality and 
provides an ethical quality on the level of civil society.390 Hegel, unlike the liberal 
argument, argues in favour of corporations. The economic activities performed by the 
corporations also have an ethical aspect which is misunderstood if economic activities 
are viewed on an individualistic basis. Corporations perform important functions of 
engendering recognitive social values in correspondence to the society they exist.391 
The difference between the estates and the corporation is that the latter are 
characteristic of civil society, since they are strictly connected with the development 
of the cities and the increase in the importance of the second estate of trade and 
industry (PR A par. 255). The argument in favour of the corporations is opposed to 
the liberal approach which saw corporations as the limit to the freedom of trade and 
source of corruption, in the sense that they had an impact on policies in favour of 
particular corporations. Instead, the modern corporations are firstly distinguished 
from the medieval guilds in the sense that they are put under the supervision of the 
modem state. The rationality of the argument in favour of the corporations lies in 
their ethical qualities of membership and thus of moderation of the selfish private 
individual who "lacks the honour" and stability that the membership in the corporation
390 Corporations for Brod (1992) are the immediate institution from which the mediation of the 
individual and society arises. That leads into the political institutions of the state (Brod 1992, p. 53).
391 Walton's account: although "schematic" it does address the question of the relation of political 
economy and political philosophy. The former is dealt with as "utilitarianism" and the latter merely 
examines liberal questions. He argues versus the "pessimistic interpretation" offered by Plant in the 
same volume of essays. He points out that economic activity is "an integral feature of the 
development and expression of essential human capacities" and its implications are reflected in the 
internal structure of civil society (Walton 1984, p 245). See also Angclidi (1994) on utilitarianism 
and liberalism.
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offers. On the level of its theoretical assumptions this argument introduces the 
viewpoint of society not merely on an individualistic basis but on the basis of the 
forms that protect the permanent resources for individuals.
In that sense Hegel runs two arguments together as the two forms of organisation; a) 
on the basis of the corporations and estates b) on an individualistic basis which sees 
society as the aggregate of individuals. The rationality of these arguments is on the 
level of their relation as an ethical relation, which clarifies the difference between 
Hegel's argument and the historicist arguments both in legal theory but also in political 
economy. Actualisation is in the sense of reflecting the relative identity of the external 
system of necessity and the inward ethical link which leads to the rationality of the 
state.
The invisible hand of the liberal argument is the "cunning of reason" which 
acknowledges contingency and thus informs it in a way that is distinct from 
arbitrariness. This rationality is actualised as the dialectic of relative identity on the 
institutional level which mediates the rationality of the actualisation of particularity as 
lawful existence (Dasein).
8. The relative identity of formal universality or the dialectics of civil society.
The separation and relative identity of formal universality and universality as rational 
and ethical quality is substantiated in the estates, but also in the third subdivision of 
civil society in police and the corporations. What is the rational character o f the 
institutions is demonstrated by an analysis of the dialectics o f civil society (PR par 
219).
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In the system of needs, needs and their satisfaction through work offer a blueprint of 
the possibility of actualisation of individuals' will as arbitrary will. These 
contingencies are annulled on the level o f the administration of justice, where all 
individuals are equal. Thus the actualisation of individual will is universalised and 
actualised by the positive legal code. In addition to that what is needed is the 
provision and protection of this actualisation. In that sense not only property, person, 
personality but also livelihood and the welfare of individuals should be secured. In the 
"rationality" of the negative justice which would protect property, person, and 
personality is also "added" the need of protection of particular right in general (PR 
par. 230). To put it in a different way, the dialectics of universality and formal 
universality actualises an ethical quality which posits right in general, actualised in the 
politico-economic institutions.
On that level, the political role of institutions such as police or corporation remains an 
external order limited by contingency, or what appears in the system of needs as the 
vestiges of the state of nature. The police is the public authority to implement penal 
justice (PR par. 233) and thus offers a public service. The political economy of the 
public utility offered by police more concretely actualise the dialectics of civil society 
as the actuality of civil society which resolves into the real universality of the political.
Contingency and individual inequalities become universalised through the 
universalisation of needs since their satisfaction is not merely by means of one's 
labour, but through labour which produces commodities. The means to satisfy needs 
were made available by the accumulation of wealth, increase of the division of labour 
and its expansion in its different forms. This process also implies the increase of the 
specialisation and limitation to a particular work, as do the dependence and want of 
the class which is tied to such work. At this point the division of labour as the 
principle of organisation of labour, apart from the advantages that political economy 
analysed very well, turns against what is its vital resource, i.e. labour power. More
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specifically, the socially organised labour power which is accompanied by the 
development of the labouring poor as a class of people.
For Hegel the analysis of the effects of the division of labour are not merely to be 
observed as alienation on the individual level but also on a broader social level. 
Alienation as the product of industrialisation deprived the labouring poor of the 
advantages o f civil society reproduce themselves and actualise their rights. That 
results in the "inability to feel and enjoy the wider freedoms, and particularly the 
spiritual advantages, of civil society" (PR par. 243).
Labour as the source of right, integrity, honour which comes by supporting oneself by 
one's own labour is lost. Thus a large amount of the population sinks below a certain 
standard of living. That led to the particular form of poverty and the creation of the 
rabble, which had a cultural element attached to it. It is not merely poverty that Hegel 
is concerned with, but also the creation of the special disposition associated with 
poverty that leads to the creation of the modem rabble whose characteristic is the 
inward rebellion against the rich, society, the government. The dialectic of the latter 
is that it makes easier the concentration of the wealth in few hands (PR par. 244).392
Even in the case where public institutions such as monasteries, wealthy hospitals, and 
other public foundations ensure the livelihood of the needy without the mediation of 
labour, this is in conflict with the principle of civil society with regard to the idea of 
individuality as active individuality and self-realisation in the ethical life.393 The choice 
of one's livelihood is mediated by labour and the division of labour. Hegel underlines
392 Poverty which leads to crime and the rabble mentality and the non-recognition of right is not only 
the problem of the poor but of the wealthy. The rich man becomes arrogant and thinks he can buy 
anything, because he secs himself as the power of the particularity of the self-consciousness. "The 
disposition of the master over the slave is the same as that of the slave ... these two sides of poverty 
and wealth, thus constitute the corruption of society". This approach to poverty and wealth is very 
much similar to the one developed by the Scots and Hegel used in his Lectures 1819-20 before 
writing the PR (PR cited by Wood, p. 454).
393 For a Nietzschean critique of labour as being central for bourgeois thought see Lb with (1988) pp 
332-365.
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the problems of overproduction, in the sense, that there is lack of the proportionate 
number of consumers. This contradiction reveals the inner dialectics of civil society 
which drives it beyond its national limits.
This dialectic of civil society is analysed as a conflicting relation on the level of the 
organisation of the labour process. On the one hand, the advantages on the social 
level is the increase of wealth, the development and elaboration of the labour process. 
On the other hand, the disadvantages o f overproduction, and the drawbacks on the 
level of the individual labourer as the industrial labourer are stultification and 
alienation and raises the need to re-examine the relation between public and private 
matters. This examination reveals the inner dialectics of civil society in relation to the 
different forms of poverty associated with its development.
The process of the introduction of the division of labour is a process of socialisation, 
interdependence and multiplication. The system of needs and the division of labour as 
universal function of public utility needs to be secured (PR par. 235). The argument 
for public provisions is also to be found in Smith and the arguments related with the 
need of public education but also with regard to the policy in the market and safety in 
the streets.
For Hegel the argument of the "free trade" is circular in the sense that it resolves into 
the need of social provisions and o f some social policy. Hegel had in mind the 
policies followed in England and Scotland to respond to the new reality and conflicts 
of civil society. The argument for the freedom of trade was followed by the argument 
of charity, abolition of corporations to deal with the increase of poverty. With respect 
to the argument in favour of free trade Hegel argues:
"This interest invokes the freedom o f trade and commerce against regulation from 
above; but the more blindly it immerses itself in its selfish ends, the more it requires
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such regulation to bring it back to the universal, and to moderate and shorten the 
duration of those dangerous convulsions to which its collisions give rise, and which 
should return to equilibrium by a process of unconscious necessity" (PR par. 236).
Hegel implicitly offers a reply to "the invisible hand" argument as the unconscious 
necessary process o f reaching an equilibrium among conflicting interests. Public 
provisions guarantee first that public works are performed in the proper manner, but 
also secure the right of the individual to choice. Public provisions performed by the 
public authority are to limit the contingencies and secure the permanent resources of 
society responding to the development of the institutions o f civil society in contrast to 
institutions such as the family, medieval guilds and corporations.
Nevertheless, the inner dialectic of civil society resulted in the internationalisation of 
the market by colonisation or the search for new consumers which transcend the 
national level. Trade and the development of communications developed the links 
between countries and contracts. The conflicting tendencies of the development on 
the national level resolve into its inwardly developed solution by the generalisation of 
commerce and trade and the internationalisation of political economy, poverty and 
exploitation.
Hegel highlights the
"... actualisation and preservation of the universal which is contained within the 
particularity of civil society, [and it does so] as an external order and arrangement 
for the protection and security of the masses of particular ends and interests which 
have their subsistence in this universal; as the higher guiding authority, it also provides 
for those interests which extend beyond the society in question" (PR par 249).
As I have shown in this section, the dialectics of civil society in its political and 
economic institutions lead Hegel to the exposition of the dialectics of modem political 
economy of the free trade and to the way that reflects in political institutions as the
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means of moderation of its conflicts. This dialectics exposes the politico-economic 
effects of the rise of industrial society. The role of labour and the division of labour is 
essential for the realisation of the dialectics of industrial society as the formal 
universality and the source of socially actualised freedom or as a form of domination. 
In that sense to grasp Hegel's analysis of the division of labour is important to take on 
account: first, the distinction of formal universality and second, universality positing 
the political and ethical aspect of the universal formal aspect of the division of labour. 
Hegel puts forward the dialectics of civil society as the implicit rationality, of the 
ethical nature of modem institutions as the basis of their change.
9. Freedom, actuality and formal universality.
The relativity of need and satisfaction of needs in the system of needs appears in the 
first place as an external necessity or as reflected into itself in terms of abstract right. 
The political economy of abstract right is to be found first on the relations arising in 
the reconstruction of labour and division of labour and second in the way they are 
objectified on the level of the institutions for the administration of justice. Individuals 
are taken as equal human beings, rather than as the Jew, Protestant, Catholic etc., but 
from the cosmopolitan view of equality. Right as the universally recognised right 
becomes law of the nation and is endorsed in the legal code as positive, i.e. universal 
law.
The existence of right as universally recognised right of particularity in its rightful 
existence (Dasein), it is not merely an arbitrary right. Right existing in and for itself is 
the root of the universality of the will on the level of the administration of justice, and 
of universality on the level of the state. Abstract will acquires subjectivity and 
actuality as particularity as self-referring negativity, i.e. as universal right. But this
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already forms the rightful existence (Daseiri) on a formal, universal level than merely 
an existence (Sein).
In the process o f right becoming objective law two distinctive moments emerge: first, 
the moment whereby something is declared to be universally valid for everyone and 
recognised rule. Second, the inner essential moment, of cognition (Erkentnis) of the 
content in its determinate universality. These two moments are distinctive 
characteristics of the modem system o f law, and are what distinguishes Hegel's 
argument from either a merely deductive approach or a historicist one. It is rather a 
historical explanation which is valid and justified through the philosophical articulation 
of its different moments. The justification on the basis of logical deductions or by the 
circumstances is relative, and is put as absolute, i.e. as the external appearance in 
place of the nature of the thing itself (PR par. 3). In that sense the historical 
demonstration and exposition of the origins of certain institutions is different from the 
philosophical exposition of the same origins and of the concept of the thing But at 
the same time the concept of right and will in Roman law lacks the modem 
institutions which actualise the idea of modern freedom, which is also expressed in the 
systematisation of the law. The condition of the validity of modem right is that it has 
to be known in thought and thus made public. In addition, "... that right must be 
known by thought, it must be a system in itself, and only as such can it have any 
validity among the civilized nations" (PR par. 211, A H,G).
In that sense it is the duty of the positive science of law to use deductions, but it has 
to follow the determination of right. Hegel pointed to the antinomy between universal 
law and its specification which resolves into a quantitative matter, in the case of the 
penal law as a "price list". In the case of the administration of justice, the 
specification o f the universal law is through its content of property and contracts 
which on the level aim at the protection welfare and individual's livelihood. The way
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that law protects individual's well being and their right to their livelihood is an 
indication o f the degree of stability in society.
The structure of right and the realisation o f  will is dealt with not as a normative 
system, as in most liberal contract theories, but as the actualisation of freedom.394 
This argument puts forward the different forms of consciousness and will of the 
abstract formal and universal right as the abstract existence, rightful existence 
(Dasein) and the universal existence in the state. This structure reflects what Hegel 
calls the ethical organisation which is resolved into the universality of the political 
institutions of the modern state. However, a conceptual exposition of right is 
twofold, on the one hand:
"... the concept, in order to exist, must first of all enter into the distinction between 
the concept and its reality, and hence into determinacy and particularity (see & 7), and 
that only thus can abstract thinking attain actuality and ethical objectivity" (PR par. 
207).
This relativity o f ethical life allows an idea of freedom which can exist and be 
actualised only as external existence. It passes through necessity without being 
limited and cancels itself. Formal is the liberation whereby the particularity of the end 
remains as its content, i.e. there is the split between particular and universal. That is 
explained by the social tendency towards an indeterminate multiplication and 
specialization of needs, means and pleasures, a tendency which has no limits and 
involves an equally infinite increase of dependence and want.
What is important in the distinction of formal universality and universality as an 
ethical and political concept is that Hegel attempts to offer a foundation of political 
science in thought. This is his argument against the historicist argument of Herr von 
Haller, that it lacks philosophical reflection. Consequently it fails to realise the
394 Riedel (1975) in Materialen.
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rational character of the institutions. The political aspect of this absence is that it 
results in identifying the rationality of institutions with the despotism of what is (PR 
par. 221). In other words, if civil society is viewed only as the external state of 
necessity where the mediation between particular and individual is the relation 
between individuals based on their conflicting self-interests Furthermore, all the 
mediating structures which coexist somehow in the context of civil society, such as 
community on the basis of self-interest, or social mediation through the rationality of 
the division o f  labour, the mediation of universality and particularity are reduced 
either to the state of nature or to a normative moral wish
The individual's right becomes abstract right or the pre-modern right of warfare and 
thus of despotism. The historical or logical origin of these institutions has no bearing 
on their rational basis (PR par. 219). In other words, against the historicist argument 
which establishes law on custom, Hegel puts forward the need for having law as a 
system and thus as subject of thought and of science. But then the actualisation of 
right needs specification and, what for Kant was important, publicity (Öffentlichkeit). 
The latter is put as follows: as the confidence in one's right, but also as the freedom of 
public communications. In both cases, knowledge of the law is necessary.
The conflicting nature of universality as expressed in civil society and actualised 
through the structures of labour gave rise to the rule of law as different from the 
external state of necessity. Thereby the historical school of law which roots law on 
customary law is criticised by the perspective of the modern natural law and contract 
theory and the latter looked at from the point of view of living ethical life in which is 
articulated the relation of right and law.
Smith's argument postulates the need of the modern system of law and offers an 
analysis of the political economy of natural law and the division of labour. Hegel
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Conclusion
This thesis is to be read in the context of the critical theory of society and it is an 
attempt to explore and reconstruct the complexities of the dialectics of enlightenment 
and of the reconstruction of enlightenment with particular emphasis on the question of 
the division of labour and the rise of modern social theory. The question of the 
division of labour in its different forms is the link between Hegel’s and Smith’s social 
theory and highlights the complementarity and differences in their argument by 
examining the division of labour not merely as an economic question but as a 
moral/ethical, social and philosophical question. Most importantly, the division of 
labour as a socio-theoretical question had implications for the conceptualisation of 
modem society and expressed the historical shift from social contract theories 
towards the rise of modern social theory.
By reconstructing Smith’s and Hegel’s social theory from the point of view of the 
division of labour I problematise the way that Hegel’s and Smith’s theories have been 
misread as either an institutionalist, absolutist, statist approach, i.e. primacy of the 
political over the economic, as versus the modem liberalism of “laissez faire", i.e 
implying the radical separation of economy and the political. My reconstruction of 
their arguments highlights their similarities in reconstructing commercial society or 
what Hegel would call the “system of needs” and civil society. The differences in 
their argument throws light on the most discussed and debatable “sensitive balance” 
between the economic and political, moral and ethical relations. The division of 
labour is proved to be central both for comprehending and reflecting on economic
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relations but also for breaking through the immediacy/invisibility, intimacy/distance of 
modem ethical relations as subject of modem social science.
The link between Smith and Hegel is reconstructed, conceptually and historically in 
the way that they criticise and conceptually produce the modem idea of the social. 
This “conceptual production” is reflected in the textual research and textual 
presentation of their argument in a way that it was systematically developed and 
modified by producing two different but also overlapping views on modem society.
The question of the modern division of labour in Smith's thought arises in the context 
of his historical account of the different forms of law, property and labour and in 
relation to the application of the rules of justice in the market (LJ). This idea of polity 
was to replace the classic civic idea of the polis of the citizens where social orders 
were defined on the basis of their social role. The modem commercial society was 
associated with the developed form of the division of labour, the system of positive 
law and private property and the decline of traditional morality based on moral 
obligation, benevolence or in Smith’s terms the system of sympathy, and the 
normative construction of the impartial spectator. The decline of traditional morality 
was enforced by civil, private morals in contrast to the civic perception of the citizen, 
or the habitual moral sense acquired in a community. The modern civil morals 
underlined the importance of individual freedoms and interests.
Summing up Smith’s argument, the division o f labour presupposed and enforced a 
moderated “civilised” form of self-interest, which was based on the common
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recognition that non-moderation of interests leads to war and impossibility of 
exchange on the basis of agreed values. The combination of self-interest and division 
of labour “invisibly” supported the general good of the whole nation. Smith goes so 
far as to say that division o f labour arises from the natural disposition to exchange and 
barter one thing for another. This natural justification of division of labour became 
the source of the Marxist and sociological critiques of political economy: first, as the 
reproduction o f  the naturalism of reason and a naturalistic justification of division of 
labour and property law, second, as falling in internal conflict with the idea of the 
modem stratified society where individuals are not merely self-interested property 
owners but also classified in a society with social and economic inequalities.
On the one hand, the modern division of labour is contrasted to the rank system in the 
TMS and the argument o f moral corruption by the commercial spirit was shifted to 
the observation that division of labour produced also the class of “free” labourers 
employed in manufacture, skilled but also alienated individuals who were neither 
bourgeois nor citizens.
On the other hand, the division of labour, instead of being the natural form of 
redistribution of social wealth as Smith claimed, was obstructed; first, by social and 
economic inequalities, second, by monetary policies which favoured commercial 
interests more than other class interests and third, by the traditional guild system and 
corporations worked in favour of the “commercial spirit” rather than towards the idea 
of the public interest. The combination of the division of labour and commercial spirit 
led Smith in the analysis of the conflicting nature o f the modern polity supplemented 
by his idea o f  the primary public virtue of justice not only for exchange relations but 
as guarantee o f social order. Part of his normative economic argument is the supply
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and demand economic principle for the formation of prices, which was in need of the 
invisible hand to work in favour of the system of perfect liberty and natural justice. In 
addition, Smith underlined the need of the wise legislator which played the same role 
as the impartial spectator or the skilled and wise player in the metaphor which 
represented society as a chess board in the TMS.
From that perspective Smith developed a critique of his contemporary systems of 
morality, i.e. Hobbes, Mandeville, Rousseau, Hume and the systems of political 
economy, i.e. physiocratic and mercantilist systems. His moral politico-economic 
argument is resolved in the historical investigation of the rise of commercial civilised 
society and of the modern polity as being subject to the “sensitive balance” among 
general, class and individual interests. Moral and religious education were produced 
as the need o f the division of labour and individualisation in modem society 
characterised by economic and social inequalities and the rise of manufacture. 
Smith’s social theory resolved in the moral political economy of the general good.
The moral politico-economic argument for the well-ordered, civilised society was 
taken up by Hegel in the context of the German politico-philosophical discussions as 
well as by the Polizeiwissenchaft and Volkswirtschaft. Hegel's political philosophy 
articulated an account on the modern science of right or of political science and a 
historical view of the modern form of ethical life in contrast to the civic idea of the 
polis but also to the idea of the police-state which was associated with what is known
as cameralism.
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Early Hegel was influenced by the new science of political economy which had as its 
subject the division of labour and what he calls “system of needs”. In his systematic 
speculative and phenomenological accounts he tackles the way that modem science 
was subject to the division of labour as division between modem abstract scientific 
disciplines. The historical account of modern science led Hegel to the critique of the 
different versions of formalism and empiricism employed in the modem science of 
right and the systematic analysis of the different historical forms of the ethical life.
In the NLE there is a shift from the classic form of unity of the living ethical life to the 
systematic view of modem ethical life as developed later in the SDS. In the PS the 
early phenomenology of spirit, as in the SDS, the importance of labour and division of 
labour for the articulation of what is examined in Encyclopedia as the “objective 
spirit” is highlighted. The mediating role of labour as extemalisation, objectification 
and alienation is to be used as the critique for the immediacy of feeling and formal 
universalism which is identified with the universal form of consciousness in the 
abstract subject-object relation. Division of labour represents the universal form of 
modem labour and assumes the mechanisation of modern production which is 
associated with the development of modern manufacture.
In parallel, the division of labour is associated with the different forms o f labour as 
abstract and concrete labour in the context of the different estates. These social 
estates are substantial part of the discussion on the modern constitution. The latter is 
perceived not merely in its negative form as mainly based on property law and the 
nation state but as the ethical unity. The political is produced in a similar way to that
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of political-economy as the response to the modem division of labour and the need to 
moderate the dynamic released by modern mechanised labour. The system of rights, 
will, modem law, contract, the transition from possession to property as developed 
and mediated by relations of recognition and the generalisation of the division of 
labour supersedes labour theory of property and the subject-object relation.
In the PR the question of the division of labour is the mediating moment of the 
discussion of civil society and of the ethical life The rise of the question of the 
division of labour affects the reconstruction of the social as subject to the division 
between political and economic institutions. Therefore, civil society was 
reconstructed on the basis of the division of labour and the system of needs, 
contrasted to the liberal approach of civil society as a relation of recognition among 
individual egoistic, property owners. The labour theory of property law was 
reconsidered on the basis of the complex relations of interdependence arising from the 
extensive division of labour and money exchange.
In addition, division of labour is related to the corporations and the ethical subdivision 
of the estates. The idea of the reproduction of the ethical unity of civil society played 
a political role for the reproduction o f right not merely as abstract right or property 
right but as an ethical historical relation. The internal dialectics of negative and 
positive right, or rather abstract, particular universal and the universal aspects of civil 
society is “cancelled” into the constitution of the modern state as the ethical political 
unity. The constituted political secures political freedom and individual rights not
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merely as arbitrary particular right or as formal legislation but as the realisation of 
modem subjectivity in the modern political institutions.
In that sense, Hegel was the first to draw the distinction between civil society and the 
state, as the defining characteristic of modern ethical life, which was only implicit in 
Smith’s thought. Both Hegel and Smith agree that the state is not the result of a 
social contract but is produced as the result of the internal dialectics of the division of 
labour However, there lies the difference between Smith’s and Hegel’s argument. 
Smith offers an analysis of the conflicting interests from a moral point o f view and 
therefore his argument is critical. Hegel offers a reconstruction of Smith’s argument 
and highlighting the political constitution of modern liberties. Therefore, Hegel’s 
politico-philosophical argument is a critique and reconstruction of the politics of right 
and division of labour, where division of labour is the mediating moment for the 
modem political freedom.
Labour/division of labour acquire an ethical content as relation of recognition 
realisation, externalisation, alienation and education of “civilised” individuality. This 
ethical content of labour is in conflict with the negative approach o f the liberal 
conceptions of civil society on the basis of abstract right and will. Further, it 
acknowledges the ethical historical and phenomenological view contrasted to 
traditional moral or rational theory of society on the basis of which power is a 
“fiction” rather than power being a productive relation.
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The combination of Smith's and Hegel's argument articulates the relation between a 
moral argument on modem society offered by Smith and an ethical historical view 
offered by Hegel. Both thinkers offer a critical reconstruction o f the natural law, 
natural right and contract theories of society. Both put emphasis on the rise of the 
modem social as split and divided. Both by addressing the question of the division of 
labour in its different configurations made the shift from the cognitive moral theories 
of society to acknowledge the ethical nature of modem social theory.
Hegel’s philosophical argument involves the exposition of the relations of recognition 
and an acknowledgement of the ethical nature of the modem world as the realisation 
of modem freedom/unfreedom. By dealing with the question o f right Hegel puts 
forward the nature of modern freedom as political freedom which is not simply subject 
to the closure of the unresolved conflics of civil society. Therefore, the social and 
politico-economic relations of production and reproduction are to be considered as 
subject o f reconstruction and re-examination, i.e., it is neither taken as immediate and 
given nor as the abstract objective principle.
Finally, I should close by referring to the particular role of the division of labour in a 
process of globalisation. The “sensitive balance” between the political and economic 
cannot be polarised either in the privatisation of the political under the economic 
sphere or the opposite. The first may lead to the despotism of the factory, the 
privatisation of the social and of its economic and political dynamism and the second 
in political repression and totalitarianism.
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Modem “post-contactual” social theory, similar to social contract theories, are critical 
theories of society and gave rise to modern social science as negative and critical 
science. However, the division of labour, by becoming the subject of modem social 
theory, reflects this historical reconstruction of modem social and political science as 
critical science.
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